


AIRPROX REPORT No 2015180

Date: 9 Oct 2015 Time: 1635Z Position: 5110N 00040W Location: 5nm SW Guildford

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	B206	PA28
Operator	Civ Pte	Civ Club
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Basic	Basic
Provider	Farnborough LARS(W)	Farnborough LARS(W)
Altitude/FL	1800ft	NMC
Transponder	A, C, S	A, S
Reported		Not reported
Colours	Blue/grey	
Lighting	Beacon, strobes, HISL	
Conditions	VMC	
Visibility	>10km	
Altitude/FL	1800ft	
Altimeter	QNH (1021hPa)	
Heading	360°	
Speed	112kt	
ACAS/TAS	TAS	
Alert	TA	
Separation		
Reported	<50ft V/ <500m H	
Recorded	NK V/0.1nm (185m) H	



THE B206 PILOT reports heading north to his destination in clear weather with good visibility and light winds. When about 5nm southwest of Guildford, he saw a red hot-air balloon landing to the northwest of Godalming. He also noticed a traffic indication ‘without relative altitude’ on his TAS at a location close to that of the hot-air balloon. About 30sec later, the TAS issued an audio warning (warning threshold was set at 2nm). He kept ‘a sharp look out’ to the left 10-11 o’clock. Shortly after, at a range of less than 1nm, a white and dark coloured PA28 appeared from about 30° left of the nose on an estimated bearing of about 320-330° and at the same altitude. The B206 pilot made a sharp climbing turn to the left, towards west, and the pilot of the other aircraft also turned left, towards east. The B206 pilot noted that he could see the logo on the fin of the PA28.

He assessed the risk of collision as ‘Medium’.

THE PA28 PILOT reports that he did not recall an Airprox or passing close to another aircraft and was ‘just following ATC instructions from Farnborough’. He declined to file an Airprox report.

THE FARNBOROUGH LARS (W) CONTROLLER reports that he was informed of the Airprox by unit management, that it was not reported on frequency at the time and that he had no recollection of the incident.

Factual Background

The weather at Farnborough was recorded as follows:

METAR EGLF 091620Z 07006KT 9999 FEW043 15/08 Q1021=

Analysis and Investigation

CAA ATSI

The B206 pilot was tracking northwards, maintaining altitude 1800ft and in receipt of a Basic Service from Farnborough LARS (W). The PA28 pilot was tracking southeast, also in receipt of a Basic Service from Farnborough LARS (W). No level information was available as the aircraft was not transponding Mode C although the PA28 pilot had reported his altitude as 1900ft at 1622:15.

At 1634:15, another pilot advised Farnborough LARS (W) that they were going to change to another frequency. The Farnborough controller instructed them to standby and, at 1634:21 (Figure 1), commenced passing Traffic Information on the PA28 to the B206 pilot.




Figure 1: 1634:21

The B206 pilot momentarily keyed his transmit switch but did not reply until asked by the controller if he was visual, which the B206 pilot confirmed at 1634:32. Reciprocal information was then passed to the PA28 pilot at 1634:37, and the sighting of the B206 by the PA28 pilot was confirmed at 1634:42. CPA was at 1634:32 (Figure 2) with the aircraft separated by less than 0.1nm horizontally.




Figure 2: 1634:32

CAP774 states¹:

'Basic Service relies on the pilot avoiding other traffic, unaided by controllers/FISOs. ...'

'Given that the provider of a Basic Service is not required to monitor the flight, pilots should not expect any form of traffic information from a controller/FISO. A pilot who considers that he requires a regular flow of specific traffic information shall request a Traffic Service.'

UKAB Secretariat

The B206 and PA28 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard². If the incident geometry is considered as head-on or nearly so then both pilots were required to turn to the right³, notwithstanding their responsibility to avoid collision. If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the PA28 pilot was required to give way to the B206⁴.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a B206 and a PA28 flew into proximity at 1635 on Friday 9th October 2015. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, both in receipt of a Basic Service from Farnborough LARS (W).

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of a report from the B206 pilot, radar photographs/video recordings, a report from the air traffic controller involved and a report from the appropriate ATC authority.

The Board first considered the Farnborough LARS (W) controller's actions and commended him for providing Traffic Information to the pilots when both were in receipt of just a Basic Service; although the PA28 did not display a Mode C altitude, he used that pilot's last reported altitude to make a judgement of risk and passed Traffic Information to both pilots, albeit to the PA28 pilot after CPA. Some members thought that the pilots would have been better served by formally asking for a Traffic Service from Farnborough, although they acknowledged that they had effectively received one nonetheless.

Turning to the pilots' actions, the B206 pilot had received a TAS indication and alert on the PA28 and had sensibly biased his lookout towards the indicated direction of traffic. A discussion ensued about whether he could also have changed his track at this point, at least to break the collision course. However, members agreed that although this could be one course of action, the fact that the other pilot's intentions couldn't be predicted meant that the best course of action was probably to try to achieve visual contact and be prepared to manoeuvre if required. It was unfortunate that neither pilot was seemingly able to achieve visual contact until a relatively late stage but, without a report from the PA28 pilot, it was not possible to analyse his actions fully. From his brief statement it appeared that he did not see the B206, did not take avoiding action and, consequently, the turn perceived by the B206 pilot appeared to have been coincidental.

Members opined that the PA28 pilot's assertion that he was 'just following ATC instructions from Farnborough' may indicate a lack of understanding of the provisions of a Basic Service given that no instructions from ATC are offered under such a service. However, they could not explore this train of thought further due to his choice not to participate in the Airprox process, for which the Board voiced their disappointment given that valuable flight safety lessons, for the benefit of all, might not be detected as a result.

¹ Chapter 2, Paragraphs 2.1 and 2.5

² SERA.3205 Proximity.

³ SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c) (1) Approaching head-on.

⁴ SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c) (2) Converging.

In the absence of a report from the PA28 pilot, the Board determined that the cause of the incident had simply been a conflict in Class G which had been resolved, at least in part, by the B206 pilot. The B206 pilot's reported separation, the recorded radar separation and the rate of closure of the aircraft in what amounted to a head-on situation persuaded the Board that safety had been much reduced from the norm.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: A conflict in Class G resolved at least in part by the B206 pilot.

Degree of Risk: B.