


**AIRPROX REPORT No 2015133**

Date: 18 Jul 2015 Time: 1511Z Position: 5159N 00103W Location: 4.5nm NNW Enstone Airfield

**PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB**

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	Europa	Dimona
Operator	Civ Pte	Civ Trg
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Basic	AGCS
Provider	Brize Radar	Enstone Radio
Altitude/FL	3400ft	NMC
Transponder	A/C/S	A
<b>Reported</b>		
Colours	White	White
Lighting	Fuselage strobe	Tail strobe
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	20km	NK
Altitude/FL	2500ft	~3000ft
Altimeter	QNH	QFE
Heading	080°	160°
Speed	~110kt	75kt
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	Not fitted
Alert	N/A	N/A
<b>Separation</b>		
Reported	Nil V/20m H	100ft V/NK H
Recorded	NK V/0.1nm H	



**THE EUROPA PILOT** reports that he had agreed a Basic Service with Brize Radar. Despite having a good look-out, the other aircraft appeared from his left about 50m away (flying north-south) across his track at the same altitude (2500ft). When he spotted the aircraft, he instinctively turned left in a 90° banked turn. Collision was avoided, but the aircraft closed to about 20m. It took 20-30 seconds to recover the aircraft to normal cruise. P2 then took over control. After approximately one minute, he contacted Brize to report an Airprox. Brize responded that there was no trace of the other aircraft on their primary radar, and asked if it was a glider. He commented that it was similar to a Diamond type aircraft.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

**THE DIMONA MOTOR GLIDER PILOT** reports that he had been undertaking general handling training to the north/north west of Enstone. He had called Enstone Radio for a 'standard overhead join' and was operating on the Enstone QFE, heading generally south-southeast, possibly in a gentle left turn and looking into the overhead area. He caught sight of an aircraft in his peripheral view, turned to look and due, to the close proximity (below but close), instinctively pulled back on the stick seeing the other aircraft passing below under the back of his aircraft's wing/tail area. The other aircraft was not on Enstone's frequency, and continued in a general east-northeast direction towards Banbury.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

**THE BRIZE LARS CONTROLLER** reports that the Europa pilot called on frequency at 1508 and requested a Basic Service. During the transit the pilot reported an Airprox on frequency with a light powered aircraft that had passed, he recollected, from right to left across his flight-path. This was reported 3 minutes after the aircraft had passed each other, at which time he looked to try and

determine the potential conflicting aircraft. A primary contact was seen approximately 3nm northwest of the Europa tracking northwest. The pilot indicated that this may potentially be the conflicting traffic; however, he could not positively identify it and, because the aircraft was not operating with a transponder, it would be very difficult to trace. The pilot of the Europa confirmed that he had not been able to see the registration or identify the aircraft type. He then explained that he would submit the paperwork when on the ground. The aircraft continued its transit with no further event and changed to an en-route frequency. The controller commented that Traffic Information was not provided to the Europa pilot because he had not seen the confliction. At the time he was co-ordinating an arrival at Gloucester departing from the L9 airway, which was complicated by the activation of Redlands parachute site and the temporary restricted airspace at RAF Fairford during RIAT. Because the Europa pilot was operating under a Basic Service, and the L9 airways departure would be IFR, he believed he was prioritising correctly in focusing his attention on the L9 traffic.

## Factual Background

The weather at Brize was recorded as follows:

EGVN 181450Z 25008KT CAVOK 21/07 Q1016 BLU NOSIG=

## Analysis and Investigation

### Military ATM

The Brize controller issued the Europa pilot with a Basic Service at 1507:34. Whilst the controller was involved in a landline conversation with a civil sector over a Gloucestershire inbound, the aircraft were on a converging course (Figure 1). CPA occurred at 1511:09 (Figure 2). The Europa pilot declared an Airprox at 1512:50.




Figure 1: Geometry at 1510:41.




Figure 2: Geometry at CPA at 1511:09.

The Europa was transponding the Brize SSR code (3717) with Mode C; the Dimona had a 7000 squawk, no Mode C. Neither aircraft was Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) fitted and so this barrier was absent. The Europa was under a Basic Service and responsible for collision avoidance as per UK FIS rules. See-and-avoid is the crucial barrier in Class G, and the late sighting by the Europa led to a 90° avoiding action turn to prevent a collision.

### **UKAB Secretariat**

The Europa and Dimona pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard<sup>1</sup>. Because the incident geometry was converging the Dimona pilot was required to give way to the Europa<sup>2</sup>.

### **Summary**

An Airprox was reported when a Europa and a Dimona flew into proximity at 1511 on Saturday 18<sup>th</sup> July 2015. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, the Europa pilot was in receipt of a Basic Service from Brize and the Dimona pilot in receipt of an Air Ground Service from Enstone (although the Airprox occurred over 4nm from the airfield). The Europa pilot saw the Dimona at the same altitude 50m away; the Dimona pilot first saw the Europa when it was in close proximity and pulled back on the 'stick' as avoiding action. He reported the vertical separation as 100ft. The radar recordings show the two aircraft passing 0.1nm apart.

### **PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS**

Information available included reports from both pilots, the Brize controller, area radar and RTF recordings and reports from the appropriate ATC and operating authorities.

The Board noted that the Airprox had occurred in Class G airspace with both pilots operating under VFR in VMC. The Europa pilot had requested, and had been provided with, a Basic Service from Brize. Under a Basic Service, the Board noted that there was no reason for the Brize controller to identify or monitor the Europa's progress and, consequently, no Traffic Information was issued about the Dimona. The Dimona pilot was in receipt of an Air/Ground Service from Enstone. Again he would not have received any information about the presence of the Europa, not least because its pilot had not been on the same frequency. Accordingly the only way for the two pilots to avoid conflict in a busy aviation area, given their choices of Air Traffic Service, was by 'see-and-avoid'. The Board opined that if the Europa pilot had requested a Traffic Service from Brize, he could have expected to have been informed about the presence of the Dimona. The Military ATM advisor agreed that, although it is not always possible to provide the service due to other commitments, on this occasion the controller would have been able to provide a Traffic Service if it had been requested because, as far as he was aware, the Dimona's SSR label would have shown on the radar display as the 2 aircraft came into proximity.

The Board quickly decided that the cause of the Airprox was a late sighting by both pilots: the Europa pilot had only spotted the Dimona 50m away and the Dimona pilot had only seen the Europa when it was in close proximity to his aircraft. Turning to the risk, it was apparent from both pilots' reports that the two aircraft were very close at the time of the Airprox. The radar recording shows that they had passed each other less than 0.1nm apart horizontally. Because the Dimona was not equipped with SSR Mode C it was not possible to determine the vertical separation at the time; notwithstanding, members were convinced that both pilots' reports of having to take instinctive action to prevent a collision meant that the separation between the 2 aircraft had been reduced to the minimum. Consequently, the Board agreed that the Airprox should be categorised as risk Category A.

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<sup>1</sup> SERA.3205 Proximity.

<sup>2</sup> SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c) (2) Converging.

**PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK**

Cause: A late sighting by both pilots.

Degree of Risk: A.