


AIRPROX REPORT No 2018145

Date: 27 Jun 2018 Time: 0919Z Position: 5331N 00030W Location: ivo Hibaldstow parachuting site

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	C208	KC135
Operator	Civ FW	Foreign Mil
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	IFR
Service	Traffic	Traffic
Provider	Humberside	Swanwick Mil
Altitude/FL	FL101	FL94
Transponder	A,C,S	A,C,S
Reported		
Colours	White	White
Lighting	Beacon, strobes	Beacon, strobes
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	50km	50km
Altitude/FL	FL100	FL110
Heading	060°	010°
Speed	90kt	400kt
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	TCAS II
Alert	N/A	RA
Separation		
Reported	~300ft V/~300m H	~500ft V/ 0.5nm H
Recorded	700ft V/0.4nm H	



THE CESSNA 208 (C208) SUPERVAN PILOT reports operating from the Hibaldstow parachuting site. At approximately 2000ft during the climb to his operating level he requested a Traffic Service from Humberside Radar and was informed of military traffic at FL100, 15nm to the southeast which would transit east of the 'Drop Zone (DZ)'. Once on the jump-run within the 1.5nm radius of the DZ at FL100 straight and level, heading 060° at an indicated 75kt, 5 parachutists left the aircraft 0.2nm before the DZ centre-point. He then applied power, cleaned the aircraft up, started climbing and gently turned for the reciprocal to drop the remaining parachutists at FL150. At this point, about 5-10 secs into initiating climb, he spotted the KC135 to his right, slightly behind him and below tracking west through the middle of the DZ. He made a comment to the controller and they requested him to call them after the flight. During the jump-run (especially the first because it's the most critical because of the concentration on winds and flying an accurate drop) he was communicating with the DZ on their local frequency and monitoring Humberside. He did hear some communications from Humberside but he was talking to the DZ at the time so never understood the message or in fact if the messages were intended for him.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE KC135 PILOT reports that traffic was called by Swanwick Mil. They were able to see the traffic on TCAS, but not visually. When the traffic appeared to be 1nm away on TCAS, Swanwick directed an avoiding action of a right-hand turn. As they initiated the right-hand turn, they determined that it would put them closer to the other aircraft and rolled to the left to increase separation. As they rolled left, they received a TCAS RA, directing them to descend. They followed the RA and avoided the other aircraft. Once clear of the conflict they reported the RA to Swanwick. At no point were they notified of the active DZ or the presence of parachutists.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE HUMBERSIDE RADAR CONTROLLER reports that he was acting as an On the Job Training Instructor (OJTI) when he spotted a northbound track squawking 4661 approaching Hibaldstow from the south at FL100 (Mode S indicated a KC135). Hibaldstow was active with the C208 having just reported 2 mins to the drop at FL100. Traffic Information was passed to the C208 pilot on 4 occasions as the KC135 approached from 17nm south until the DZ. Attempts were also made to contact Swanwick Mil via landline to advise of the developing situation but the call went unanswered until the KC135 vacated the DZ. Primary contacts believed to be the parachutists appeared behind the secondary contact of the C208 at FL100. The KC135 appeared to take avoiding action to the west, descending.

THE SWANWICK MIL TAC RIGHT CONTROLLER reports that she was working aircraft in both East and NE. At 0910 she had just had a small spike in traffic levels and telephone calls due to aircraft exiting the D323 complex, with one returning to base. Also an aircraft leaving her frequency after the TILNI Radar Corridor (RC). She had also received three pre-notes from Lakenheath, two for the Lichfield RC and another for the Westcott RC. During this time, she was allocated a track from Central (the KC135). She did not initially take this track due to the other priorities and being unsure of its intentions. Once she was in a position to accept the traffic, now being down to two aircraft, she was informed by the North Supervisor, due to East Supervisor being on the telephone, the KC135 had been pre-noted incorrectly to Central and wanted to transit north. She conducted an electronic silent handover of the KC135. During this time she also handed over an aircraft to Lakenheath and was immediately handed the aircraft for the Westcott RC. The KC135 was approaching Y70 at F100 and so was below the airway, she checked with the pilot that he would remain east of R313 but also noticed a contact in the northern portion of Y70 indicating FL45 climbing, tracking east. She then acknowledged the pilot routing to Westcott and asked him to maintain heading 360° to gain height. The contact in the northern portion of Y70 tracking east was continually climbing now indicating FL98. She called the traffic to the KC135 pilot at approximately 8nm. The KC135 pilot acknowledged the call but did not have radar contact on the traffic. She then received several telephone calls in quick succession due to the Planner buzzer having been turned on by the North Supervisor (after realising it had been off causing other units to believe they had communication problems). 4 telephone lines were ringing but she was extremely aware of the converging nature of the two aircraft. At approximately 4nm she called the conflicting traffic again to the KC135 pilot. 3 telephone lines were now ringing. She intended to ignore them due to the aircrafts' proximity but saw that one was from the Prestwick East controller. She thought that the conflicting aircraft could be a track they had been working so she answered it. They stated the KC135 had encroached Hibaldstow para-dropping site. It was only at this point that she realised the nature of the conflicting aircraft. She did not have Hibaldstow para-dropping site selected on her screen. When arriving on console she had checked the Danger Areas but not the para-dropping sites which had become active prior to her arrival. On receipt of this message she immediately gave avoiding action to the KC135 pilot, heading 040°. The pilot acknowledged stating he was taking the avoiding action but also that he was taking his own vertical avoiding action. He then began to descend showing FL94. Within approximately 30 secs, having passed only slightly behind the conflicting aircraft, he stated that he was now climbing back to FL100 and requested a heading. She stated to route direct to ALASO. She now answered one of the lines which was Humberside who also stated that the KC135 had encroached upon the para-dropping site. She stated that she had given avoiding action and informed them of the type of aircraft involved.

She perceived the severity of the incident as 'Medium'.

THE SWANWICK MIL EAST BANK SUPERVISOR reports that leading up to the incident the workload was at a medium intensity for the Tac, and no Planner was required. Whilst he was taking telephone calls regarding airspace bookings, the Tac telephone lines were also ringing, with the controller answering them as they came through. After coming off the landlines, the Tac informed him that the KC135, originally at FL100, had descended after taking a TCAS RA against a para-dropping aircraft also at FL100, squawking 0033. Hibaldstow para-dropping site was notified as being active on SiS, however the para-dropping site was not displayed on the radar map. Having spoken to the Humberside Supervisor, they informed that they had been calling Swanwick; however, there had been no answer. This was due to the Tac being on the telephone to other outside agencies.

THE PRESTWICK EAST SECTOR PLANNER reports that at approx 0918 he noticed the unknown KC135, which was outside controlled airspace and maintaining FL100, approximately 10nm south-south-east of Hibaldstow parachute area and tracking directly at the Hibaldstow para-dropping aircraft squawking 0033 (a C208 from Mode S aircraft ID). The para-dropping aircraft was either maintaining FL100 or very slowly climbing through it. He tried to call Humberside Radar on the landline to point the KC135 out to them, and the East Tac called Swanwick to point out the Hibaldstow para-dropping aircraft. When East Tac got through to Swanwick he warned them of the parachute aircraft and they immediately gave avoiding action to the KC135 pilot whilst East tactical was still on the telephone with them. The two aircraft then merged on radar and the KC135 was observed descending to FL96.

Factual Background

The weather at Humberside was recorded as follows:

METAR EGNJ 270850Z 06007KT 020V120 9999 FEW015 16/11 Q1029=

The Hibaldstow parachuting site is highlighted on the CAA VFR chart by a circle, with a radius of 1.5nm. Operations are conducted to an upper limit of FL120, although drops may be made from FL150 with Scottish Control permission. Pilots of parachuting aircraft operate in communication with Humberside Approach. The parachuting site 'DZ' is not a zone in the sense of controlled or regulated airspace and offers no protection from other aircraft wishing to transit in the area.

Analysis and Investigation

CAA ATSI

At 0909:29 (Figure 1) the C208 pilot, a parachute aircraft, established communication with the Humberside Radar controller requesting a Traffic Service and a climb to FL130. The controller identified the aircraft and a Traffic Service was agreed.



Figure 1 – 0909:29.




Figure 2 – 0914:55.

At 0914:55 (Figure 2), the C208 pilot reported that they had 2 mins to drop and stated that they would be dropping from FL100 and FL150, which was acknowledged by the controller.

At 0916:05 (Figure 3), the controller passed Traffic Information to the C208 pilot on the KC135, which was acknowledged by the pilot. At 0916:23 the controller updated the Traffic Information stating that the track of the KC135 would take it just to the east of the 'DZ'.




Figure 3 – 0916:05.

The controller passed further Traffic Information on the KC135 to the C208 pilot at 0917:54 (Figure 4) and 0918:19 (Figure 5), neither of which were acknowledged by the pilot.




Figure 4 – 0917:54.




Figure 5 – 0918:19.




Figure 6 – 0918:39.



Figure 7 – 0918:43.

At 0918:39 (Figure 6) the controller updated the Traffic Information advising that the KC135 was 1nm southeast at a similar level which was acknowledged by the pilot.

At 0918:43 (Figure 7) the radar indicated that the KC135 pilot had commenced a descent.

The closest point horizontally occurred at 0918:50 (Figure 8), when the aircraft were separated by 0.2nm and 1000ft.



Figure 8 – 0918:50.

CAP 774 states:

The controller shall pass traffic information on relevant traffic, and shall update the traffic information if it continues to constitute a definite hazard, or if requested by the pilot.

The Humberside Radar controller passed and updated Traffic Information to the C208 pilot and made every attempt to contact the Swanwick Military controller prior to the Airprox.

The C208 was displaying SSR Code 0033, which is the code assigned to paradropping aircraft. This code is to be selected, together with Mode C, five minutes before the drop commences until the drop is complete and parachutists or loads are known or estimated by the pilot to be on the ground.

The Swanwick Military Controller reported that they issued avoiding action upon realising the nature of the C208's flight. The descent by the KC135 pilot was in order to comply with a TCAS RA.

The Airprox took place in Class G airspace where collision avoidance is ultimately the responsibility of the pilot.

Military ATM

The KC135 pilot was receiving a Traffic Service from Swanwick (Mil) East tracking north at FL100. In the period leading up to the Airprox the controller noted that their workload had been busy with a spike in traffic and numerous handovers to and from Lakenheath. At the time of the Airprox, the controller was only working two aircraft, but some complexity was added by numerous line checks from Maastricht (Mil) and several telephone lines ringing. The East Bank Supervisor was occupied on a task resolving some issues with MDA bookings prior to the occurrence. At the time of the occurrence the Supervisor was on the land line to Maastricht attempting to identify and resolve a landline issue. Due to human error, the Hibaldstow parachuting site was not marked on the Swanwick (Mil) controllers radar screen.

Figures 9-12 show the positions of the C208 and KC135 at relevant times in the lead up to and during the Airprox. The screen shots are taken from a replay using the Claxby radar, which is utilised by Swanwick (Mil) and representative of the picture available to the controller. It should be noted that there was a discrepancy between the timings on the radar replay and those provided on the tape transcript (the tape transcript times were slow by approx. 1min 10sec).

Figure 9 depicts the time that Traffic Information was first passed to the KC135 pilot by Swanwick(Mil). The Swanwick(Mil) investigation noted that the Swanwick(Mil) East controller had adopted an incorrect mental model and believed that the parachuting squawk (0033) belonged to Doncaster Airport [Doncaster Approach squawks 6171-6177] and they therefore did not appreciate the significance of it. The report from Humberside Radar states that Traffic Information was passed to the C208 pilot a total of four times starting at a range of 17nm. Updated Traffic Information was passed to the KC135 pilot approximately one minute later following a line check conducted by Maastricht(Mil).




Figure 9. KC135 4661; C208 0033.

Following a prompt from PC East about the growing conflict, which also identified that Hibaldstow parachuting site was active, the Swanwick(Mil) East controller issued avoiding action onto a heading of 040° and passed more Traffic Information to the KC135 pilot. Separation had decreased to approximately 1.2nm and the KC135 pilot received a TCAS RA to descend (Figure 10).




Figure 10.




Figure 11.

CPA occurred some 8 secs after this final Traffic Information whilst the KC135 pilot was responding to the TCAS RA (Figure 11). Due to radar replay 'jump' the closest measurable separation was 0.4nm horizontally and 700ft vertically. Allowing the radar replay to continue indicates that the radar returns likely merged with approximately 1000ft indicated separation.

Swanwick(Mil) conducted a thorough investigation that highlighted several issues which have subsequently been addressed. The most significant of these was the fact that the controller in question did not routinely check the parachuting information page as part of their console setup. Thus, the opportunity to highlight active parachuting sites on the radar screen was lost. This, coupled with the incorrect mental model with respect to the 0033 squawk, meant that the controller did not appreciate the potential severity of the impending conflict. That said, Traffic Information was passed by the controller on two occasions (7nm & 4nm) before an avoiding action turn was given as well as further Traffic Information. These final acts were coincident with the KC135 pilot receiving a TCAS RA alert to descend.

UKAB Secretariat

The C208 and KC135 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard¹. If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the C208 pilot was required to give way to the KC135².

There is a Letter of Agreement (LoA) between the Prestwick Centre and the parachute operating company at Hibaldstow. Under the heading 'Military Coordination' it states that 'Swanwick (Mil), on notification of the activation, will avoid the paradrop aircraft by 5nm laterally or be not below FL170'.

CAP774³ states:

Deconfliction is not provided under a Traffic Service. If a pilot requires deconfliction advice outside controlled airspace, Deconfliction Service shall be requested. The controller shall make all reasonable endeavours to accommodate this request as soon as practicable.

When providing headings/levels for the purpose of positioning and/or sequencing or as navigational assistance, the controller should take into account traffic in the immediate vicinity based on the aircraft's relative speeds and closure rates, so that a risk of collision is not knowingly introduced by the instructions

¹ SERA.3205 Proximity.

² SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

³ Chapter 3.6.

passed. However, the controller is not required to achieve defined deconfliction minima and pilots remain responsible for collision avoidance even when being provided with headings/levels by ATC.

The UK AIP⁴ states under the heading 'Free-fall Parachuting Drop Zones':

Visual sighting of free-falling bodies is virtually impossible and the presence of an aircraft within the Drop Zone may be similarly difficult to detect from the parachutists' point of view. Parachute dropping aircraft and, on occasions, parachutists may be encountered outside the notified portion of airspace. Pilots are strongly advised to give a wide berth to all such Drop Zones where parachuting may be taking place.

Comments

USAFE Comment

In the absence of NOTAM action or information from Swanwick Mil, the KC135 crew was unaware of any DZ activity at Hibaldstow.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a C208 and a KC135 flew into proximity near Hibaldstow parachuting site at 0919hrs on Wednesday 27th June 2018. The C208 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC, in receipt of a Traffic Service from Humberside. The KC135 pilot was operating under IFR in VMC, in receipt of a Traffic Service from Swanwick Mil.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from the pilots and controllers concerned, radar and RTF recordings, and reports from the appropriate operating authorities.

The Board noted that both pilots were in receipt of a Traffic Service; the C208 pilot (in accordance with local procedures whilst carrying out a parachute drop from Hibaldstow), was receiving the service from Humberside whilst the KC135 pilot was receiving a service from Swanwick (Mil) East as they routed northwest on a track that would take the aircraft close to Hibaldstow.

Members first discussed the actions of the Swanwick (Mil) East Tac controller. The Mil ATC Area member and the BM Safety Advisor explained what had been occurring during the period leading up to the incident. They commented that the workload had been high, involving protracted handovers and an increase in traffic. Although at the time of the Airprox there were only two aircraft being controlled, the workload had increased due to issues with telephones within the East Bank, the Supervisor had been involved with sorting out a problem with Maastricht, and several telephone lines had been ringing. Because of this, the controller had felt that she was at capacity and, with hindsight, they commented that it would have been useful if she could have been assisted by another controller, who could have dealt with the landline calls.

The Board noted that the controller reported that she had observed an aircraft climbing near Hibaldstow airfield but had not realised that it was operating a parachute sortie, nor that Hibaldstow was active. Normally, if it was notified as being active, the parachute site would have been selected by the controller as a map overlay which would have created a white outlined circle, centred around the site, with a radius of between 2-3nm. On this occasion the controller, for an unknown reason, had not checked for parachute information when taking over the position; consequently the site had not been displayed. Members also noted that the radar recordings show that the C208 was squawking the appropriate SSR code (0033) for a parachute flight and members wondered why she had not assimilated this information. The Mil Area member explained that the radar display system had a range of squawks that would be highlighted to controllers as 'traffic of interest' by enclosing their Mode A & C readout in a blue box. The squawks that have been selected to be highlighted were those starting with 00, 33, 46, 60, 61 & 64. In

⁴ ENR 1.1, Paragraph 5.5.4.3.

addition to the '00' squawks, this includes the Doncaster ATC '61' squawks, and the military members believed that, under pressure, she had probably interpreted the C208's 'blue boxed' 0033 squawk as a 'blue boxed' Doncaster squawk. The Board acknowledged both of these elements as being Human Factors issues when under high workload but agreed that the fact that the Swanwick controller did not know that Hibaldstow was active (and consequently did not select an appropriate overlay), and did not assimilate the C208's 0033 squawk were contributory factors because it was likely that she would have routed the KC135 further away from Hibaldstow if she had been aware that it was active.

Nevertheless, the Board noted that the Swanwick(Mil) East controller did issue the KC135 pilot with Traffic Information about the C208 when it was at a range of about 8nm, and this was updated at a range of about 4nm. As a result, the Board concluded that she had discharged her responsibilities as required under a Traffic Service in that respect. As she focused on the proximity of the two aircraft as they continued to route towards each other, her initial thought was to ignore the multiple phone lines that were ringing but she noted that one was from the Prestwick Civil East controller; believing that he may have been working the other traffic she answered his line. The Prestwick controller advised her that the KC135 was routeing close to the Hibaldstow parachute site and this was the first time she had realised that the other traffic was a para-dropping aircraft. She immediately gave the KC135 pilot an avoiding-action right turn, together with Traffic Information, although the pilot later commented that they determined that a right turn would put them closer to the other aircraft, so they rolled to the left and had then received a TCAS RA to descend. The Board noted that a published parachuting Drop Zone did not give any protection from aircraft entering the area; however, appropriate to this incident, a LoA between Prestwick and Swanwick(Mil) states that '*Swanwick(Mil), on notification of the activation, will avoid the paradrop aircraft by 5nm laterally or be not below FL170*'. Having only assimilated the fact that the C208 was paradropping after the Prestwick controller's call, members noted that the Swanwick(Mil) controller had immediately acted to achieve as much separation as possible by issuing an avoiding action turn. Notwithstanding, some members felt that the conflict was evident before this, that the fact that the C208 was a paradropping aircraft was irrelevant, and that, although collision avoidance ultimately remained the responsibility of the pilots concerned, the Swanwick(Mil) controller should have acted earlier.

The Board then briefly discussed whether the Humberside controller could have done more to resolve the situation. However, the general opinion was that he had passed timely and adequate Traffic Information to the C208 pilot (although the C208 pilot had not registered some of his transmissions or subsequently asked for clarification of them). Additionally, the Humberside controller had tried to contact Swanwick(Mil) by telephone but had been unsuccessful, as also initially had the Prestwick controller. The Board considered that the fact that they were not able to establish contact with the Swanwick(Mil) controller in a timely fashion was another contributory factor. Notwithstanding, the Board commended the actions taken by the Humberside and Prestwick controllers in trying to telephone Swanwick (Mil) to warn of the potential confliction, especially the Prestwick controller, who was not actually involved operationally with either aircraft at the time.

Turning to the C208 pilot's actions, the Board noted that Traffic Information had initially been passed to the pilot by Humberside when the aircraft was about 16nm from the KC135. This was updated shortly afterwards stating that the track of the KC135 would take it just to the east of the Drop Zone. The C208 pilot acknowledged both of these calls but no response was received from him after further updated Traffic Information was issued at a range of about 5nm and 3nm. Some members wondered why the pilot had missed these calls, and GA members commented that, at the time, the pilot would understandably be prioritising his actions by talking to the parachute site on a local frequency to manage the drop. It was considered to be a contributory factor that the C208 pilot did not assimilate the later Traffic Information although members noted that he did subsequently acknowledge Traffic Information issued by the controller at a range of about 1.5nm. It was apparent to the Board that the C208 pilot had not taken any action based on the Traffic Information that he had acknowledged, especially given that when in close proximity to the KC135 he had turned towards the aircraft. In this respect, the Board noted that the C208 pilot had continued with his parachute sortie and had not taken any action to give way to the KC135 as required by SERA3210; this was also considered to be a contributory factor. Some members wondered whether the C208 pilot had expected the KC135 to remain clear of the Drop Zone area because he considered it was protected airspace; they highlighted

the AIP entry which stated that although pilots are strongly advised to give a wide berth to all such Drop Zones where parachuting may be taking place, there was no segregation or formal avoidance criteria *per se*.

The Board then debated whether the KC135 pilot should have been aware that his track was taking him towards the Hibaldstow parachuting site. The USAFE advisor confirmed that the site would not have appeared on any charts that the KC135 crew would have used and, because no NOTAM had been issued about its operation, the only way they would have been aware was through information passed by the controller. The Board wondered whether this lack of information was a contributory factor, but the majority of members did not agree that this was appropriate given that most aircraft flying at such altitudes would be unlikely to be aware of Hibaldstow's operation without prompting from ATC.

Turning to the cause and risk of the Airprox, there was considerable debate about whether the incident had occurred because the C208 pilot had not given way to the KC135, or whether it had been because the Swanwick(Mil) controller had not routed the KC135 to avoid the parachute site. The debate was finely balanced, during which it was noted that although both elements were highly relevant, the KC135 pilot had also received Traffic Information that could have been acted upon. In the end, it was agreed that because in Class G airspace it was ultimately for the pilots to ensure collision avoidance, the cause was probably best described as a conflict in Class G airspace resolved by the KC135 pilot who had descended in reaction to a TCAS RA. As to the risk, some members opined that the TCAS RA had been sufficient to prompt the KC135 pilot to manoeuvre and ensure 700ft separation which, although safety had been reduced, meant that there had been no risk of collision. Others countered by saying that although 700ft had been achieved, the high rate of closure and the late activation of the TCAS alert as the C208 pilot turned towards the KC135 meant that safety had been much reduced below the norm. In the end, the latter view prevailed and the Board assessed the risk as Category B.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

<u>Cause:</u>	A conflict in Class G resolved by the KC135 pilot.
<u>Degree of Risk:</u>	B.
<u>Contributory factors:</u>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The C208 pilot did not give way to the KC135. 2. The C208 pilot did not assimilate the later Traffic Information. 3. The Swanwick controller did not know that Hibaldstow was active and consequently did not select an appropriate overlay or assimilate the C208's 0033 squawk. 4. The Prestwick and Humberside controllers were not able to contact the Swanwick controller.

Safety Barrier Assessment⁵

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

ANSP:

⁵ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).

Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the Swanwick(Mil) controller had not briefed themselves about the active parachute sites and did not satisfy the Prestwick LoA requiring Military controllers to avoid para-dropping aircraft by 5nm.

Situational Awareness and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the Swanwick(Mil) controller did not assimilate the C208's 0033 squawk or the fact that the Hibaldstow parachute site was active.

Flight Crew:

Regulations, Processes, Procedures, Instructions and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the C208 pilot did not give way to the KC135.

Situational Awareness and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the C208 pilot turned towards the converging KC135 despite receiving specific Traffic Information about it.

Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **partially available** because only the KC135 was equipped with a TAS/TCAS.

