


**AIRPROX REPORT No 2015074**

Date: 30 May 2015 (Saturday) Time: 1355Z Position: 5122N 00120W Location: Kingsclere

**PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB**

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	Cirrus 75B Glider	Light Aircraft
Operator	Civ Pte	Unknown
Airspace	Lon FIR	Lon FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	NK
Service	None	NK
Provider	N/A	NK
Altitude/FL	NK	
Transponder	Not fitted	A,C
Reported		
Colours	White/Red	White
Lighting	N/R	NK
Conditions	VMC	NK
Visibility	>20km	NK
Altitude/FL	3400ft	NK
Altimeter	QFE (987hPa)	NK
Heading	315°	NK
Speed	50kt	NK
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	NK
Separation		
Reported	20ft V/150ft H	
Recorded		NK



**THE CIRRUS PILOT** reports cruising between thermals on a bearing towards Newbury when he noticed an aircraft 90° to his right and slightly lower, the aircraft was single engine, low-wing, white and he could see the pilot was wearing a red top. He was unable to take avoiding action right as this would have taken him towards to other aircraft, to turn left would have meant losing sight of it, and to dive would have taken him through its level, so he kept the control stick slightly back and hoped the other aircraft would continue straight-and-level and that he did not encounter any “sink”. He did not get the registration because he was intent on looking at the pilot in the other cockpit to see whether he was looking at him and hoping to get an acknowledgement, which he didn’t get.

He perceived the severity of the incident as ‘High’.

**THE LIGHT AIRCRAFT PILOT** could not be traced.

**Factual Background**

The weather at Odiham was recorded as:

METAR EGVO 301350Z 24011KT 9999 SCT045 SCT250 15/04 Q1014 BLU

**Analysis and Investigation****UKAB Secretariat**

The incident was difficult to confirm with any degree of certainty on the NATS radars, because the glider was not transponding and the primary contact was intermittent. Therefore, tracing pilot two proved to be impossible.

Both pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard<sup>1</sup>. When two aircraft are converging at approximately the same level, the aircraft that has the other on its right shall give way, except as follows: (i) power-driven heavier-than-air aircraft shall give way to ... sailplanes...<sup>2</sup>

## Comments

### BGA

There was very little that the glider pilot could do in the circumstances, although this Airprox does demonstrate that good look-out is essential.

## Summary

An Airprox was reported on 30 May at 1355 between a Cirrus Glider and an untraced light aircraft. The Glider was not receiving an ATS, nor did he have any TAS equipment, therefore he did not receive any Traffic Information. Unfortunately the pilot of aircraft 2 could not be traced.

## **PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS**

Information available consisted of reports from the glider pilot, radar photographs/video recordings, reports from the air traffic controllers involved and reports from the appropriate ATC and operating authorities.

The Board noted that both aircraft were operating in Class G airspace, both were entitled to be there, and that the primary barrier to preventing a mid-air collision was see-and-avoid. As such, it was vital that both pilots employed good look-out techniques. The Board commented that it was unfortunate that the incident did not show on the NATS radars, and so the pilot of the light aircraft could not be traced to provide his version of events. Nevertheless, recognising that the light aircraft pilot was required under SERA to give way, and because he had not reacted to the glider, the Board thought it likely, from the glider pilot's description of the events, that he had not seen the glider.

The Board acknowledged that it was the glider pilot's look-out that enabled him to detect the conflict; albeit too late to take more positive avoiding action to ensure that the separation was more than the bare minimum. This led the Board to determine the cause of the Airprox as a late sighting by the Cirrus pilot and probably a non-sighting by the light aircraft pilot. Even without radar analysis it was clear from the glider pilot's report that there was nothing that he could do to improve matters, and so the risk was assessed as Category A, separation had been reduced to the minimum and chance had played a major part in events.

## **PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK**

Cause: A late sighting by the Cirrus pilot and probably a non-sighting by the light aircraft pilot.

Degree of Risk: A.

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<sup>1</sup> SERA.3205 Proximity.

<sup>2</sup> SERA.3210 Right-of-way.