


**AIRPROX REPORT No 2015127**

Date: 6 Aug 2015 Time: 1502Z Position: 5051N 00314W Location: Dunkeswell

**PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB**

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	PA28	BE99
Operator	Civ Pte	Civ Comm
Airspace	Dunkeswell ATZ	Dunkeswell ATZ
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	a/g	a/g
Provider	Dunkeswell Radio	Dunkeswell Radio & DZ
Altitude/FL	FL015	FL016
Transponder	A,C	A,C,S
Reported		
Colours	White, Blue	White
Lighting	Beacon, Strobes	Tail beacon
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	10km	10km
Altitude/FL	700ft	<800ft
Altimeter	QFE (982hPa)	1013hPa
Heading	040°	220°
Speed	85kt	100kt
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	Not fitted
Separation		
Reported	0ft V/400m H	NK
Recorded	100ft/0.2nm	



**THE PA28 PILOT** reports that he was returning to his home airfield, called on the radio when about 10nms out, and listened on the busy frequency. He joined the circuit on the downwind leg of RW22. When about three quarters of the way along the downwind leg and abeam the runway threshold, he was preparing to turn left onto a base leg. Until this point he was unaware of the other aircraft's location, although he knew it had dropped some parachutists a few minutes earlier. The other aircraft appeared ahead and slightly above, crossing right to left in a descending manoeuvre with port wing down. He had no time to react because the whole incident lasted less than a second. Moments later, the other pilot called short final. The PA28 pilot extended downwind a short distance before turning left base, but by now was feeling a little flustered and under pressure. As he turned final he saw the other aircraft land long and it seemed to be at high speed, he could clearly see a large smoke trail from its starboard wheel, indicating heavy braking. It was now obvious that the aircraft would need to continue to the end of the runway and require a backtrack to the intersection so he elected to go-around from this approach and re-positioned mid-field downwind.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

**THE BE99 PILOT** reports that he did not see the other aircraft and was not aware that there was an incident at the time. He joined left base for RW22 at 800ft and made the appropriate call, he did not receive a response from any other traffic. He turned final, again making the appropriate call and heard another aircraft call "left base turning final for touch and go", it was a flying school Cessna, inside and below him. He deemed there was sufficient separation to continue as number 2, the Cessna landed but there was a relatively long period between the touch and the go. Whilst the Cessna was airborne before he landed, the separation was not as far as he would have liked and he thought he may have been inadvertently covering the brakes on landing as spectators reported tyre

smoke. He was aware that an aircraft behind him called for a go-around, but considered this appropriate as he was on the runway.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'None'.

## Factual Background

The weather at Exeter was reported as:

METAR EGTE 061450Z 30009KT 260V350 9999 SCT048 20/11 Q1014

## Analysis and Investigation

### UKAB Secretariat

Although Dunkeswell operate A/G and therefore RT transcripts and radar replays were not available, the incident was able to be viewed on the NATS radars. The follow screen shots show the positioning of the BE99 on base leg and the PA28 downwind. There was also another aircraft, a C182, which whilst not involved in the Airprox was positioning downwind in close proximity to the PA28 and may have become a focal point for the BE99 pilot as he integrated into the circuit.




Figure 1 (time -1500:45)




Figure 2 (1501:37)



Figure 3 (1501:49, just before CPA)

Both pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard<sup>1</sup>. An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation<sup>2</sup>. When making an approach to land SERA regulations state:

<sup>1</sup> SERA.3205 Proximity.

<sup>2</sup> SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.

*Landing.* An aircraft in flight, or operating on the ground or water, shall give way to aircraft landing or in the final stages of an approach to land.

(i) When two or more heavier-than-air aircraft are approaching an aerodrome or an operating site for the purpose of landing, aircraft at the higher level shall give way to aircraft at the lower level, but the latter shall not take advantage of this rule to cut in front of another which is in the final stages of an approach to land, or to overtake that aircraft.<sup>3</sup>

## Summary

An Airprox was reported on 6 August 2015 at 1501 between a PA28 and a BE99. Both pilots were operating VFR in VMC in the Dunkeswell visual circuit, listening out, and making calls on the Dunkeswell a/g frequency. The PA28 pilot joined downwind and perceived that the BE99 cut in front of him on finals. The BE99 pilot joined left base and did not see the PA28.

## **PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS**

Information available consisted of reports from the pilots of both aircraft and radar photographs/video recordings.

The Board first discussed the actions of the PA28 pilot and noted that he had elected to join downwind, which he was entitled to do, and was listening out on the Dunkeswell frequency; he reported that he hadn't heard the BE99 making any calls on the RT, and was therefore not expecting him to join on the base leg. The Board discussed the fact that, at A/G airfields, there is no air traffic control and it is therefore up to the pilots to integrate into the circuit safely whilst making the correct positioning calls to ensure that other pilots know where they are. In this respect, the Board noted also that both pilots had reported that the RT was busy. They opined that the PA28 pilot might easily have missed the BE99 pilot's calls, but without an RT transcript the Board were unable to know for certain that all calls were correctly made.

Turning to the BE99, some members informed the Board that parachuting operators often have commercial pressures placed upon them to land quickly in order to get the next set of parachutists into the air as soon as possible. As such, it is not unusual for parachuting operators to use a base-leg join to expedite their recovery, which they are entitled to do provided that they integrate properly into the circuit and sequence with other aircraft already forming a pattern of traffic. The Board noted that, in this instance, the BE99 pilot described fitting in behind a Cessna aircraft (not involved in the Airprox), and that radar replays showed that the Cessna was close to the PA28 as both aircraft tracked downwind. Some members opined that, assuming that the BE99 pilot looked downwind, it could have been that the BE99 pilot was therefore concentrating on the Cessna and that this was why he did not see the PA28. However, other members commented that the BE99 pilot reported only becoming aware of the Cessna when it called turning left base; there was therefore some uncertainty in the minds of the Board about how well the BE99 pilot had looked out downwind before making his base-leg join. Ultimately, members noted that the PA28 pilot had reported making the appropriate radio calls within the circuit and was there to be seen by the BE99 pilot (along with the Cessna which was also downwind).

In determining the cause of the Airprox, the Board agreed that the BE99 pilot had not integrated properly into the busy visual circuit. In determining the risk, the Board noted that the BE99 pilot had not seen the PA28, and that the PA28 pilot saw the BE99 too late to take any avoiding action. With radar replays indicating that there had been about 100ft and 0.2nm separation between the two aircraft, the risk was assessed as Category A, chance had played a major part in events and separation had been reduced to a minimum.

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<sup>3</sup> SERA 3210 Right of way.

**PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK**

Cause: The BE99 pilot did not integrate into the visual circuit.

Degree of Risk: A.