


AIRPROX REPORT No 2019237

Date: 17 Aug 2019 Time: 1151Z Position: 5051N 00039W Location: 4nm E Goodwood

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	Cabri G2	C152
Operator	Civ Helo	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	
Service	None ¹	
Provider		
Altitude/FL	1700ft	2100ft
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C, S
Reported		Not Reported
Colours	White	
Lighting	Strobes, Nav	
Conditions	VMC	
Visibility	>10km	
Altitude/FL	1500ft	
Altimeter	QNH (1006hPa)	
Heading	263°	
Speed	85kt	
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	
Alert	N/A	
Separation		
Reported	100ft V/30m H	NR
Recorded	400ft V/0.1nm H	



THE CABRI PILOT reports that he was on a listening watch with Shoreham as he transitioned 4nm north of the field on return from a private site. About 9nm from Goodwood, he swapped to Goodwood for awareness of local traffic before asking for a re-join. Given the short amount of time he would be outside the proximity of either Shoreham or Goodwood, he did not, on this occasion, go to the LARS frequency. The cloud was 'broken' around 1800ft with 'scattered' around 1600ft. Around 4nm from Goodwood, he and his passenger almost simultaneously became aware of a C152/C172-style aircraft very close and closing in. It was about 0.25nm away, just above their height and flying south, perpendicular to them. He had minimum time to react and the aircraft had overflowed them before the lowering of the collective had a material impact on height. He discussed with the passenger (not a pilot) how they could have not seen the aircraft until so close, because they believed they were both keeping a lookout. They suspected that the other aircraft either came down through the broken cloud or was hidden from view until the last few seconds by the scattered cloud just above their height.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE C152 PILOT did not respond to requests for a report.

Factual Background

The weather at Shoreham was recorded as follows:

METAR EGKA 171120Z 23015KT 9999 SCT018 19/15 Q1006=

¹ Had switched to Goodwood frequency, but not yet called.

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

The Cabri and C152 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard². If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the Cabri pilot was required to give way to the C152³.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a Cabri and a C152 flew into proximity in the vicinity of Goodwood at 1151hrs on Saturday 17th August 2019. The Cabri pilot was operating under VFR in VMC, without an ATS. The C152 pilot did not submit a report.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of a report from the Cabri pilot of both aircraft, and radar photographs/video recordings. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first looked at the actions of the Cabri pilot. He was returning to Goodwood and had not yet called them although, even if he had, unless the C152 pilot was on frequency they would have been unlikely to have been able to pass any Traffic Information anyway. Members briefly discussed whether he could have received a radar service in the area, and noted that Farnborough was the LARS provider, but agreed that at the time of the Airprox he was in a position at which Goodwood were the best service provider. Without a CWS, the Cabri pilot had no way of receiving prior situational awareness on the C152 (**CF1**). The Cabri pilot reported that nearby cloud may have masked the C152 from his view, meaning that he didn't see the other aircraft until it was only 0.25nm away (**CF2, CF3**). Fortuitously, there was 400ft height separation because when the Cabri saw the C152 it was too late for them to take any meaningful avoiding action.

The Board were disappointed that the C152 pilot had not responded to requests for a report because without his perspective it was not known whether he was visual with the Cabri and content with the separation, or had not seen it at all. Members thought that given the weather in the area at the time, it was likely that he was flying close to the cloud-base and they cautioned against this because of the chance of obscuration from other aircraft.

Finally, the Board assessed the risk and, given that there had been 400ft recorded vertical separation between the two aircraft, some members initially wondered whether this represented normal safety standards in Class G airspace and therefore Category E. However, others thought that because the Cabri pilot had not seen the C152 until later than desirable and could not have taken avoiding action if it had been needed, although there had been no risk of collision, safety had been degraded. The Chair took a vote and the latter view prevailed. Accordingly, the Airprox was assessed as risk Category C.

² SERA.3205 Proximity. MAA RA 2307 paragraphs 1 and 2.

³ SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging. MAA RA 2307 paragraph 12.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

2019237			
CF	Factor	Description	Amplification
Flight Elements			
• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
1	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Generic, late, no or incorrect Situational Awareness
• See and Avoid			
2	Contextual	• Poor Visibility Encounter	One or both aircraft were obscured from the other
3	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Late-sighting by one or both pilots


Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment⁴

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the Cabri pilot had no prior knowledge of the C152.



⁴ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).