


**AIRPROX REPORT No 2015132**

Date: 31 Jul 2015 Time: 1620Z Position: 5240N 00019E Location: 9nm W Marham

**PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB**

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	DA42	Untraced Glider
Operator	Civ Comm	Unknown
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	NK <sup>1</sup>	NK
Provider	NK	
Altitude/FL	FL50	
Transponder	A, C, S	
<b>Reported</b>		
Colours	White/blue/orange	White
Lighting	HISLs	
Conditions	VMC	
Visibility	25km	
Altitude/FL	4000ft	
Altimeter	QNH (1015hPa)	
Heading	130°	
Speed	135kt	
ACAS/TAS	TAS	Unknown
Alert	None	N/A
<b>Separation</b>		
Reported	200ft V/400m H	
Recorded		NK



**THE DA42 PILOT** reports that he saw a white glider in the left 1030 position, co-altitude, at a range of ¼nm, in straight-and-level flight and on a converging course. He turned away, and the glider passed close behind. He reported the Airprox to Lakenheath. In subsequent discussion with an Airprox Inspector, the pilot was firm in his assertion that he had reported the Airprox to Lakenheath and that he remembered doing so in light of his previous Airprox, earlier the same day [2015131].

He assessed the risk of collision as ‘Medium’.

**THE GLIDER PILOT** could not be traced.

**THE LAKENHEATH ATSU** reports that ATC recordings were checked for the period 1430Z to 1730Z for 31<sup>st</sup> July 2015 and that there was no record of an aircraft with the reported callsign having been in contact with Lakenheath.

**Factual Background**

The weather at Marham was recorded as follows:

METAR EGYM 311650Z 18007KT CAVOK 21/07 Q1015 BLU NOSIG

<sup>1</sup> The DA42 pilot reported in receipt of a Traffic Service from Lakenheath, who had no record of such provision.

## Analysis and Investigation

### UKAB Secretariat

The DA42 and glider pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard<sup>2</sup>. If the incident geometry is considered as head-on or nearly so then both pilots were required to turn to the right<sup>3</sup>. If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the DA42 pilot was required to give way to the glider<sup>4</sup>.

The DA42 pilot's reported time and location of the Airprox did not match with radar recordings. The time and location of CPA is based on the reported heading of 130° and the DA42 being at FL50, shortly before descending on the TACAN approach profile. A sharp turn is also apparent on the radar recording, which is inconsistent with the DA42's previous and subsequent track. The DA42 pilot was not able to provide further clarification of the circumstances of the Airprox.

### Summary

An Airprox was reported when a DA42 and a glider flew into proximity at about 1620 on Friday 31<sup>st</sup> July 2015. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC. It was not possible to confirm the Air Traffic Service being provided to either pilot.

### **PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS**

Information available consisted of a report from the DA42 pilot, radar photographs/video recordings and a report from the Lakenheath ATSU.

Members quickly agreed that both pilots had been operating in Class G airspace and that the glider pilot had either not seen the DA42 or had been unconcerned by its proximity. The DA42 pilot described the glider passing from left-to-right, similar to his other glider Airprox earlier in the day [Airprox 2015131]. In the event, the reported time of occurrence could not be correlated with the reported heading, altitude and position of the DA42 and subsequent reassessment of the reported time did not provide additional clarity. Lakenheath ATSU also expended considerable effort in their attempt to identify the DA42 from their ATC RT recordings, reportedly in receipt of a Traffic Service from Lakenheath at the time of the Airprox. It was eventually determined that the DA42 pilot had not been in communication with Lakenheath using the reported callsign, over the period 1430-1730Z on the day of the Airprox. Unfortunately, by this time it was not possible to determine whether the pilot might have confused this and had been in contact with Marham instead, because their ATC RT recording media had been re-used. Irrespective, it was felt that Marham could have been contacted earlier to seek any information, but it was also agreed that it was the responsibility of the Airprox parties involved to provide information of sufficient accuracy that tracing could realistically be achieved; speculative requests for transcription from other local agencies who may have been in communication with a pilot was not wholly reasonable. Consequently, members noted that the position of the DA42 at CPA was entirely speculative.

Turning to the cause and risk, members agreed that it was the pilots' responsibility to see-and-avoid in Class G airspace, and that the DA42 pilot was required to give way to the glider but had not seen it until at close range. Given the paucity of information, members were left with little option other than to classify the cause as a sighting report by the DA42 pilot. Given the reported separation, members opined that this did not represent a situation where normal safety margins applied (Category E), but nor did it represent a situation where safety was much reduced below normal (Category B). In the end, the Board classified the risk as Category C, effective and timely actions had been taken.

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<sup>2</sup> SERA.3205 Proximity.

<sup>3</sup> SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c) (1) Approaching head-on.

<sup>4</sup> SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c) (2) Converging.

Members commented on the level of reporting and noted that it had been such that considerable effort had been expended by third parties whilst attempting to ascertain the Airprox position and likely other aircraft. It was noted that the Airprox reporting procedure benefitted significantly from the timely capture of relevant information. If nothing else, a simple declaration of Airprox time and position to an ATSU fixed the event sufficiently for subsequent investigation to proceed without expending nugatory effort.

### **PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK**

Cause: A sighting report.

Degree of Risk: C.