

AIRPROX REPORT No 2018221

Date: 13 Aug 2018 Time: 1428Z Position: 5006N 00540W Location: Lands End ATZ

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	DHC 6	PA28
Operator	CAT	Civ FW
Airspace	Lands End ATZ	Lands End ATZ
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	ACS	ACS
Provider	Land's End	Land's End
Altitude/FL		
Transponder	A, C, S	NK
Reported		
Colours	White, Blue, Red	
Lighting	Nav, Beacon, Strobes	
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	20km	
Altitude/FL	1000ft	
Altimeter	QNH (1013hPa)	NK
Heading	050°	NK
Speed	100kt	NK
ACAS/TAS	TAS	Unknown
Alert	TA	Unknown
Separation		
Reported	0ft V/1nm H	NK
Recorded	NK	



THE DHC6 PILOT reports that on first contact with ATC he was given airfield conditions, joining instructions for landing and details of another aircraft joining from the east. He was told he was No1 for landing and continued to join left-base RW34, maintaining a good look-out for the other aircraft joining right-base. On coasting-in, they heard the other pilot report that he was not yet visual with the airfield, or with them. Although they were also not visual with the other aircraft, it's pilot had reported it was in the Penzance vicinity, so they expected it to be a few minutes behind their arrival time. They then saw the other aircraft as the pilot reported 'field in sight' and ATC instructed him to commence a left turn to keep clear. The other pilot reported visual with them as he turned away to the south, there was no need for the DHC6 pilot to take avoiding action because the other pilot was turning away from them and their intended flight path. The other pilot appeared to have taken a much tighter base leg and joined sooner than he had expected.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE PA28 PILOT chose not to file a report.

THE LANDS END CONTROLLER reports that the PA28 pilot called for join, was given the airfield information, and was asked to report field in sight. The DHC6 pilot called and was also given the airfield details and joining instructions for left-base. Traffic Information was passed to both pilots and the DHC6 pilot was told he was No1 and the PA28 pilot No2. At this stage neither were visual with the other. The PA28 reported 6mins until arrival and was instructed to join right-base RW34; he was reminded that he was No2, and was told that the quicker DHC6 was joining left-base. The controller was visual with both aircraft and saw the PA28 pilot join mid-point downwind and begin to turn onto base leg. He had arrived sooner than the 6mins that he had reported, and the controller instructed him to make a left-turn towards the south coast before turning back onto final behind the DHC6. The pilot complied and then reported

visual with the DHC6. The DHC6 pilot also reported visual with the PA28 as it turned away and estimated the two aircraft were 2kms away. The DHC6 landed at 1429 and the PA28 at 1432.

Factual Background

The weather at Lands End was recorded as follows:

METAR EGHC 131420Z 30010KT 9999 FEW010 BKN020 19/16 Q1013=

Analysis and Investigation

CAA ATSI

At 1422.10, the PA28 pilot called the Lands End Aerodrome controller and reported that they were inbound to the Aerodrome and had 10 mins to run. The controller advised that RW34 was in use and that the QNH was 1013. The pilot replied that they would report the airfield in sight.

At 1424.20, the DHC6 pilot called controller and reported that they were at Point Charlie at 1000ft. The controller instructed the pilot to join left base RW34, QNH1013, and told the pilot that they should be No1. At 1424.50 the controller asked the PA28 pilot what distance they were from the aerodrome. The PA28 pilot responded that they were 'east of Penzance', this was followed by a correction, 'west of Penzance', followed by a short pause before, at 1425.00, the pilot said 5 or 6 mins. The controller advised the PA28 pilot that they would be No2, and that No1 was a Twin Otter joining left base RW34, the controller instructed the PA28 pilot to report the traffic or the Aerodrome in sight. The pilot acknowledged.

At 1425.40, the controller passed Traffic Information on the PA28 joining from the east, last reported just west of Penzance at 1300ft, to the DHC6 pilot and the pilot responded that they copied the traffic and were coasting in and descending. At 1426.00, the controller instructed the DHC6 pilot to report final. The PA28 pilot reported the Aerodrome in sight at 1426.30, and the controller asked if the pilot was happy with a RW34 right-base join, with traffic to be followed being a left-base join having just coasted in. The PA28 pilot replied that they were happy.

At 1426.50, the PA28 pilot advised the controller that they were just a bit concerned that they were not yet visual with the Twin Otter. The controller asked if the pilot had the airfield in sight. At 1427.00 the PA28 pilot replied they had the field in sight and were just to the south of the field. The controller responded that they had the PA28 visual now and that the aircraft had been hidden behind a pillar. The controller said that it was OK because the DHC6 was just joining left-base, shortly turning final, and advised the PA28 pilot that if they continued on their heading they would position No2 nicely behind the DHC6. The controller then instructed the PA28 pilot to make a slight left turn and then right all the way round, the long way round, onto final approach and advised that this would keep the aircraft nicely separated. The PA28 pilot responded that they had the DHC6 in sight and were just moving off to the left.

At 1427.00, the controller cleared the Twin Otter to land. At 1428.00, the controller advised the PA28 pilot not to be too fast on the approach due to the DHC6 requiring to backtrack the runway. At 1429.00, the PA28 pilot reported final and landing clearance was issued at 1430.00.

CAP 493 Aerodrome Control Service states:

7. Information to Aircraft

7A. Traffic Information and Instructions

7A.1 Traffic information and instructions shall be passed to aircraft on any occasion that a controller considers it necessary in the interests of safety, or when requested by a pilot. In particular, Aerodrome Control shall provide:

- (1) generic traffic information to enable VFR pilots to safely integrate their flight with other aircraft;
- (2) specific traffic information appropriate to the stage of flight and risk of collision;
- (3) timely instructions as necessary to prevent collisions and to enable safe, orderly and expeditious flight within and in the vicinity of the ATZ.

7A.2 MATS Part 2 shall detail local procedures for the integration of aircraft in the vicinity of the aerodrome.

The two ETAs provided by the PA28 pilot would have resulted in the controller believing that the DHC6 would be landing 3 or 4 minutes ahead of the PA28; the instruction to position No2 would have been based on the ETAs provided. The PA28 pilot subsequently turned onto final approach much earlier than expected at 1427.00 (expected ETA 1430).

The controller passed sufficient Traffic Information to the PA28 pilot to enable them to integrate safely behind the DHC6 and took action to avoid a potential collision once they had both the PA28 and the DHC6 in sight. The Lands End controller effectively discharged their responsibilities in the provision of an Aerodrome Control Service to both pilots.

UKAB Secretariat

The DHC6 and PA28 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard¹. An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation².

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a DHC6 and a PA28 flew into proximity at Lands End airfield at about 1428 on Monday 13th August 2018. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, both were joining the Lands End visual circuit, and both were receiving an ACS from Lands End ATC.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, transcripts of the relevant R/T frequencies, reports from the air traffic controllers involved and reports from the appropriate ATC operating authorities.

The Board first looked at the actions of the DHC6 pilot. He was joining the Lands End visual circuit at left-base for RW34 and had been told by the controller about the PA28 joining right-base, No2 behind him. He was therefore understandably concerned when the PA28 pilot reported that he wasn't visual with him, and, when he saw the PA28, was somewhat surprised to see it in an avoiding turn away to the south. That said, once the controller had told the PA28 to turn, the DHC6 pilot then didn't feel the need to take avoiding action himself and continued onto final.

The Board were disappointed that the PA28 pilot chose not to file a report because this meant that there was a missed opportunity to understand his perception of the event, and to know at what point he became visual with the DHC6. It was clear to the Board from the ATC recordings that the PA28 pilot had got his estimate of arrival time wrong, and that this had meant that he had arrived in the circuit far earlier than ATC expected thus invalidating their plan for sequencing the 2 aircraft. Nevertheless, the PA28 pilot had subsequently communicated his arrival effectively and obviously had misgivings as he approached the airfield because he told the controller that he wasn't visual with the DHC6. It was probably this call that prompted the controller to look for him and give him instructions such that the two aircraft were sequenced as they should have been.

¹ SERA.3205 Proximity.

² SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.

The Board commended the controller for his look-out; for giving timely and effective Traffic Information to both pilots so that they were able to become visual with each other; and, on assimilating that the PA28 was early on his arrival time, for intervening to ensure that the two aircraft were appropriately sequenced.

The Board quickly agreed that the incident was probably best described as a conflict in the ATZ, resolved by the controller. However, there followed some discussion about the risk categorisation. Although it was unanimously agreed that there had been no risk of collision, some members thought that this incident should be assessed as Category E (normal safety standards and procedures had pertained), because ATC had sequenced the two aircraft appropriately in accordance with their underlying remit to issue timely instructions as necessary to prevent collisions and to enable safe, orderly and expeditious flight within and in the vicinity of the ATZ. Conversely, other members felt that because the PA28 pilot wasn't initially visual with the DCH6 and ATC had needed to instruct him to turn later than desirable, normal safety standards could not be said to have pertained. After considerable debate, the latter view prevailed and the risk was assessed as Category C.


PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: A conflict in the ATZ resolved by ATC.

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment³

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that all the safety barriers had operated effectively.



³ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).