


**AIRPROX REPORT No 2015053**

Date: 9 Apr 2015 Time: 1527Z Position: 5146N 00158W Location: 10nm SE Gloucester

**PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB**

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	Dauphin	Glider
Operator	HQ JHC	Unknown
Airspace	Lon FIR	Lon FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	NK
Service	None	NK
Provider	Gloster	NK
Altitude/FL	FL25	NK
Transponder	A,C	NK
Reported		
Colours	Blue/White	White
Lighting	Strobes, nav and landing lights.	NK
Conditions	VMC	NK
Visibility	4km	NK
Altitude/FL	3000ft	NK
Altimeter	QNH (1024hPa)	NK
Heading	310°	NK
Speed	120kt	NK
ACAS/TAS	TCAS I	NK
Alert	Nil	
Separation		
Reported	0ft V/1000m H	NK
Recorded		NK



**THE DAUPHIN PILOT** reports that he was on a Procedural IRT sortie, VFR, at 3000ft. They had just left the Brize frequency, where they were receiving a Traffic Service, and had been handed-over to Gloster. Just prior to establishing communication with Gloster, a glider was seen 2000-1000m ahead, it was crossing and closing from the right. The instructor took control and made an avoiding action turn to the right. The glider did not register with TCAS and had not been reported by Brize Radar prior to handover.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

**THE GLIDER PILOT could not be traced.**

### Factual Background

The weather at Gloucestershire was reported as:

EGBJ 091620Z 13003KT 8000 FEW040 18/06 Q1023

### Analysis and Investigation

#### CAA ATSI

The Dauphin helicopter was on a local IFR training detail. Just prior to the occurrence the aircraft was in receipt of an ATC service from Brize Radar. The Airprox occurred just after leaving the

Brize frequency and just before establishing communication with Gloster Approach. There is no mention of the Airprox on the Gloster frequency when communication was established. A review of the radar at the time reported did not provide any evidence of the Dauphin flight. However, there is a contact observed in the area an hour earlier which was squawking 3741 and whose history and altitude are consistent with the report. ATSI were advised that this code was assigned to the Dauphin. However, there was no evidence of any conflicting aircraft in the vicinity that was observed to affect the progress of this flight.

### **Military ATM**

The Dauphin pilot was under a Traffic Service with Brize Radar but was in the process of a frequency change to Gloucester at the time of the incident. The Radar Analysis Cell could not capture the glider on any of the available radar replays, and the glider could not be traced.

The controlling team at Brize were not made aware of the Airprox because the pilot had switched frequencies and they could not recall the event. The RT transcript was impounded when the unit were eventually informed of the incident.

The Dauphin was placed under a Traffic Service by Brize Radar at 1525:55 upon leaving the Brize Zone, and traffic was called as, "*12 o'clock, 5 miles, crossing left to right, height unknown.*" The traffic was roughly in the BZN 286/15nm (51.44.95 01.35.13). The traffic was not called again, and the Dauphin was transferred to Gloucester at 1527:22.

The glider did not appear on the radar replay, and the CPA was estimated at 1528:01. It is not known if the traffic called by Brize was the Airprox glider, and there is limited information from the control team. The controller had updated the service to the Dauphin upon leaving CAS, and had called traffic prior to the frequency change to Gloucester. The normal barriers to an Airprox in Class G airspace would be Traffic Information, ACAS and 'see-and-avoid'. Traffic Information had been provided on non-squawking traffic; however, it was not known if the information related to the Airprox glider, or if the glider had appeared on the Brize radar. TCAS did not provide an alert, and the radar replay did not detect a transponding aircraft in the area. One of the Dauphin pilots was flying on instruments, and the instructor was solely responsible for the lookout. Ultimately, the instructor visually acquired the glider and took avoiding action to maintain safe separation.

### **UKAB Secretariat**

Both pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard<sup>1</sup>. When two aircraft are converging at approximately the same level, the aircraft that has the other on its right shall give way, except as follows: (i) power-driven heavier-than-air aircraft shall give way to ... sailplanes...<sup>2</sup>

### **Comments**

#### **JHC**

This occurred in Class G airspace and highlights the fact that a Traffic Service cannot necessarily give accurate detail of all traffic, especially those that are not transponding. JHC are continuing to investigate the inclusion of FLARM displays in ATC, providing an additional safety barrier. Crews have recently been educated to view "Glidernet" to highlight major glider concentrations prior to departure. In this case, the non-handling pilot saw the glider early, and carried out the correct action to prevent the conflict developing further.

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<sup>1</sup> SERA.3205 Proximity.

<sup>2</sup> SERA.3210 Right-of-way.

**BGA**

With 1-2km separation in Class G airspace, it is unlikely that the glider pilot would have considered this to be an Airprox.

**Summary**

An Airprox was reported on 9<sup>th</sup> April at 1529 between a Dauphin helicopter and a glider. The Dauphin had just left the Brize frequency and had not yet established contact with Gloster so did not receive any Traffic Information. The instructor saw the glider and took avoiding action by turning to the right. The glider did not show on the NATS radars and could not be traced.

**PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS**

Information available consisted of reports from the Dauphin pilot, transcripts of the relevant RT frequencies, radar photographs/video recordings and reports from the appropriate ATC and operating authorities.

The Board first considered the actions of the Dauphin pilot. The Board noted that Brize Radar had given Traffic Information on traffic prior to the Dauphin leaving their frequency, but whether this was on this glider or another aircraft it was impossible to tell. It was unlikely that the glider had any form of TCAS and, although it could have been fitted with FLARM, this wouldn't have been compatible with TCAS which would therefore explain why the Dauphin pilot hadn't received any TCAS derived Traffic Information. The Board noted that both aircraft were flying in Class G airspace where see-and-avoid was the main mitigation against mid-air collision, both aircraft were entitled to be there, and that see-and-avoid had worked in that the Dauphin pilot at least had seen the other aircraft in enough time to take appropriate action before the situation closed to closer proximity. Noting the JHC comment regarding Glidernet, the Board wished to commend them on highlighting the usefulness of Glidernet to pilots prior to getting airborne, and they also made comment that, although clearly not usable specifically as a controlling tool due to time lag and other certification complications, Glidernet had great potential value to ATC in providing general situational awareness of gliders which may not be otherwise detectable by radar.

The Board commented that it was unfortunate that the glider hadn't shown on the NATS radars, and therefore that the pilot couldn't be traced in order to provide his version of events. This sparked off a frequently held discussion by the Board about radar conspicuity of gliders, and the possibility of fitting radar reflectors in the aircraft. The Board heard about some of the difficulties of sighting a reflector in the airframe and that, regretfully, this aspiration was no further forward. The Glider Board member reported that the BGA were keen to encourage pilots to talk to each other and ATC either by calling on radios when airborne, or calling up units by telephone prior to getting airborne. Citing education and dialogue as a key resource in understanding the needs and requirements of other airspace users, they were also keen to ensure gliding clubs adopted good relations with neighbouring airfields, and attended local airspace user groups whenever possible.

The Board noted that it was entirely appropriate that a report had been raised by the Dauphin pilot which highlighted the need for good look-out and awareness in all phases of flight. In assessing the cause of the Airprox, they agreed that it was a sighting report and that, given the actual proximity once action had been taken; they decided that the risk was Category E, normal safety standards and procedures had pertained.

**PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK**

Cause: A sighting report.

Degree of Risk: E.