


AIRPROX REPORT No 2018151

Date: 28 Jun 2018 Time: 1336Z Position: 5110N 00102W Location: 1nm WSW Lasham

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	ASW27	PA31
Operator	Civ Gld	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	None	None
Provider		
Altitude/FL	NK	3200ft
Transponder	Not Fitted	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	White	White, Green
Lighting	Nil	Strobes
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	3000ft	3000ft
Altimeter	QNH	NK
Heading	270°	360°
Speed	50kt	120kt
ACAS/TAS	FLARM	Not fitted
Alert	None	N/A
Separation		
Reported	0ft V/50m H	0ft V/200ft H
Recorded	NK	



THE ASW27 PILOT reports that he was turning left in a thermal with 2 other gliders, one well below and one 500ft higher, just outside Lasham airfield. As part of his normal lookout scan, he checked as far left as he could and from behind him saw a Piper Navajo in very close proximity. It was on a northerly heading and at the same height. There was no time to take avoiding action and, as the aircraft passed, he only had time to read the first 4 letters of the registration, it had gone before he could register the last character. He continued to circle left and next time around, some 30 seconds later, he saw the aircraft, still on a northerly heading but commencing a pronounced climb. He was listening to Lasham’s frequency and had heard the Navajo receiving information for departure a few mins earlier. However, he had not been concerned because this was a regular occurrence and in the past the aircraft had always flown well away from the airfield before climbing, as per the airfield operating regulations. The Airprox was witnessed from the ground by the gliding club CFI and it was confirmed that the aircraft in question was indeed the one that had just taken off, and that an Airprox would be filed.

He assessed the risk of collision as ‘High’.

THE PA31 PILOT reports that he has operated out of Lasham for 11 years and cooperation with the Lasham Gliding Club has been good. On the day in question he departed as he always did, took off from RW09, made a circuit to the south to avoid Odiham, climbed downwind and, once west of the airfield, continued the climb to 4400ft. Whilst heading north and climbing, he encountered two gliders which he hadn’t previously seen. On seeing the first one to his left at the same level, he increased his rate of climb to increase separation, he then saw another glider above him, so he stopped climbing and passed about 200ft below the glider. Neither glider altered track and he believed both pilots saw him well before he saw them. The ‘launch point controller’ observed the incident and did not issue any warnings over the RT, yet the RT was used by him to notify the gliders that he intended to file an Airprox. Subsequently he was issued with a document by the LGA CFI which explains the procedures and routing that the LGA require powered aircraft to take. He noted that prior to the incident he had

not been aware of the document's existence, or the procedures, and could see that had he followed them, the incident would have been avoided.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'Low'.

Factual Background

The weather at Odiham was recorded as follows:

METAR EGVO 281250Z 06011KT 9999 FEW048 25/12 Q1024 BLU NOSIG=

An excerpt from the Lasham operating procedures suggest that:

These notes are designed as guidance for pilots operating twin engine aircraft into and out of Lasham Airfield.

Once you are airborne it is important that you don't conflict with gliders in the local area, so try to remain well outside the glider circuit and stay below 1000ft until at least 5nm away from Lasham.

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

The ASW27 and PA31 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard¹. If the incident geometry is considered as head-on or nearly so, then both pilots were required to turn to the right². If the incident geometry is considered as converging, then the PA31 pilot was required to give way to the glider³.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when an ASW27 and a PA31 flew into proximity at 1336hrs on Thursday 28th June 2018. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, the ASW27 pilot was thermalling and the PA31 was departing the Lasham circuit.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots and radar photographs/video recordings.

The Board first discussed the actions of the glider pilot. Whilst thermalling with two other gliders, he heard the PA31 taking off from Lasham, but didn't think that its flight would affect him because he assumed that it would remain below 1000ft until clear of the area. Members acknowledged that he might reasonably expect the aircraft to follow the suggested departure procedure but that he should not have assumed it would do so and would have been better served by maintaining, as best he could, situational awareness of PA31 until he knew it had passed well clear, rather than being surprised when it didn't. Some non-gliding members wondered whether the launch point supervisor could have given Traffic Information to warn the glider pilots, but were told that it was beyond the scope of launch point supervisors' role to give such information; they were not Air/Ground Operators and were not trained to provide any kind of service. Although the glider pilot saw the PA31 as it passed, it was too late for him to take any action, and members noted that the PA31 had passed close enough for him to read its registration.

For his part, the PA31 pilot reported that he was unaware of the Lasham powered-aircraft departure procedure guidance and had taken off and climbed as he normally would. He reported that he had seen two gliders thermalling, and, noting that there were in fact 3 gliders reported to be in the thermal,

¹ SERA.3205 Proximity.

² SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(1) Approaching head-on.

³ SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

the Board deliberated at some length about whether he had seen the ASW27 in question, or whether he had seen the lower and higher glider but not the ASW27 in between. In the end, they agreed that his description of the incident seemed to indicate that he probably had seen the ASW27 in question, and he reported climbing to get above it, then levelling to keep clear of the glider above. Members wondered at what point he had seen the gliders, and thought that because he clearly had generic information about gliding activity in the Lasham vicinity, he would have been better served by waiting until he was sure he was well clear of all gliding activity anyway before he climbed.

The Board then discussed for some time the Lasham guidance procedures for powered-aircraft departing the circuit. Some GA members opined that it was not always practical to fly below 1000ft until 5nm clear of Lasham due to terrain and aircraft performance safety concerns. Nevertheless, whatever the procedures were agreed to be, it was clear that this pilot was not aware of them. The Board noted that the procedures were not published on the Lasham website and were informed that this was because it was a strictly PPR airfield where pilots were required to receive a brief before departing. The CAA advisor reported that, as a non-licensed airfield, Lasham did not have an entry in the UK AIP Aerodrome General Index, only in the ENR 5.5 (Aerial Sporting and Recreational Activities), but the procedures could not be found there either. The Board opined that it was somewhat futile to have procedures in place but not to publish them in a place that was easily available for pilots to read. Furthermore, if a local agreement was in place between the PA31's operating company and the Lasham Gliding Society then it was in both parties' interest to ensure that all pilots were aware of it.

[UKAB Secretariat Note: Since the UKAB meeting Lasham have indicated that the procedures were indeed emailed to the PA31 pilot's operating company annually.]

Turning to the cause of the Airprox, although having agreed that the PA31 pilot had probably seen the glider in time to adjust his climb, the Board quickly agreed that this had been at a late stage. For his part, although the ASW27 pilot had been aware of the PA31 departing the airfield, it had effectively been a non-sighting by the ASW27 pilot who only saw the PA31 as it passed close by. Given that both pilots reported a similar close proximity, the Board assessed the risk as Category B, safety had been much reduced below the norm. Noting that the PA31 pilot would likely not have climbed when he did had he been aware of the local powered-aircraft departure procedures, the Board then resolved to make a recommendations that the Lasham Gliding Society ensure that their powered-aircraft procedures are promulgated to all pilots using the airfield, and also that the PA31's operating company ensures that their pilots are made aware of these procedures (and any other local agreements covering the use of Lasham airfield).

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

<u>Cause:</u>	A late sighting by the PA31 pilot and effectively a non-sighting by the ASW27 pilot.
<u>Contributory Factor:</u>	The PA31 pilot was not aware of the recommended departure profile for powered aircraft.
<u>Degree of Risk:</u>	B.
<u>Recommendations:</u>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. That Lasham Gliding Society ensure that their powered aircraft departure procedures are promulgated to all pilots using the airfield. 2. The PA31 operating company ensure that their pilots are aware of the Lasham powered aircraft departure procedures.

Safety Barrier Assessment⁴

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

ANSP:

Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance were assessed as **partially effective** because whilst there was guidance published about how powered-aircraft should depart Lasham, it was not sufficiently promulgated.

Flight Crew:


Regulations, Processes, Procedures, Instructions and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because although the gliding club had procedures for powered aircraft departing from Lasham, the PA31 pilot was not aware of them.

Tactical Planning was assessed as **partially effective** because: the guidance material for procedures when departing the circuit was not easily available to the PA31 pilot; and, notwithstanding, knowing that there would likely be numerous gliders around the airfield, he would have been better advised anyway to avoid climbing in the immediate airfield area.

Situational Awareness and Action were assessed as **partially effective** because although the glider pilot knew about the PA31 getting airborne from Lasham, he did specifically monitor it to make sure it was not a confliction.

Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the FLARM in the glider could not detect the PA31, and the PA31 was not fitted with a CWS.

See and Avoid were assessed as **partially effective** because although it was a late sighting by the PA31 pilot, he was able to adjust his climb to increase separation.



⁴ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).