


AIRPROX REPORT No 2014036Date/Time: 4 Apr 2014 0946ZPosition: 5052N 00216W
(4nm W of Blandford Forum)Airspace: London FIR (Class: G)Aircraft 1 Aircraft 2Type: DA42 Twinstar PA28Operator: Civ Trg Civ TrgAlt/FL: 1400ft 2500ft
(1008hPa) NKConditions: VMC VMCVisibility: 10km >10nmReported Separation:

0ft V/<0.25nm H 0ft V/200yds H

Recorded Separation:

200ft V/0.1nm H

**PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB**

THE DA42 PILOT reports flying a white aircraft, under VFR, eastbound towards Bournemouth Airport, for a join at Tarrant Rushton, at 1400ft, squawking transponder Modes A & C, and avoiding cloud to remain VMC. Having left Yeovilton's frequency, the pilot had selected Bournemouth Radar's frequency but was briefing his student about joining the visual circuit and had not yet established 2-way communication or agreed an Air Traffic Service. Due to the briefing, the pilot recalls that his lookout had probably been degraded before he saw the PA28 '1/4 mile' away, approaching 'head-on' on a reciprocal track at the same level. He made a 'steep turn to the right' but noted that the PA28 did not appear to take any form of avoiding action. In his open and frank report, the DA42 pilot commented that he might have been better served in establishing an appropriate Air Traffic Service with Bournemouth Radar before commencing his briefing, in order to supplement his lookout at a time of increased workload. However, he also noted that because the weather was VMC he would likely have asked for a Basic Service anyway.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE PA28 PILOT reports departing Bournemouth with a student flying the white aircraft at 95kt, VFR, clear of cloud, with the rotating beacon illuminated, and squawking transponder Modes A and C. Receiving a Basic Service from Bournemouth Radar as they were leaving 'controlled airspace', the pilot saw a twin-engined white aircraft in his 12 o'clock, at the same level, around 200 yards away; the other aircraft was 'turning away' in a right-hand turn so the PA28 pilot decided that no further action was necessary. He did not receive any Traffic Information, but did not expect any as he was under a Basic Service. In his candid report, the pilot opined that possibly his '40 years in little aircraft' had made him a little more 'blasé' about seeing other aircraft when operating under VFR.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'Low'.

Factual Background


The Bournemouth weather at 0950 was recorded as:

EGHH 040950Z 26007KT 240V310 9999 BKN030 12/09 Q1009=

Analysis and Investigation

CAA ATSI

At 0939:40 the PA28 pilot reported leaving controlled airspace, and a Basic Service (under which there was no requirement to monitor the flight) was agreed with Bournemouth Radar. Screenshots from the local radar recordings at 0946:30, 0946:40 and 0946:50 (CPA) are shown below. The DA42 did not call on frequency until 0947:30, after the incident. No mention was made on the Bournemouth frequency of an Airprox.



UKAB Secretariat

Both pilots had equal responsibility to avoid a collision.¹ The aircraft appeared to the pilots to be approaching head-on so both were required to alter course to the right, which the DA42 pilot did.²

Summary

An Airprox was reported in Class G airspace, 4nm to the west of Blandford Forum, between a DA42 and a PA28. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC; the PA28 pilot was in receipt of a Basic Service from Bournemouth Radar, and the DA42 pilot had not yet established radio contact with Bournemouth Radar.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available included reports from the pilots of both aircraft, transcripts of the relevant RT frequencies, radar photographs/video recordings, reports from the air traffic controller involved and reports from the appropriate ATC and operating authorities.

The Board agreed that this was a relatively straightforward conflict in Class G airspace and members praised both pilots for their frank and open reporting. With see-and-avoid being the primary means of deconfliction, the Board noted that the DA42 pilot had reported briefing a student whilst listening out on Bournemouth Radar's frequency; they agreed with his own assessment that he would have been better served to have adjusted his priorities by establishing two-way communications with Bournemouth Radar first, and agreeing a Traffic Service to supplement his lookout, before adding to his task-load by briefing his student. Turning to the actions of the PA28 pilot, the Board agreed that, whilst he may have assessed that avoiding action was unnecessary, the encounter had been very close, and that his decision to take no action at all did not set a good example to his student.

Considering how close the encounter was, and that both aircraft were visible on the Bournemouth radar recording, members thought it would have been helpful if the Bournemouth controller could have passed Traffic Information to the PA28 pilot, who was on the frequency at the time. However, it was noted that the PA28 pilot had agreed a Basic Service and, consequently, there was no requirement for the Bournemouth controller to pass Traffic Information, or even to maintain track identity on the PA28. The controller could well have been busy or working on higher priority tasks

¹ Rules of the Air 2007, Rule 8, Avoiding Aerial Collisions

² Rules of the Air 2007, Rule 10, Approaching Head-on

and, if the PA28 pilot had wished to supplement his lookout, he could easily have requested a Traffic Service.

The Board quickly agreed that the cause was a late sighting by both pilots. Turning to the degree of risk, members agreed that the CPA had been close enough to warrant an assessment of A; however, because the DA42 pilot had seen the PA28 just in time to take avoiding action and increase the separation, in the end a risk of B was agreed: safety standards had been much reduced below the norm.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: A late sighting by both pilots.

Degree of Risk: B

ERC Score³: 20

³ Although the Event Risk Classification (ERC) trial had been formally terminated for future development at the time of the Board, for data continuity and consistency purposes, Director UKAB and the UKAB Secretariat provided a shadow assessment of ERC.