

AIRPROX REPORT No 2014174

Date/Time: 12 Sep 2014 0658Z

Position: 5158N 00014W
(3nm NE Luton Airport)

Airspace: London TMA (Class: A)

Aircraft 1 Aircraft 2

Type: A319(1) A319(2)

Operator: CAT CAT

Alt/FL: 5000ft 5000ft
QNH (1024hPa) QNH (1024hPa)

Conditions: VMC VMC


Visibility: 3700M 30KM

Reported Separation:

0ft V/2.5nm H NK

Recorded Separation:

100ft V/3.5nm H



PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

THE AIRBUS A319 (1) PILOT reports being outbound from RW08 at Luton Airport (LTN) under IFR in VMC, in receipt of a Radar Control service from LTN Approach. Beacon, strobes and landing lights were illuminated; SSR Modes C and S were selected; TCAS was fitted. His departure clearance was an OLNEY (OLY) SID from RW08, climbing to 4000ft. He began the initial climb and was handed over to LTN Radar. On first contact, he was given a climb to 5000ft. He continued the climb, maintaining 222kt on the first turn of the SID [a left turn]. During this turn, at 5000ft and whilst passing through approximately 040°, he was instructed to 'turn right heading 250°'. This was followed by 'sorry, turn immediately right heading 040°' (he thought). This turn was initiated. Passing through north, TCAS showed another A319 at the same level on a direct intercept. The pilot of this aircraft was also given an avoiding action right turn. The minimum separation, he thought, was approximately 2.5nm at the same level on a reciprocal track. He did not receive a TCAS TA or RA.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE AIRBUS A319(2) PILOT reports that he was conducting an empty positioning flight (pilots only, no cabin crew) from Stansted to LTN, in receipt of a Radar Control service from LTN Approach. He departed RW04 on a Barkway (BKY) 2S SID. He was approximately 7nm north of the LUT NDB at 5000ft and 250kt on an assigned heading from LTN Radar of 260° when ATC issued an avoiding-action right turn instruction onto heading 300°. He disconnected the Auto-pilot and rolled 30-35° angle of bank onto the heading. Traffic was seen on TCAS in the 8 o'clock position, 400ft below and climbing. No TCAS TA or RA was received. ATC confirmed the turn was to maintain radar separation, and that the other aircraft was a departure from RW08 at LTN.

He perceived the severity of the incident as 'Medium'.

THE TC LTN INTERMEDIATE DIRECTOR reports that A319(1) departed LTN on an OLY SID RW08 climbing to 4000ft. A319(2) was heading west through the LOREL gate at 5000ft. He mistakenly thought that A319 (1) was on a COMPTON (CPT) SID and, on first contact, instructed the pilot to climb to 5000ft. As the aircraft climbed through 3000ft he instructed him to turn right heading 250° in accordance with normal practice, but noticed that he was starting to turn left. Immediately he realised that he was on an OLY departure and he gave an avoiding action right turn onto heading 080°. The turn would keep him 4-5nm south of A319(2). To ensure separation was maintained as A319(1) was

turning, he then also gave an avoiding action right turn, heading 300°, and Traffic Information to the pilot of A319(2). Standard separation was maintained throughout.

Factual Background

The LTN weather was:

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EGGW 120650Z 05006KT 360V080 2700 BR SCT002 OVC003 13/13 Q1024=
EGGW 120720Z 07007KT 3800 BR FEW002 OVC003 13/12 Q1025=
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Analysis and Investigation

CAA ATSI

ATSI had access to reports from both pilots, the LTN Radar controller, area radar recordings and transcription of the LTN Radar frequency. A319(1) was operating IFR on a flight outbound from LTN in receipt of a Radar Control Service from LTC LTN Radar. A319(2) was operating IFR on a flight from Stansted to LTN in receipt of a Radar Control Service, also from LTC Luton Radar on the same frequency. At 0657:18, (Figure 1) the A319(1) pilot contacted LTN Radar passing 2500ft climbing to 4000ft on the OLY1C SID from LTN. The LTN Radar controller instructed A319(1) pilot to squawk 'ident' and climb to 5000ft which was read back correctly.




Figure 1

In his written report the LTN Radar controller stated that he mistakenly thought that A319(1) was on a CPT SID (Figure 2) with a right turn out instead of the Olney 1C (Figure 3) which turns left.




Figure 2: CPT SID




Figure 3: OLY1C SID

At 0657:55, the LTN controller instructed the A319(1) pilot to turn right heading 250° which was read back correctly. The LTN controller then transmitted “[A319(1) C/S] my apologies maintain- er fly radar heading turn right immediately fly radar heading of er zero eight zero degrees”. The A319(1) pilot read back “turn right and maintain radar heading zero eight zero degrees er [A319(1) C/S]”. Figure 4 shows the relative aircraft positions at the end of this transmission.




Figure 4

At 0658:27, the A319(2) pilot was given avoiding action and instructed to turn right heading 300°. The LTN controller also passed Traffic Information on A319(1) to the A319(2) pilot. The CPA occurred at about 0658:46 when the aircraft were 3.5nm horizontally and 100ft vertically separated. There was no loss of separation.

UKAB Secretariat

Notwithstanding that the pilots were in receipt of an Air Traffic Control clearance where minimum required separation was 3nm horizontally or 1000ft vertically if within 3nm, they also shared an equal responsibility to avoid colliding with the other aircraft¹.

¹ Rules of the Air 2007 (as amended), Rule 8 (Avoiding aerial collisions).

Summary

The Airprox occurred in the Class A airspace of the London TMA, between two Airbus A319s. Both pilots were in receipt of a Radar Control Service from the TC LTN Intermediate Director. The controller mistakenly believed that A319(1) was on a Compton SID, turning right after take-off, and gave its pilot a climb to 5000ft. However the pilot of A319(1), following his cleared OLY1C SID routeing, turned left which, together with the clearance to climb, brought the aircraft into conflict with A319(2). When the controller realised his mistake he gave a heading to the A319 (1) pilot to avoid A319 (2), and gave avoiding action and Traffic Information to the pilot of A319 (2). Standard separation (3nm/1000ft) was maintained; minimum separation was 3.5nm horizontally and 100ft vertically. Neither pilot received either a TCAS TA or RA.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available included reports from both pilots and the controller concerned, area radar and RTF recordings and reports from the appropriate ATC and operating authorities.

It was readily apparent to the Board that it had been the Luton Radar controller's actions that had led to the Airprox being filed. He had mistakenly thought that the pilot of A319 (1) was cleared on a Compton SID from Luton which involved a right turn after departure from RW08. However, A319 (1) was actually carrying out an Olney SID, which specified a left turn out. Believing that A319 (1)'s route was to the south, the controller instructed the pilot to climb to 5000ft which resulted in the left-hand turning A319 (1) coming into potential conflict with A319 (2), which was to the north of LTN at 5000ft. Civil ATC TC members commented that there were a number of sources to inform the controller of A319 (1)'s SID: it was displayed on the departure CCTV screen; it was on the Flight Progress strip; on initial contact the pilot had reported departing on an Olney SID; and the code 'R' shown on the aircraft's SSR data box on the radar display indicated that it would be on a north-bound route. An ATC member reported that he had discussed the issue with the controller concerned, who could offer no reason why he had mistaken A319 (1)'s SID. All that being said, the Board also noted that the controller had quickly realised that A319 (1) was unexpectedly turning left and had issued corrective actions to both pilots in time to ensure that standard separation criteria were maintained.

The Board considered the reasons why the pilot of A319 (1) had decided to file an Airprox report despite standard separation being maintained. One factor was believed to be the receipt of the avoiding action call which reversed his aircraft's direction of turn and placed doubt in his mind as to the relative positioning of the other traffic. This would have been reinforced by the fact that although he had neither received a TCAS TA nor RA, he perceived that TCAS was showing another aircraft at the same level on a direct intercept at 2.5nm. The Board agreed that the Airprox was fundamentally one of perception by the pilot of A319 (1), who was concerned about the proximity of A319 (2).

Although the root of the Airprox lay in the controller's action in climbing A319 (1) to 5000ft in the mistaken belief that it was on a CPT SID, the Board noted that he had corrected this in time to maintain standard separation and that his actions were more a contributory factor to the Airprox rather than the cause itself. Although his action had caused the concern to its pilot, he had resolved the incident without a loss of separation.

The Board then turned its attention to the risk and opined that it was not normal procedure for pilots to receive avoiding action turns within Class A airspace; therefore, they agreed that, although the incident had, in the end, been benign, this precluded the Airprox being categorised as Risk E. They again noted that the controller's avoiding action turns had been timely in ensuring that standard separation had been maintained; therefore, because effective action had been taken to prevent the aircraft colliding, the Board categorised the Airprox as risk Category C.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

<u>Cause:</u>	The pilot of A319 (1) pilot was concerned by the proximity of A319 (2).
<u>Contributory Factor:</u>	The controller instructed A319 (1) pilot to climb to 5000ft in the mistaken belief that he was on the CPT SID.
<u>Degree of Risk:</u>	C.
<u>ERC Score:</u> ²	50.

² Although the Event Risk Classification (ERC) trial had been formally terminated for future development at the time of the Board, for data continuity and consistency purposes, Director UKAB and the UKAB Secretariat provided a shadow assessment of ERC.