


AIRPROX REPORT No 2018140

Date: 17 Jun 2018 Time: 1508Z Position: 5052N 00313W Location: Dunkeswell – elev 839ft

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	PA28	Bell 206
Operator	Civ FW	Civ Helo
Airspace	Dunkeswell ATZ	Dunkeswell ATZ
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	AGCS	AGCS
Provider	Dunkeswell Radio	Dunkeswell Radio
Altitude/FL	1200ft	1200ft
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C
Reported		
Colours	Blue, white	Grey, green
Lighting	Landing	HISL, strobe, anti-col
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	7km	NK
Altitude/FL	1300ft	800ft
Altimeter	QFE (997hPa)	QFE (NK hPa)
Heading	220°	140°
Speed	67kt	80kt
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	TAS
Alert	N/A	Unknown
Separation		
Reported	400ft V/400ft H	Not seen
Recorded	0ft V/0.1nm H	



THE PA28 PILOT reports that he contacted Dunkeswell radio for airfield information and was given the in-use runway (RW22) and the QFE, which he read-back along with his intention to conduct a straight-in approach. On entering the ATZ, with a 500ft cloudbase, the front-seat passenger saw a helicopter at the 2 o'clock position which crossed ahead and took up a position about 500yd on the left and slightly ahead. The PA28 pilot took avoiding action by carrying out a right-hand orbit. The pilot stated that he, his 93yr old veteran passenger and his son 'were nearly killed'.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'Very High'.

THE B206 PILOT reports that he had been flying circuits for the majority of the day, that visibility 'wasn't great' and that he was about 100ft below the cloudbase. The other aircraft joined the circuit straight-in and called final as they came through the clouds. The airfield chart clearly states no straight-in joins and to give way to circuit traffic. The PA28 pilot landed, parked his aircraft, came over to the helicopter operation and started being aggressive and abusive towards the crew and telling customers waiting to fly that they were a dangerous operation and that they should not fly with them. The B206 pilot stated that the A/G Operator heard no radio calls from the PA28 pilot. The PA28 pilot also stated that the B206 pilot was not making radio calls but the A/G Operator had heard the B206 pilot's calls and would testify to that. The B206 pilot noted that he did not see any problem with what had happened, that it was perhaps 'one of those things' and that no one was ever in danger.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'Low'.

THE DUNKESWELL A/G OPERATOR did not submit a report.

Factual Background

The weather at Exeter was recorded as follows:

METAR EGTE 171520Z 18010KT 9999 FEW015 BKN023 18/15 Q1015=

METAR EGTE 171450Z 20012KT 170V230 9999 FEW015 BKN023 18/15 Q1015=

TAF EGTE 171402Z 1715/1724 21007KT 9999 SCT020 TEMPO 1715/1724 8000 -RA SCT009 BKN012=

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

The PA28 and B206 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard¹. An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation².

The UK AIP entry for Dunkeswell³ states:

Circuits

- (a) Circuit directions: Runway 04 - RH; Runway 22 - LH. Circuit height: 800 ft.
- (b) No overhead joins as parachuting is in operation seven days a week between daylight hours.
- (c) Subject to parachuting, pilots may request an overhead join only when two way communication is established with the A/G radio station, otherwise the pilot is to join on the downwind or base leg for the runway in use.
- (d) No straight in approaches, pilots may request subject to circuit traffic.
- (e) No orbits in the circuit or on final approach, ie extend downwind or go around.
- (f)
 - (i) Helicopters approach from the north not above 500 ft.
 - (ii) Helicopters depart to the north not above 500 ft.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a PA28 and a B206 flew into proximity in the Dunkeswell visual circuit at 1508hrs on Sunday 17th June 2018. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, both in receipt of an Air Ground Communication Service from Dunkeswell Radio.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots and radar photographs/video recordings.

Members first discussed the relative situations of the two aircraft and noted that both pilots appeared to be operating in marginal VFR conditions. The B206 pilot was conducting pleasure flights in the immediate vicinity of Dunkeswell and so would have needed to be particularly sensitive to other traffic joining and intending to land. In this respect, members noted that the helicopter ground track did not conform to that expected of a left-hand circuit to RW22, although it might conceivably be construed as 'joining from the north not above 500ft' as detailed in the Dunkeswell AIP entry. Notwithstanding, the Board opined that the B206 pilot would have been better placed in remaining clear of the circuit pattern (and especially the finals track) until established on left-base for RW22, especially given the prevailing marginal weather conditions.

¹ SERA.3205 Proximity.

² SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.

³ AD 2.EGTU-5 EGTU AD 2.22 FLIGHT PROCEDURES, dated 22 Jun 2017.

For his part, the Board noted that the PA28 pilot had conducted a straight-in approach, which the B206 pilot asserted was not permitted at Dunkeswell. This prompted an examination of the Dunkeswell AIP entry, which the Board found to be lacking in several respects. The entry at AD 2.22 paragraph (b) categorically states that overhead joins are not permitted in any circumstances due to parachuting; but paragraph (c) then states that an overhead join may be 'requested' subject to parachuting. Similarly, paragraph (d) states that straight-in approaches are not permitted, but then qualifies this by stating that a straight-in approach may be 'requested' subject to circuit traffic. The Board noted that Dunkeswell operates an AGCS and that A/G operators are not afforded the privilege of granting pilot requests for any particular type of join; in the circumstances described above it would be for the pilot to inform the A/G operator of his intentions after requesting information as to the current state of parachuting or circuit traffic. Members agreed that the Dunkeswell AIP entry could result in confusion, and that that had been the case in this Airprox. After further discussion, the Board resolved to recommend that, 'Dunkeswell review their AIP entry regarding pilots notifying a straight-in join' and hoped that this would prompt a more in depth examination of the contents of the AIP entry.

Turning to the cause and risk, the Board noted that the B206 pilot had not reported at what stage he became visual with the PA28 other than to state that he heard the PA28 pilot call final 'as they came through the clouds', which some members thought implied that he may have been visual with the PA28 at that point. On the other hand, other members noted that the B206 was not in the promulgated left-hand circuit for RW22, and that because he had crossed in front of the PA28 in close proximity from a 'right-base' position as he turned final himself, he had probably not seen the PA28. The PA28 front-seat passenger had said he saw the helicopter in the right 2 o'clock position, which would correspond to approximately 35sec before CPA. The two aircraft had then closed to 0.1nm lateral separation at the same level before the PA28 pilot orbited right to increase separation. Unable to definitively determine who called finals when, or who saw whom or when, the Board felt that the cause was probably best described as a conflict in the visual circuit resolved by the PA28 pilot. Turning to the risk, the Board agreed that the circumstances, actions and separation pertaining at the time indicated that safety had been much reduced below the norm. The Board expressed their regret that the Dunkeswell A/G Operator had not responded to the request for a narrative report, which could have done much to inform the Board in these respects.

Finally, members noted that the subsequent conversation between the PA28 pilot and the helicopter owner had not helped to resolve or even understand the circumstances of the incident. The Board reiterated that rules, regulations and procedures could sometimes be unwieldy and may not resolve every circumstance in a black-and-white manner. It was courtesy and consideration that helped aviators share the same airspace no matter what their circumstances, and the Board urged all pilots to operate with due caution and anticipation for others for whom they may not be aware, and who may equally not be aware of their own presence and intentions.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

<u>Cause:</u>	A conflict in the visual circuit resolved by the PA28 pilot.
<u>Degree of Risk:</u>	B.
<u>Recommendations:</u>	Dunkeswell review their AIP entry regarding pilots notifying a straight-in join.

Safety Barrier Assessment⁴

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

ANSP:

Situational Awareness and Action were assessed as **not used** because the AGCS Operator apparently did not provide information on traffic (and was not required to do so).

Flight Crew:


Regulations, Processes, Procedures, Instructions and Compliance were assessed as **partially effective** because the PA28 pilot conducted a straight-in approach and the B206 pilot was manoeuvring across the final approach path from a right-base location; both of which were ambiguous within the AIP.

Tactical Planning was assessed as **partially effective** because neither pilot fully followed notified or established procedures.

Situational Awareness and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because neither pilot was aware of the proximity of the other until visually sighted.

Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the B206 TAS did not alert on the approaching PA28.

See and Avoid were assessed as **partially effective** because the PA28 pilot only saw the B206 at a late stage, and the Board could not determine when the B206 pilot saw the PA28 other than to say that it did not appear to be at a timely point.



⁴ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).