


AIRPROX REPORT No 2016109

Date: 15 Jun 2016 Time: 1734Z Position: 4943N 00209W Location: ENE Alderney airport

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	BN2	D228
Operator	Civ Trg	CAT
Airspace	CTR	CTR
Class	D	D
Rules	VFR	IFR
Service	Aerodrome	Aerodrome
Provider	Alderney	Alderney
Altitude/FL	NK	FL14
Transponder	A,C,S	A,C
Reported		
Colours	Yellow/white	Company
Lighting	Rotating beacon, bright wing-tip landing, nav	All serviceable
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	10nm	10km
Altitude/FL	250ft	1500ft
Altimeter	QNH	NK
Heading	080°	260°
Speed	90kt	130kt
ACAS/TAS	Unknown	Not fitted
Alert	Unknown	N/A
Separation		
Reported	500ft V/2nm H	900ft V/1nm H
BN2Recorded	NK V/0.6nm H	



THE BN2 ISLANDER PILOT reports that he was conducting training to the west of Alderney and requested join for a west-east transit of Alderney simulating a cliff search followed by a join to long final for a touch-and-go on RW26. The initial clearance was to search the north of the island, but R/T made it apparent that a D228 was joining from the north; therefore, he requested and was approved a south cliff search as they flew towards Alderney. He heard the D228 pilot transferring from right base to final approach as they were south abeam the airport. He did not sight the traffic. He requested more traffic information and the D228 was reported 'on final'. The airport was 1.5nm behind his aircraft with the coastline now turning north into a bay. Whilst he was certainly concerned that he was not visual with the traffic, he was unconcerned about the risk of a collision because he knew that there was vertical separation throughout. However, in [turning left] following the coastline he looked back over his shoulder towards Alderney for the traffic and saw that he was going to cross the runway centreline. He could not see the traffic there, so he looked back away from the airport and saw the traffic to the east of him. He was approaching the D228's trajectory and, rather than reverse direction and cross once again through his trajectory but at a closer range, he elected to fly further left and to the north. In so doing he knew that he would infringe the clearance to remain south of Alderney but he could not make a radio call to this effect because the frequency was busy. Once clear to the north, the radio calls ceased and the Aerodrome controller queried his flight path. Quite rightly he observed that he had not complied with his clearance to remain south. As he continued to the north he estimated that the lateral separation with the D228 was 2nm but that there was also vertical separation throughout.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'None'.

THE DORNIER 228 (D228) PILOT reports that he was cleared by Alderney Tower to join right base for RW26 and turned onto a 4nm final. They could hear the radio conversation between the BN2 pilot, who was conducting a 'cliff search' on the south side of Alderney, and the Tower. The Tower instructed the BN2 pilot to remain south of Alderney. As they turned final they could see the BN2 in the sun glint on the south coast and, as it moved into the shadow, it was apparent that it was routing in an anti-clockwise direction around the coast. It passed through the runway centreline in front of them. The Tower then instructed the BN2 pilot to remain north while they completed their approach and landing. There was no need to take any avoiding action, and they were visual with the BN2 throughout the event. The first sighting was at 3nm.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'Low'.

THE ALDERNEY AERODROME CONTROLLER reports that at approximately 1730 the BN2 and D228 pilots contacted the frequency. The BN2 pilot was instructed to remain south of the Island and was given Traffic Information on the inbound D228. The D228 pilot was given Traffic Information on the BN2. Approximately one minute later the BN2 was observed turning to the north and crossing the final approach track. Its pilot stated his intention was to carry out a right-hand tear drop and position number 2. A position report was obtained from the inbound D228 pilot who reported just turning final RW26. The BN2 pilot then reported visual with the traffic and would remain clear of it. The pilot of the D228 subsequently advised that he felt that the safety of his flight had been compromised.

He perceived the severity of the incident as 'Medium'.

THE CHIEF OFFICER OF THE BN2'S OPERATING COMPANY reports that the incident was discussed at the June meeting of their Safety Management Committee. The Company Safety Report found that the pilot failed to appreciate his location relative to the Alderney Airport RW26 approach centre line while conducting search training at some 500 feet. He estimated that the closest he came to the Dornier on crossing the centre line was some 2nm. He is fully aware of his error and has been fully debriefed, as have all other company pilots.

Factual Background

The weather at Alderney was recorded as follows:

METAR EGJA 151720Z 23009KT 9999 FEW013 14/13 Q0999=

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

The BN2 and D228 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard¹. An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation².




Figure 1 CPA 1734:54 (BN2 3734/D228 5420).

¹ SERA.3205 Proximity.

² SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a BN2 and a D228 flew into proximity at 1734 on Wednesday 15th June 2016. The D228 was inbound under IFR in VMC; the BN2 was on a training flight under VFR in VMC. Both pilots were in receipt of an Aerodrome Control Service from Alderney, within Class D airspace. Traffic Information was passed to both pilots. The BN2 pilot was instructed to remain south of the Island but crossed to the north through the RW26 approach path in front of the D228.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available included reports from both pilots, the controller concerned, area radar and RTF recordings and reports from the appropriate ATC and operating authorities.

The Board first noted that both pilots were in receipt of an Aerodrome Control Service from Alderney TWR and that the BN2 pilot had requested to carry out a low-level (at about 250ft) training cliff search along the south side of the island. Aware that the D228 was inbound from the north to RW26, the controller had therefore restricted the BN2 pilot to remain south of the island, and its pilot was passed Traffic Information about the D228. For his part, the D228 pilot was also given Traffic Information about the BN2 and was aware that its pilot had been instructed to remain south of the island. He subsequently observed the BN2 pass through final approach ahead of his aircraft and, although he had not needed to take any avoiding action, had been concerned that the safety of his flight had been compromised.

The Board quickly agreed that the BN2 pilot had clearly not complied with his clearance to remain to the south, but noted that the circumstances were such that the BN2 pilot had probably become task-focussed at low-level in conducting his cliff search and had only realised that he would fly through the centre-line at a late stage. Although prevention would have been better than recovery action, members noted that the BN2 pilot had then made a cogent risk assessment and had decided that the best course of action was to continue away from the conflict with the D228 and across the centre-line rather than attempt to comply with his clearance at such a late stage, which would likely have resulted in a closer encounter. Furthermore, realising that he was going to cross the final approach, the BN2 pilot had tried to advise ATC of the situation but the frequency was too busy at the time to be able to make the call.

Noting that both pilots were aware of each other, were visual, and were well separated by height, the Board agreed that the cause of the Airprox was simply that the D228 pilot had been concerned by the proximity of the BN2; that being said, the fact that the BN2 had not complied with his clearance was considered to be a contributory factor. They then discussed the risk. Although it was agreed that the BN2 pilot had not complied with his clearance and had crossed through the RW26 approach path ahead of the D228 (which could be construed as not being 'normal' in an ATC sense), the Board considered that there had been no possibility of a collision because the two aircraft were well separated. Accordingly, it was judged that normal separation safety standards were considered to have pertained, and the Airprox was assessed as risk Category E.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: The D228 pilot was concerned about the proximity of the BN2.

Contributory Factor: The BN2 pilot did not comply with his clearance.

Degree of Risk: E.