


AIRPROX REPORT No 2015154

Date: 9 Sep 2015 Time: 1359Z Position: 5109N 00106W Location: 3nm SW Lasham (elev 616ft)

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	BE200	Silent 2
Operator	Civ Comm	Civ Pte
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	None	None
Provider	N/A	(Lasham A/G)
Altitude/FL	2800ft	NK
Transponder	A, C, S	Not fitted
Reported		
Colours	White/blue	White
Lighting	Strobes, 'external lighting'	Nil
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	2800ft	2100ft
Altimeter	QNH (1022hPa)	QFE (NK hPa)
Heading	350°	Left turn
Speed	180kt	50kt
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	FLARM
Alert	N/A	None
Separation		
Reported	100ft V/30m H	0ft V/100m H
Recorded	NK	



THE BE200 PILOT reports having taken off from Lasham and turning onto south, and then west, to clear known Lasham gliding activity. He then turned onto north to route to his destination airfield. Shortly before level off, and still in about a 15° banked right turn, the right-hand seat occupant saw a glider pass close down the left side of the aircraft at a distance of approximately 200m. At the time of the Airprox the left-hand seat pilot was making a frequency change from Odiham, for MATZ penetration, and Farnborough, to obtain a Traffic Service, while the right-hand seat occupant was focused on two other glider contacts to the northeast at a range of 1-2nm. No avoiding action was taken because the glider was seen very late and the pilot assessed that there was no immediate risk of collision. The pilot stated that, prior to flight, the right-hand seat occupant was deliberately placed in the cockpit rather than the cabin to assist with lookout. He noted that Odiham had provided a Traffic Service for his earlier arrival at Lasham, but did not offer one for departure and that this resulted in him having to make a second frequency change to Farnborough to obtain a Traffic Service.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'None'.

THE SILENT 2 PILOT reports soaring in the local area after a winch launch from Lasham, listening out on the Lasham A/G frequency but not in receipt of a service. He was operating about 3nm southwest of Lasham when he saw a twin-engine aircraft take-off from RW09. Shortly afterwards, he was circling to the left in a thermal when he heard a loud engine sound and the Beech appeared in his field of view, banking steeply right to avoid him, he thought.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE ODIHAM APPROACH CONTROLLER reports the BE200 pilot reported climbing out of Lasham to the west, en-route to Compton, and requested a Traffic Service. No traffic was seen on radar to affect so the pilot was advised to free-call Farnborough LARS West. The pilot acknowledged the frequency and changed.

Factual Background

The weather at Odiham was recorded as follows:

METAR EGVO 091350Z 07008KT 9999 FEW030 SCT040 17/10 Q1021 BLU NOSIG=

A transcript of the Odiham Approach VHF frequency was provided, as follows:

From	To	Speech Transcription	Time
BE200	APR	Odiham good afternoon [BE200 C/S]	14.58.05
APR	BE200	[BE200 C/S] Odiham Approach good afternoon, pass message	14.58.07
BE200	APR	[BE200 C/S] is a King Air just getting airborne from Lasham, shortly routing to [destination], requesting a Traffic Service please. We're just westbound at the moment, shortly levelling three thousand feet from Lasham looking to come north routing to Compton.	14.58.11
APR	BE200	[BE200 C/S] roger, for a Traffic Service suggest you free-call Farnborough, one two five decimal two five zero.	14.58.25
BE200	APR	One two five decimal two five zero, wilko	14.58.33

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

The BE200 and glider pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard¹. With the glider orbiting in a thermal, the incident geometry would have continually changed from converging to overtaking to head-on. It could be considered in keeping with the spirit of the applicable legislation that in this apparently converging/overtaking situation a powered aircraft would give way to a glider.

Occurrence Investigation

The BE200 operating company Safety Manager commented that it was a common occurrence for their crews to operate from Lasham and that the threat from gliders at this airfield was well understood by all crews. The pilot in this case was well aware of glider activity and took all reasonable actions to try to avoid them. It is unfortunate that, in this case, his track took him towards a previously unseen aircraft. The company had decided to review its procedures in light of this occurrence.

Comments

BGA

We commend the BE200 crew for their proactive efforts to maximise their lookout in airspace that was always likely to be busy with gliders. If they operate regularly from Lasham, P-FLARM could be a useful additional aid.

Summary

¹ SERA.3205 Proximity.

An Airprox was reported when a BE200 and a glider flew into proximity at 1359 on Wednesday 9th September 2015. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC and neither was in receipt of an Air Traffic Service.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, a report from an air traffic controller involved and comments from the appropriate operating authorities.

Members quickly agreed that this was an unfortunate incident in that the Silent 2 pilot had been aware that the BE200 had become airborne from Lasham (but not its subsequent routing) and the BE200 pilot was in the process of attempting to establish a Traffic Service to mitigate against potential airborne conflict. Some members wondered why the Odiham controller had not agreed a Traffic Service with the BE200 pilot, but also noted that the controller had reported not seeing any conflicting traffic and therefore that a Traffic Service would not have afforded Traffic Information on the glider in this case anyway.

Members noted that the BE200 operating company commonly operated from Lasham and wondered whether there were better means of coordination to mitigate against an occurrence such as this one. It was suggested that the BE200 pilot could more efficiently have departed the Lasham area to the east and north, with a phone call to Odiham before departure to advise of transit of their MATZ. Another suggestion was of a pre-departure call on the Lasham A/G frequency, advising those listening of the BE200 pilot's intention to turn right and depart climbing to the west and then north. A gliding member suggested that if the BE200 was a regular visitor to Lasham then fitment of P-FLARM would also help provide some mitigation to risk of collision. Members agreed that none of these suggestions were a panacea, but that there were proactive steps to mitigation available.

After some discussion concerning the pilots' responsibilities, it was noted that each shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and that this incident had been caused by a late sighting by the BE200 pilot and effectively a non-sighting by the Silent 2 pilot. Members noted that the BE200 pilot had taken the proactive and sensible step of moving someone who would normally occupy the cabin to the cockpit right-hand seat to assist in lookout, but that their sighting was unfortunately late. The BE200 pilot's description of CPA indicated that he had had time to assess that there was no immediate risk of collision, and that separation was therefore not down to providence. However, members also noted the glider pilot's description of the event and commented that glider pilots often seem less concerned by close encounters because they are used to operating very close to each other when thermalling. For a glider pilot to comment that he first heard the engine noise and then judged there to be a high risk of collision as the BE200 appeared in his field of view indicated that, notwithstanding a degree of 'startle factor', this was likely a very close incident. In the end, the Board agreed that safety margins had been much reduced below the norm.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: A late sighting by the BE200 pilot and effectively a non-sighting by the Silent 2 pilot.

Degree of Risk: B.