


AIRPROX REPORT No 2020062

Date: 07 Jul 2020 Time: 1240Z Position: 5214N 00144W Location: Snitterfield airfield

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	ASK21	DH104 Dove
Operator	Civ Gld	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Listening Out	NK ¹
Provider	SoAGC ²	NK
Altitude/FL	~1320ft	1400ft
Transponder	Not fitted	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	White	White, blue
Lighting	Not fitted	Nav, beacons
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	5km	10km
Altitude/FL	1000ft	1268ft
Altimeter	NK	QNH (NK hPa)
Heading	Turning right	228°
Speed	50kt	131kt
ACAS/TAS	NK	NK
Alert	NK	NK
Separation		
Reported	200ft V/200m H	200ft V/500m H
Recorded	~80ft V/~330m H	



THE ASK21 PILOT reports that they were thermaling at the west end of the airfield when a twin-engine aircraft appeared from the right hand side and passed close by. It was travelling just under the cloud and appeared too late for the pilot to take avoiding action.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as ‘High’.

THE DE HAVILLAND DOVE PILOT reports conducting a post-maintenance airstest, 800ft below cloud, when they saw a white glider abeam on the left side. No avoiding action was required because the glider was clear on the left and on a parallel course.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as ‘None’.

Factual Background

The weather at Birmingham was recorded as follows:

METAR EGBB 071250Z 25006KT 210V290 3300 RA SCT009 OVC027 13/12 Q1019=
 METAR EGBB 071220Z 27006KT 240V320 5000 RA SCT014 BKN037 13/11 Q1019 RERA=

TAF AMD EGBB 071213Z 0712/0812 25008KT 9999 FEW040
 TEMPO 0712/0718 7000 RA
 PROB40 TEMPO 0715/0718 BKN010
 TEMPO 0718/0812 7000 RA BKN008
 PROB40 0721/0812 3000 BR RADZ BKN004=

¹ The DH104 pilot was wearing the Coventry conspicuity squawk and stated that he was in receipt of a Basic Service from Coventry but Coventry ATSU confirmed that he had changed to an en-route frequency before the notified time of the Airprox.
² Stratford on Avon Gliding Club.

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

The ASK21 and DH104 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.³

Comments

BGA

The concentration of sailplanes generally gets higher the closer you get to a gliding site, especially in the circuit around circuit height, as in this case. The BGA is seriously concerned by the current level of overflights, especially when they are below the charted winch altitude and cross over the winch run while it is active (also in this case).

Summary

An Airprox was reported when an ASK21 and a de Havilland Dove flew into proximity near Snitterfield airfield at 1240Z on Tuesday 7th July 2020. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, the ASK21 pilot not in receipt of a FIS but listening out on the Common Gliding Field Frequency and the DH104 pilot most likely not in receipt of a FIS.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, reports from the air traffic controllers involved and reports from the appropriate operating authorities. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

Due to the exceptional circumstances presented by the coronavirus pandemic, this incident was assessed as part of a 'virtual' UK Airprox Board meeting where members provided a combination of written contributions and dial-in/VTC comments.

Members first discussed the DH104 pilot's choice of operating area and noted that they had flown through the overhead of a promulgated and active gliding site and below the maximum notified winch altitude. Whilst this is not prohibited by regulation, it clearly introduced a risk of endangerment and indicated that the DH104 pilot had perhaps not fully considered where they would carry out the airtest (**CF1**). The Board felt that more thorough pre-flight consideration of the planned route and operating area would have resulted in the DH104 pilot likely remaining clear of the gliding site winching activity. Similarly, cursory study of the UK AIP would give a contact frequency for Snitterfield with which to notify the airfield of planned overflight. A BGA member noted that SoAGC notify Birmingham, Coventry and Wellesbourne Mountford when they are active so presumably the DH104 pilot was notified of such on departure. The Board were informed that the DH104 pilot had been in receipt of a Basic Service but had changed frequency prior to the time of the Airprox. Unfortunately, an error in transcription had resulted in the R/T recording not being preserved so the Board were unable to discuss what was said to the DH104 pilot. In the event, the ASK21 and DH104 pilots were not aware that they were flying into proximity (**CF2**), albeit generic SA was available to the DH104 pilot had he noted his track was taking him towards a gliding site. Members also felt that the DH104 pilot was likely engaged in the airtest which may have detracted from an otherwise more robust lookout (**CF3**). The Board discussed the pilots' actions at CPA and agreed that each had seen the other aircraft at or very shortly before CPA, in effect a non-sighting because neither could have increased separation before CPA (**CF5**). Although the DH104 pilot was unconcerned by the proximity of the ASK21, the Board felt that they had seen it at a very late stage and that it was providential that the aircraft had been separated to such a degree laterally. Some members thought that the DH104 pilot may have seen another glider, further away than

³ SERA.3205 Proximity.

the Airprox glider. Concerning risk, members agreed that the effective non-sighting by both of the pilots and degree of separation at CPA indicated that safety had been much reduced (**CF4**).

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2020062		
CF	Factor	Description	Amplification
	Flight Elements		
	• Tactical Planning and Execution		
1	Human Factors	• Flight Planning and Preparation	
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action		
2	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Pilot had no, late or only generic, Situational Awareness
3	Human Factors	• Distraction - Job Related	Pilot engaged in other tasks
	• See and Avoid		
4	Contextual	• Near Airborne Collision with Aircraft, Balloon, Dirigible or Other Piloted Air Vehicle	Piloted air vehicle
5	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots

Degree of Risk: B.

Recommendation: Nil.

Safety Barrier Assessment⁴

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because the DH104 pilot did not avoid overflight of the gliding site or above the notified maximum winch altitude.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the generic SA of the position of the gliding site was not acted on.

See and Avoid were assessed as **ineffective** because neither pilot saw the other aircraft in time to increase separation at CPA.

⁴ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).

Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2020062		Outside Controlled Airspace						
Barrier		Provision	Application	Effectiveness				
				Barrier Weighting				
				0%	5%	10%	15%	20%
Ground Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	●	●					
	Manning & Equipment	●	●					
	Situational Awareness of the Confliction & Action	●	●					
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	●	●					
Flight Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	●	●					
	Tactical Planning and Execution	●	●					
	Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action	●	●					
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	●	●					
	See & Avoid	●	●					
Key:		<u>Full</u>	<u>Partial</u>	<u>None</u>	<u>Not Present/Not Assessable</u>	<u>Not Used</u>		
Provision	●	●	●	●	○			
Application	●	●	●	●	○			
Effectiveness	■	■	■	■	□			