


AIRPROX REPORT No 2018096

Date: 21 May 2018 Time: 1534Z Position: 5052N 00256W Location: South Chard

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	LS7 Glider	PA28
Operator	Civ Gld	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	None	Basic
Provider		Exeter
Altitude/FL	3973ft (taken from IGC file)	3900ft
Transponder	Not fitted	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	White with High Vis marking	White, Blue.
Lighting	Nil	NK
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	5km	8km
Altitude/FL	2700ft	2500ft
Altimeter	NK	NK
Heading	Thermalling	270°
Speed	50kt	115kt
ACAS/TAS	FLARM	Not fitted
Alert	None	N/A
Separation		
Reported	0ft V/50m H	0ft V/200m H
Recorded	NK	



THE LS7 PILOT reports that he was on a cross-country gliding flight, east of Chard, thermalling. There were showers near Crewkerne so he decided to turn back. A fellow glider pilot radioed to tell him that there was a plane beneath him, and a few seconds later he saw a blue plane banking sharply to its left, under his left wing. This banking avoided a collision; however, the whole encounter was very close.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE PA28 PILOT reports that the PA28 was being flown by a student on a CPL skill test. They had just completed a nav-ex and had established with Exeter for a Basic Service. The aircraft was on a westerly heading; the visibility had deteriorated in a light rain-shower but was still VMC, and as they progressed west the visibility improved, although it was still hazy. The student was unsure of his position and flew between Chard and Crewkerne in an attempt to make a visual position fix. The examiner first noticed what appeared to be a glider in his 2 o'clock at a range of approx. 300m, but couldn't make out a heading due to the very small surface area presented by the side elevation of the glider, together with the haze and flying into the sun. A decision of heading deviation could not be made until the relative bearing and direction of the glider was established. The glider made a right turn away from the PA28, thus showing an increased profile area and the examiner took control of the aircraft and initiated a turn to the left; the assessment and avoiding action took approx. 1 sec. No ATC communication about possible gliding activity was received.

THE EXETER CONTROLLER filed a report, but it was based upon an original time reported which the UKAB investigation subsequently showed was some 50 mins earlier. Running up to the Airprox time, the PA28 had left the Exeter frequency and then returned; whilst it is likely Exeter was once again providing a Basic Service, this could not be verified.

Factual Background

The weather at Exeter was recorded as follows:

EGTE 211450Z VRB03KT 9999 FEW040 22/09 Q1015=

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

The LS7 and PA28 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard¹. If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the PA28 pilot was required to give way to the glider².

Comments

BGA

Gliders and other aircraft may be encountered anywhere in Class G airspace. It might be wise not to rely on 'warnings' from ATC regarding normal gliding activity, particularly when in receipt of a Basic Service.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when an LS7 glider and a PA28 flew into proximity near South Chard at 1450hrs on Monday 21st May 2018. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, the PA28 pilot in receipt of a Basic Service from Exeter, the glider pilot was not in receipt of an ATS.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from the pilots of both aircraft and radar photographs/video recordings.

The Board first looked at the actions of the LS7 pilot. They commended his fellow glider pilot who had alerted him to the proximity of the PA28 by calling on the radio and concluded that this action had enabled him to see the PA28 and assess that the other pilot had already taken sufficient avoiding action. Noting that the glider was fitted with FLARM rather than P-FLARM, members noted that although the PA28 was squawking, the LS7 pilot's equipment would not have alerted him to its proximity due to FLARM's inability to receive SSR transmissions.

Turning to the PA28 pilot, members noted that this was a student and an examiner undertaking a skills test for LST. Knowing that such a skills test involved the student having to find their position from visual references, some members wondered whether they had both been task-focused on navigation to the detriment of look-out. They also noted that the aircraft was not fitted with any form of electronic conspicuity and, because the glider was not easily picked up by radar even if they had been in receipt of an appropriate surveillance service, there was nothing available other than lookout to provide them with situational awareness about its proximity. That said, the Board noted that the examiner had seen the glider, albeit late, and in taking avoiding action had undoubtedly been instrumental in improving matters.

Although Exeter had provided a controller's report, the original reported time for the Airprox was some 50 mins before the Airprox actually occurred and, by the time the true time of the incident was discovered, it was too late to determine whether Exeter had given Traffic Information or not. That said, under a Basic Service they were not required to do so, and it was unlikely that they would have been

¹ SERA.3205 Proximity.

² SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

able to see a glider on their radar anyway. Therefore, the Board thought that there was very little the controller could have done to help the situation.

The Board then discussed the cause of the Airprox and quickly agreed that this had been a late sighting by the PA28 pilot and, because he hadn't seen the PA28 in time to take any action, effectively a non-sighting by the glider pilot. In assessing the risk, it was thought that the PA28 pilot's avoiding action, although later than ideal, had likely averted a collision and so they assessed the risk as Category B, safety had been much reduced below the norm.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: A late sighting by the PA28 pilot and effectively a non-sighting by the LS7 pilot.

Degree of Risk: B.

Safety Barrier Assessment³


In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Crew:

Situational Awareness and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because neither pilot had any situational awareness about the other aircraft.

Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the glider's FLARM could not identify the PA28, and the PA28 did not have any form of CWS.

See and Avoid were assessed as **partially effective** because the PA28 pilot managed to take last-minute avoiding action.



³ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).