

## **AIRPROX REPORT No 2012126**

Date/Time: 17 Aug 2012 1444Z

Position: 5540N 00620W (2nm  
SW Islay A/D - elev 56ft)

Airspace: Islay ATZ/FIR (Class: G)

Reporting Ac Reported Ac

Type: BE200 PA28R

Operator: CAT Civ Pte

Alt/FL: 700ft↓ 700ft  
QNH (1004hPa) QNH (1004hPa)

Weather: VMC CLBC VMC CLOC


Visibility: 10km+ 10km+

Reported Separation:

300-400ft V/0.3-0.5nm H Not seen

Recorded Separation:

Not recorded



## **PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB**

**THE BEECH BE200 KINGAIR (BE200) PIC** reports he was the PF whilst inbound to Islay from Glasgow under VFR, squawking A7414; Modes C and S were on but TCAS is not fitted. They had been notified earlier by Scottish CONTROL that a PA28R was also inbound to Islay; he advised that his BE200's ETA at Islay A/D was 1443 and Scottish CONTROL informed them that the PA28R would arrive 2–3min later. Scottish CONTROL 'cleared' them to descend inbound Islay and switched them to Islay INFORMATION on 123.15MHz. They established contact with Islay INFORMATION, announced their estimated arrival time and distance out and that they planned to fly overhead the A/D and then turn downwind directly into a left hand visual cct to land on RW31. The PA28R pilot also made contact on the RT and reported to Islay INFORMATION an ETA at the A/D about 1min after his BE200. Islay INFORMATION understood that they would arrive close together and suggested that the PA28R pilot enter a holding pattern a minimum of 3nm W of the A/D, over the water, until their BE200 had landed; the PA28R pilot confirmed that he would do this. They reported E of the A/D with about 1min to run; he was already in visual contact with the RW and began the approach as previously announced. At about 2nm SW of the A/D heading 150° at 150kt, descending through 700ft QNH (1004hPa), in VMC, they 'discovered' the PA28R in their 10 o'clock in level flight at a slightly higher altitude, on a broadly N'y course. The PA28R passed 300-400ft above his ac about 0.3–0.5nm away; no avoiding action was taken as the PA28R was heading the opposite way and above them; he was descending and so continued downwind and performed a normal landing on RW31. His ac is coloured white; the HISLs were on.

**THE PIPER CHEROKEE ARROW PA28R (PA28) PILOT** reports he was flying solo inbound to Islay from Elstree under VFR with scattered cloud around, but he was able to remain clear of cloud throughout the cruise at 5000ft and the descent into Islay; the visibility was excellent. Routeing from TURNBURY VOR/DME to Islay, approaching the A/D from the E at 110kt, squawking A7000 with Modes C and S on, he called Islay INFORMATION on 123.15MHz. The FISO informed him that the BE200 - on a scheduled service - was due O/H within 1min of his ETA and so he advised the FISO that he would be happy to head out to the W, past the A/D, to hold over the water about 3nm away to allow the BE200 to land ahead. The choice to allow the BE200 to land ahead was due to it being a scheduled service and the fact that his PA28 was burning far less fuel. The choice to go out over the water was due to the mountainous terrain around Islay that he wished to avoid, particularly as the cloud base over Islay was below some of the high ground to the E.

As he crossed over the shore to the SW of the A/D he encountered a low bank of cloud and so made an immediate hard turn to the L to remain clear of the cloud. After turning through 90°, level at 700ft, he reduced the bank angle of this L turn and executed two 360° orbits to the S of the A/D, but during this period he lost visual contact with the BE200. During the second orbit he drifted to the north and into the Islay ATZ and flew close to the BE200 that was downwind for RW31; he did not see the BE200 and could not estimate the minimum separation. Subsequently, he joined the cct and landed.

After landing he visited the Tower and the FISO informed him that he had been close to the BE200, therefore, he filed an MOR some 48hr later setting out the above.

In hindsight, the situation could have avoided if:

Following his change of course as a result of encountering cloud, he should have informed the FISO; however, he was pre-occupied avoiding both the weather and terrain.

He should have entered the cct directly upon arriving O/H the A/D and allowed the BE200 to land ahead, which would have allowed him to maintain visual contact.

The ac is coloured white/blue and the HISL was on.

**THE ISLAY A/D FLIGHT INFORMATION SERVICE OFFICER (FISO) REPORTS** he was working the BE200 inbound from Glasgow when the PA28 pilot called up at 1438 some 9nm E of the A/D at 3000ft ALT descending to 2000ft ALT, requesting landing and joining instructions. He passed the aerodrome information and traffic information on the BE200, which was acknowledged. The PA28 pilot estimated the A/D at 1442Z, whereas the BE200 crew's estimate was 1443Z.

At 1439 the BE200 pilot estimated he would be O/H at 2500ft ALT in 2½ min time, but was unsure where the PA28 was, so the FISO passed details of the PA28 to the BE200 pilot, whose intentions were to fly O/H the A/D, descend to 1000ft ALT and turn L into a visual cct to RW31. This was acknowledged and the BE200 crew were asked to report O/H. At 1441 he asked the PA28 pilot if he had copied this information; the PA28 pilot acknowledged the call and reported visual with the other ac. The BE200 crew reported 1 minute out at 1441, but they were still unsure where the other traffic was, so he asked the PA28 pilot for an update on his position. PA28 pilot replied he was descending, 1000ft above the cloud base, 3nm SE of Islay and would hold S until the BE200 has landed. He confirmed that the BE200 crew had copied this information, which was acknowledged and their position given as 1nm due E of the A/D. Asking the PA28 pilot his intentions, the pilot replied that he would head out W over the water and hold 3 miles away until the BE200 had landed. This was acknowledged and further TI was passed to the PA28R pilot about an inbound air ambulance, to which the PA28R pilot replied that he would try to land between the traffic.

At 1442 the BE200 crew reported O/H with their intentions, which was to cct L to land on RW31; this was acknowledged. He [the FISO] was now visual with the BE200 and he advised its crew accordingly, who were also asked to report finals for RW31.

With the BE200 downwind L for RW31 at 1443, when asked to report finals for RW31, the crew advised they were still not visual with the other traffic – the PA28R. This was acknowledged and it was reiterated that the PA28 pilot was going to hold 3 miles to the W until the BE200 had landed, and then fly in to finals, which the BE200 crew copied. The BE200 crew reported they had a light ac in sight at 1444 and at this point he also saw the PA28, as it flew through some cloud from the W heading towards the O/H, passing approximately 200-400ft above the BE200. Both ac landed safely without further incident.

UKAB Note (1): The UK AIP at AD2 EGPI-5 notifies the Islay ATZ as a circle of 2nm radius centred on RW13/31 extending from the surface to 2000ft above the A/D elevation of 56ft amsl.

UKAB Note (2): This Airprox occurred outwith recorded radar coverage. The radar recording shows the two ac converging to a horizontal separation of 3.6nm, before the PA28R contact fades about 3min before the Airprox occurred.

UKAB Note (3): The Islay SPECIAL Wx report provided by the FISO is:

1438Z 25012kt; 50km Nil Wx; SCT @ 1100, SCT @ 1900; 17/15; Q1004; RW31.

**ATSI** reports that the Airprox was reported at Islay Aerodrome when the BE200 and PA28 came into proximity while the BE200 was making an approach to land on RW31.

The BE200 crew was operating VFR from Glasgow to Islay and in receipt of a BS from the Islay FISO on 123.150MHz. The PA28 pilot was operating VFR from Elstree to Islay and in receipt of a BS from the Islay FISO on frequency 123.150MHz.

CAA ATSI had access to written reports from the pilots of the BE200 and the PA28 and also from the Islay FISO together with RTF recordings. Although both ac can be seen on the area radar recordings on initial approach to Islay, neither ac was visible on radar at the time of the Airprox.

Islay METARs:

1420Z 15007KT 080V200 9999 BKN010 SCT024 18/16 Q1004=  
1450Z 25010KT 200V260 9999 BKN011 SCT042 17/15 Q1004=

At 1432:00, the BE200 crew called Islay INFORMATION stating that they were 10 minutes from Islay and requested the latest Wx. The Islay FISO passed the Wx details and asked the BE200 pilot to report field in sight.

At 1438:20, the PA28 pilot advised Islay INFORMATION that he was 9nm E of Islay descending from 3000ft to 2000ft Islay QNH (1004hPa) and requesting joining instructions. The PA28 pilot was passed the A/D information, with TI on the BE200 inbound from Glasgow that was estimating Islay at 1442. The PA28 pilot acknowledged the TI and advised the FISO that his estimate for Islay was 1443.

At 1439:50, the BE200 pilot called again and advised the FISO that they were at 2500ft QNH and estimating the field in, *"..about 2 and a half minutes"*. A BS was agreed and the FISO asked the BE200 pilot if he had copied the information on the PA28. The BE200 pilot replied that he was unsure of the position of the PA28 but that it seemed that both ac would arrive at the same time.

The FISO re-iterated the TI on the PA28 to the BE200 crew who replied that their intentions were, *"to go overhead the field..descending down to 1 thousand feet and then most likely a left..visual turn in for runway 3-1"*. The FISO acknowledged this and asked the BE200 pilot to report O/H. At 1440:40, the FISO asked the PA28 pilot if he had copied the BE200 crew's intentions; the PA28 pilot replied that he had and that he was visual with the BE200.

At 1441:20, the BE200 crew transmitted to the FISO that they were 1 minute from the A/D and, *"still uncertain about the other traffic"*. The FISO asked the PA28 pilot to transmit his position and altitude. The PA28 pilot transmitted that he had, *"descended 1 thousand feet just below the cloudbase about 3 miles south..east of Islay..we can just hold to the south until the Beech is clear"* at 1441:40.

The FISO checked that the BE200 crew had copied that and then asked the pilot of the PA28 what his intentions were. The pilot of the PA28 replied that, *"we'll head out to the west of the field over the water and..we can circle about 3 miles away until the Beech lands"*. The FISO acknowledged this and advised the PA28 pilot of another ac inbound estimating the field at 1451.

At 1442:40, the BE200 crew advised the FISO that they had just passed O/H and were turning L inbound to land. The FISO acknowledged this and stated that he was visual with the BE200.

At 1443:20, the BE200 crew reported downwind L for RW31 and added that they were not visual with the PA28. The FISO advised the BE200 crew that the PA28 was intending to hold out to the W until they had landed.

At 1444:00, the BE200 crew reported that they had a light ac in sight to which the FISO replied, “*I have both of you visual*”.

The BE200 pilot’s written report states that he was expecting the PA28 to hold 3nm W of the A/D but as they were downwind, encountered the PA28 in their 10 o’clock between 0-3-0-5nm away and 300-400ft vertically above them, on a northerly heading.

The written report from the PA28 pilot states that he informed the FISO that he would head out W to 3nm from the A/D to allow the BE200 to land. As the PA28 crossed the coast the pilot encountered low cloud and entered a sharp L turn to maintain VMC. The turn took the PA28 back through the ATZ and close to the BE200 that was downwind (as reported by the BE200 – the PA28 pilot did not have visual contact with the BE200). In his report the PA28 pilot acknowledges that he should have informed the FISO of his change of plan.

The FISO’s written report states that he expected the PA28 to proceed out W as the pilot had stated. When the BE200 crew reported that they had the PA28 in sight the FISO saw the PA28 heading towards the overhead from the W and believed that the PA28 had passed overhead the BE200 by 200-400ft.

The PA28 pilot expressed his intention to hold 3nm to the W of the A/D in order to allow the BE200 to land. The FISO passed appropriate TI and ensured that both the PA28 and the BE200 pilots were kept informed of each other’s intentions as notified to the FISO.

When the PA28 pilot encountered low cloud he did not inform the FISO of his change of plan and therefore the FISO was unable to update the BE200 on the PA28 pilot’s intentions.

As the FISO did not have both ac in sight until the Airprox occurred he was unable to pass accurate position information on the PA28 to the BE200 pilot.

The Airprox occurred when the BE200 crew was positioning downwind for RW31, approaching to land and the pilot became concerned about the proximity of the PA28, which the BE200 pilot expected to be 3nm to the W.

As the FISO was unaware of the change of the PA28 pilot’s intentions he was unable to provide assistance to the BE200 in the form of updated TI.

## **PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS**

Information available included reports from the pilots of both ac, transcripts of the Islay RT frequency and a report from the ISLAY FISO.

The Board agreed with the PA28 pilot’s analysis of the incident and its cause. Having offered to remain clear of the ATZ to allow the BE200 to land ahead of him, the PA28 pilot should have notified the FISO when he was forced to change his plans to remain clear of cloud. Of course, an orbit at 3nm from the A/D would inevitably mean the closest point of approach would be closer than 3nm and the BE200 pilot flying downwind at 2nm distance from the A/D might have expected to see the PA28 at close range. However, he would not have anticipated seeing the PA28 fly between him and the A/D. The Board agreed that the incident would not have occurred if both ac had conducted a

standard overhead join but noted that the scattered cloud reported in the 1438Z Met Special may have precluded it. In assessing the role of the FISO, the Board agreed that he had done all that might be expected of him in ensuring both pilots had SA on the other ac and he could not have done any more in the circumstances to prevent the incident.

In assessing the risk the Board considered that, notwithstanding that the PA28 pilot did not see the BE200, the separation of 0.3-0.5nm and 300-400ft in VMC was sufficient to suggest that there was no risk of collision.

### **PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK**

Cause: Whilst avoiding cloud, the PA28 pilot flew into conflict with the BE200 in the Islay ATZ.

Degree of Risk: C.