


AIRPROX REPORT No 2015144

Date: 6 Sep 2015 Time: 1347Z Position: 5249N 00144W Location: Tatenhill

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	C152(A)	C152(B)
Operator	Civ Trg	Civ Club
Airspace	Tatenhill ATZ	Tatenhill ATZ
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	AGCS	AGCS
Provider	Tatenhill Radio	Tatenhill Radio
Altitude/FL	900ft	900ft
Transponder	A, C	A, C
Reported		
Colours	White/blue/green	White/blue/green
Lighting	Beacon, wingtip strobes	NK
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	NK
Altitude/FL	600ft	NK
Altimeter	QFE (NK hPa)	NK
Heading	260°	NK
Speed	65kt	NK
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	NK
Alert	N/A	NK
Separation		
Reported	0ft V/15m H	NK
Recorded	0ft V/<0.1nm H	



THE C152(A) PILOT reports conducting a one hour circuit training session when, during the latter half of the lesson, he heard C152(B) joining from the west, calling 'joining overhead' and then 'descending deadside'. The C152 (A) student (PF) called 'downwind 26 touch and go' and, a short while later, the instructor heard the C152 (B) pilot call 'downwind'. The instructor had not seen the C152 (B) up to this point. After a good lookout, they turned base in the normal place and started the descent. The student turned onto final approach at a height of approximately 600ft feet, selected 30° of flap, and called 'final 26 touch and go'. Two or three seconds later the C152(B) appeared in the top left-hand corner of the screen at a range of approximately 50ft, in a descending turn to the left. The instructor took control and went around whilst moving off to the right. After landing he spoke to the other pilot who 'didn't have a lot to say other than that he had no idea that anybody else was in the circuit'. The C152 (A) instructor noted that he had been operating in the visual circuit from before the C152 (B) pilot took off until after he had landed.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE C152 (B) PILOT was contacted on several occasions but declined to take part in the Airprox process.

THE TATENHILL A/G OPERATOR did not file a report.

Factual Background

The weather at East Midlands was recorded as follows:

METAR EGNX 061350Z 27012KT 9999 FEW034 18/08 Q1028

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

Both C152 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard¹. An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation².

Summary

An Airprox was reported when two C152s flew into proximity at 1347 on Sunday 6th September 2015. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC and both were in receipt of an AGCS from Tatenhill Radio.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of a report from one of the C152 pilots and area radar video recordings.

Members expressed their disappointment that the C152 (B) pilot had chosen not to take part in the Airprox process. They re-iterated that the process was designed solely to improve safety of flight, was confidential, and that participation was to the mutual benefit of all in helping to piece together what had happened during incidents. That the Board did not have C152 (B)'s perspective was to the detriment of their analysis.

The Board agreed that the C152 (A) pilot's recall of events, coupled with the radar picture, indicated that the C152 (B) pilot had not assimilated radio calls, had not visually acquired the C152 (A) ahead of him in the circuit pattern, and had consequently not integrated with C152 (A). It was postulated that other factors, such as an RT receiver failure in the C152 (B) may have played a part but, without the C152 (B) pilot's recall of events, it was not possible to determine whether there were other relevant factors. Analysis of the radar picture showed C152(A) remaining slightly below and to the right of C152(B) on base, and this indicated that C152(A) may have been obscured to the C152(B) pilot, sitting on the left of his aircraft. Similarly, the unfortunate geometry indicated that C152 (B) would probably have been obscured by C152 (A)'s high wing as its pilot turned onto base. However, GA members opined that the C152 (B) pilot had had ample opportunity to visually acquire the C152 (A) as he completed his overhead join, a procedure designed with just that objective in mind, and should have been able to build a mental picture of the C152 (A)'s position, had he assimilated the other pilot's radio calls.

Board members agreed that the Airprox had been caused because the C152 (B) pilot had not integrated into the circuit pattern already established by the C152 (A). From the C152 (A) pilot's narrative, and supported by the radar picture, it was apparent that a collision had only just been avoided and that this had been due entirely to providence.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: The C152 (B) pilot did not integrate with the C152 (A) established in the circuit.

Degree of Risk: A.

¹ SERA.3205 Proximity.

² SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.