


**AIRPROX REPORT No 2015041**

Date: 4 Apr 2015 Time: 0937Z Position: 5139N 00201W Location: Kemble  
(Saturday)

**PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB**

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	PA28(1)	PA28(2)
Operator	Civ Pte	Civ Pte
Airspace	Kemble ATZ	Kemble ATZ
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	A FIS	None
Provider	Kemble	N/A
Altitude/FL	1500ft	1800ft
Transponder	A,C	A,C,S
Reported		
Colours	White / Green	Blue / White
Lighting	N/K	Strobes, Nav
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	10km	10km
Altitude/FL	1500ft	2300ft
Altimeter	QNH (1022hPa)	QNH (1023hPa)
Heading	260°	140°
Speed	85kt	140kt
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	Not fitted
Alert	N/A	N/A
Separation		
Reported	300ft V/500m H	800ftV/NK H
Recorded	500ft V/0.3nm H	



**THE PA28(1) PILOT** reports that on climb-out from Kemble RW08 downwind, he noticed an aircraft crossing right to left, skimming the base of the cloud layer. The other aircraft was more or less straight ahead and moving away from his intended flight path, so there was no further risk of collision and no need for avoiding action. Although he was monitoring the Kemble frequency for other circuit traffic, he did not recall hearing any aircraft calling for zone transit. He thought the aircraft might be calling for a join, so he looked to see where the Piper Arrow might be going to see if it turned for the overhead, but it disappeared in and out of cloud and maintained a southerly track. On landing he was asked by Kemble Information whether he had spotted the aircraft on departure and was asked to report to the tower.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'Low'.

**THE PA28(2) PILOT** reports that he was in and out of IMC so he left the Gloucester frequency and elected to get an ATS from Brize Norton, because he thought they could see him better on their radar. After he had passed Kemble, the Brize controller told him that Kemble had reported a plane flying through their overhead at 1500ft. He informed the controller that he had just flown to the right of Kemble at 2300ft, the controller checked which pressure setting he was on; it was the Gloucester QNH of 1023 hPa and Brize asked him to set the Brize QNH 1022 hPa. There was only one millibar difference so the controller said he would speak to Kemble, but asked him to give them a courtesy call on his return, which he did. Some days later he received notification that an Airprox had been reported. He remembered seeing 2 aircraft below him in the visual circuit; the closest one was about 800ft below.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'None'.

**THE KEMBLE FISO** reports that at approximately 0938 a PA28 was observed crossing the south eastern airfield boundary and skirting through the base of the cloud in a SSE direction. At the time there were 3 aircraft in the visual circuit, with one departing and climbing from a downwind position. The aircraft's height was assessed as being 1550ft, and looked in close proximity with PA28(1) departing downwind. Due to the late sighting because the aircraft was dipping in and out of cloud, there was no time to make an all-stations broadcast. The aircraft did not make any calls to Kemble and so tracing action was initiated by telephoning Gloucester, Brize and London Information. Brize Radar said that they could see an aircraft wearing at 7000 squawk SSE of Kemble, but it was not in radio contact with them. It was established that the pilot had initially been talking to London Information, then switched to Gloucester for local information before flying for a time without any service. Brize Radar subsequently called back to say the pilot, now some way SE of Kemble had called them for a service and they were able to confirm the registration.

## Factual Background

The weather at Kemble was reported by the FISO as:

METAR: RW08RH 9999 Nil FEW 007 SCT 010 BKN 016 PS 07/05 QFE 1007 QNH 1022

The weather at Brize Norton was reported as:<sup>1</sup>

EGVN 040950Z 02015KT 9999 SCT020 BKN033 09/04 Q1022

## Analysis and Investigation

### CAA ATSI

The P28 (2) was tracking in a south-easterly direction when it came into proximity with a P28 (1) which was leaving the circuit at Kemble on a local detail. The P28 (2) pilot made no contact with Kemble having previously spoken to Gloucester and then transferred directly to Brize Radar. At approximately 1.5nm north of Kemble, the aircraft made a left-hand orbit descending from an indicated 2800ft (Figure1) to 2500ft (Figure 2).




Figure 1

Figure 2

The PA28 (2) pilot then continued tracking southeast, descended to 1700ft and passed 0.6nm east of Kemble (Figure 3). The Kemble ATZ extends horizontally to a range of 2 miles from the mid-point of the runway and to 2000ft vertically. Kemble is over 400ft above sea level so P28 (2) indicated transiting the ATZ at approximately 1300ft above ground level. This was consistent with

<sup>1</sup> For reference, the Brize weather indicated a cloud base of 2000ft. Brize (approximately 15 miles northwest) is 150ft lower than Kemble representing an approximate cloudbase at Kemble of 1850ft; consistent with the FISO's report of BKN 016.

the FISO report of an estimated 1550ft. P28 (1) was climbing out of Kemble to the southwest, and its pilot became visual with P28 (2) as he tracked to the southwest. Traffic Information was not passed to P28(1) because the FISO was unaware of the other aircraft due to late sighting as it dipped in and out of the cloud base. The radar recording showed a CPA of 0.3nm and 500ft (Figure 4).




Figure 3




Figure 4

### UKAB Secretariat

Both pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard<sup>2</sup>. An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall: (a) observe other aerodrome traffic for the purpose of avoiding collision; (b) conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation<sup>3</sup>, furthermore, if the aerodrome has a flight information service the commander must obtain information from the flight information centre to enable the flight to be conducted safely within the ATZ.<sup>4</sup>

### Summary

An Airprox was reported on 4 Apr 2015 at 0937 between two PA28s. PA28 (1) was VFR and VMC, and departing the visual circuit at Kemble from a downwind position. PA28(2) had just left the Gloucester frequency and had not yet established contact with Brize Radar, he was VFR but skirting in and out of IMC due to the cloud when he flew through the Kemble ATZ without contacting the Kemble FISO. He reported that he was visual with the circuit traffic at Kemble. Due to a late sighting of PA28 (2) by the Kemble FISO, he was not able to give Traffic Information to the pilot of PA28 (1).

### PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from the pilots of both aircraft, transcripts of the relevant RT frequencies, radar photographs/video recordings, reports from the air traffic controllers involved and reports from the appropriate ATC and operating authorities.

In looking at the actions of the PA28 (2) pilot the Board first questioned the wisdom of flying in and out of IMC as he described, especially without having a radar service. They noted that he had flown an orbit when north of Kemble; whether this was to get some visual bearings, or to let down through a hole in the cloud, the Board could not be sure. However, they thought that the pilot had probably been pressed lower by the cloud than he had intended, and hadn't released how low he had become with relation to Kemble ATZ. Certainly, he was not at 2300ft when overhead Kemble as he thought he was. The Board noted that he recalled calling Brize for a service, which was probably a good plan

<sup>2</sup> SERA.3205 Proximity.

<sup>3</sup> SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.

<sup>4</sup> Rules of the Air 2015, Rule 11 Flights within aerodrome traffic zones.

given the circumstances, and he was correct in assuming that they would be able to give him a radar service where Gloster couldn't. However, the Board again noted that he wasn't actually speaking to Brize whilst overhead Kemble, but instead had called them some miles later. Although supposition, the Board opined that the conditions on the day had probably put him under considerable pressure such that he may also not have been fully certain of his position as he orbited, tried to maintain VMC, and then pressed on along his track. Members commented that this highlighted the need for a back-up plan when deteriorating conditions preclude following the original intentions.

Before entering the Kemble ATZ, the PA28 (2) pilot was required to call the Kemble FISO for information on circuit traffic. Had he done so, the FISO could have given Traffic Information to him and to the pilot of PA28 (1) in order for the pilot of PA28 (2) to conform to the pattern of traffic and for both of them to avoid conflict. As it was, the Board agreed that the Kemble FISO had no chance of offering any Traffic Information because he did not know that PA28 (2) was flying through the overhead, seeing it only after the incident occurred.

The Board quickly agreed that the cause of the Airprox was that the PA28 (2) pilot flew through the Kemble ATZ without establishing contact and into conflict with PA28 (1). In assessing the risk, the Board noted that the pilot of PA28 (1) was fortuitously visual with the other aircraft and deemed avoiding action unnecessary; they therefore assessed the risk as Category C.

### **PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK**

Cause: The PA28 (2) pilot flew through the Kemble ATZ without establishing contact and into conflict with PA28 (1).

Degree of Risk: C.