


## AIRPROX REPORT No 2019254

Date: 21 Aug 2019 Time: 1215Z Position: 5203N 00032E Location: 1NM W Ridgewell G/S

### PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	PA25/PW-6	Light aircraft
Operator	Civ FW	Unknown
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	
Service	None	
Provider	N/A	
Altitude/FL	NK	
Transponder	Not fitted	
<b>Reported</b>		Not reported
Colours	White	
Lighting	HISL	
Conditions	VMC	
Visibility	NK	
Altitude/FL	1200ft	
Altimeter	NK	
Heading	270°	
Speed	70kt	
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	
Alert	None	
<b>Separation</b>		
Reported	100ft V/30m H	NK
Recorded	NK	



**THE PA25 PILOT** reports that he was towing a PW-6 glider when he saw a high-wing single-engine light-aircraft in the right 2 o'clock at close range and slightly above. It passed from right to left immediately in front. There was insufficient time to take avoiding action.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

**THE LIGHT AIRCRAFT:** The Airprox occurred in an area of intense gliding activity, in which a number of primary returns were observed. No secondary returns were observed and it was not possible to discern the tracks of the PA25/PW-6 or the unknown light aircraft.

### **Factual Background**

The weather at Stansted was recorded as follows:

METAR EGSS 211220Z AUTO 22010KT 190V260 9999 FEW047 22/10 Q1026=

### **Analysis and Investigation**

#### **UKAB Secretariat**

The PA25/PW-6 and unknown light-aircraft pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard<sup>1</sup>. If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the unknown aircraft pilot was required to give way to the PA25/PW-6<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> SERA.3205 Proximity.

<sup>2</sup> SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

## Summary

An Airprox was reported when a PA25/PW-6 and an unknown light-aircraft flew into proximity near Ridgewell gliding site at about 1215Z on Wednesday 21<sup>st</sup> August 2019. The PA25/PW-6 pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, not in receipt of a FIS.

### **PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS**

Information available consisted of a report from the PA25 pilot and radar photographs/video recordings. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

Without radar recordings or a report from the unknown light-aircraft pilot, members were faced with a dearth of information with which to achieve an assessment of contributory factors and risk. Because of this, some suggested that the risk should be categorised as not determined; risk Category D. However, after further discussion, it was agreed that there was sufficient information from the PA25 pilot's report that the Board could at least surmise that neither pilot had been aware of the other converging aircraft (**CF1**). Similarly, reported separation at CPA had been such that the PA25 pilot's visual acquisition of the other aircraft had effectively been a non-sighting (insufficient time to take avoiding action) and that the other pilot had most probably either not seen the tug/glider combination or had done so too late to increase separation at CPA (**CF2**). Although it could not be established whether the unknown light-aircraft was fitted with any form of CWS, the Board commented on the value of electronic conspicuity and noted that the PA25 was not transponder equipped. Given the relatively restricted manoeuvrability of tug/glider combinations, increasing their electronic conspicuity was a useful further mitigation to MAC for both ATC and other pilots.

Bearing in mind the paucity of information, and despite the fact that a detailed analysis of the key contributory factors could not reliably be made, the Board nevertheless agreed that safety had not been assured and was well below the norm; risk Category B.

### **PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK**

#### Contributory Factors:

2019254			
CF	Factor	Description	Amplification
<b>Flight Elements</b>			
<b>• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action</b>			
1	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Generic, late, no or incorrect Situational Awareness
<b>• See and Avoid</b>			
2	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots

Degree of Risk: B.

Recommendation: Nil.

#### Safety Barrier Assessment<sup>3</sup>

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

<sup>3</sup> The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).

**Flight Elements:**

**Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action** were assessed as **ineffective** because neither of the PA25 or PW-6 pilots were aware of the proximity of the approaching light-aircraft and, from the reported separation at CPA, it is surmised that the light-aircraft pilot was similarly unaware.

**See and Avoid** were assessed as **ineffective** because the reported separation at CPA is such that it was surmised none of the pilots saw the other aircraft in time to take avoiding action.

