AIRPROX REPORT No 2012174

Date/Time:	29 Nov 2012 1344Z	
Position:	5054N 00029W (1·4nm SSW Parham G/S)	
Airspace:	LFIR	(*Class: G*)
	Reporting Ac	*Reported Ac*
Type:	Scheibe SF25C Falke M/Glider	RA390 Premier 1
Operator:	Civ Club	Civ Pvt
Alt/FL:	2500ft (QNH)	NR
Weather:	VMC CLNC	NR
Visibility:	30km	NR
Reported Separation:	Very close	NR
Recorded Separation:	~0·1nm	



PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

THE SCHEIBE SF25C FALKE MOTOR GLIDER PILOT reports, 7 weeks post incident, en-route from Shoreham to Lasham, VFR and not in communication with any ATSU; no transponder was fitted. The visibility was 30km in VMC and the ac was coloured canary yellow with strobe lights switched on. About 1nm W of Parham, heading NW'ly at 2500ft QNH and 80kt, a business jet was first sighted abeam his R wing tip at very close range. It passed them from behind rolling R and climbing before it rolled L, presumably back onto its course. He believed that the jet would have collided had it not taken avoiding action. He assessed the risk as high.

The pax pilot provided a brief description, 12 weeks post incident. He believed the incident occurred about 3nm SW of Parham; they had been looking at the Gliding Site just before the encounter so were within a short distance of the spot. Their altitude was around 2500ft and after the incident they descended 200-250ft to about 2300ft amsl so that they would not be cruising at a round number of feet. The twin-engine (rear-mounted) business jet approached from the ENE and departed WSW. He had seen it over his R shoulder a split second before it passed, their heading was NW'ly, and he thought it was marginally above their level. After passing it turned a bit to the L; he believed it was resuming its original heading having jinked a bit to its R to avoid their ac before it disappeared in the direction of the I-O-W.

UKAB Note (1): The identity of the business jet was delayed owing to an incorrect time provided by the reporting pilot. Initially, following confirmation of the erroneous time by the SF25 pilot, it was thought the reported ac may have been a DA42 TwinStar, which was seen on the recorded radar about 15min prior to the stated time. However, no radar contact could be seen which correlated to the SF25's departure from Shoreham on a NW'ly track. The SF25 pilot agreed that from his viewpoint of the other ac it could have been a DA42. The DA42 pilot kindly provided a report which included the sighting of, and subsequent avoiding action taken on, a glider close to Parham. However the geometry of the encounter described by the SF25 pilot could not be correlated to the track observed to be flown by the DA42. After a further request to the SF25 pilot to confirm the date/time of the incident, he was able to confirm (10 weeks post incident), after consultation with his pilot pax who had returned from extended absence abroad, that the incident time was over 50min prior to the previous time given. RAC Mil carried out further tracing action and found the radar

recording for the revised time does capture the Airprox. The reported ac was identified as a RA390 Premier 1 business jet. Unfortunately the operator ceased trading 2 weeks post incident and it has not been possible to obtain a report from the crew.

UKAB Note (2): Shoreham METAR shows: - EGKA 291350Z 36012KT 9999 FEW020 06/02 Q1011=

ATSI reports an Airprox occurred 1·4nm SSW of Parham gliding site and was reported by the pilot of a Scheibe Falke motor glider (SF25).

The SF25 was on a VFR flight from Shoreham to Lasham and was not in contact with an ATSU.

The reported ac was a Raytheon RA390 Premier 1 (PRM1), which had departed from Manston and was in contact with Farnborough LARS. The fps from Farnborough seems to indicate that the PRM1 was in receipt of a TS but due to the time elapsed between the incident and the confirmation of the Airprox time and date (78 days) it was not possible to obtain RT recordings.

CAA ATSI had access to written reports from the pilot of the SF25 and area radar recordings.

There is no report available from the pilot of the PRM1. As there are no recordings available from Farnborough it cannot be established if TI was passed to the PRM1 flight on the SF25.

[UKAB Note (1): The area radar recording at 1342:39 shows a primary return 2·5nm SSE of Parham tracking NW, which is believed to be the SF25. The PRM1 is seen 5nm E of Parham tracking WSW squawking 5020 (Farnborough LARS) at altitude 2400ft (QNH 1012hPa). The ac close on a line of constant bearing and by 1343:39 the SF25 is in the PRM1's 1130 position range 1·6nm. The SF25 exhibits track jitter as the ac close, and by 1344:07 the SF25 is just L of the PRM1's 12 o'clock range 0·3nm. The CPA occurs between the next 2 radar sweeps at 1344:11 and 1344:15, the SF25 crosses ahead of the PRM1 from L to R but its primary returns are unreliable owing to jitter. It is seen to steady in the PRM1's 4 o'clock on the radar sweep at 1344:19 at range 0·3nm; taking the SF25's speed prior to and post jitter it is estimated the separation is about 0·1nm at the CPA. Subsequently the ac diverge, the PRM1's Mode C shows a descent of 100ft at 1344:19 to altitude 2300ft, which is maintained for 8sec before readjusting to 2400ft.]

The Airprox occurred in Class G airspace where the principles of see and avoid apply. It is unclear if the PRM1 flight received TI on the primary return believed to be the SF25 but ultimately the pilots of both ac were responsible for their own collision avoidance.

An Airprox was reported by the pilot of the SF25 when it came into proximity with a PRM1.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available included reports from the SF25C pilot, radar video recordings and reports from the appropriate ATC authorities.

Without the benefit of a report from the Premier 1 crew or a full ATC investigation, Members had only limited information on which to assess the incident. As this had occurred in Class G airspace both crews were responsible for maintaining their separation from other traffic through see and avoid. The Premier 1 had approached the SF25 from its R rear quarter and was only spotted by both pilots on board the SF25 in their R 3-4 o'clock position shortly before it passed very close behind. The SF25 was there to be seen for some time as it was crossing through the PRM 1's projected flightpath but without knowing whether the PRM 1 crew had seen the SF25, Members could only categorise this incident as a conflict.

Looking at the risk element, the Board was unsure whether there was enough information to make an assessment. From the SF25 cockpit's viewpoint, it appeared that the PRM 1 crew may have taken late avoiding action on their ac as it was perceived to have manoeuvred as it passed. The

radar recording does not show any discernible track deviation but any small/momentary deviation would be unlikely to show. This perceived avoiding action manoeuvre flown by the PRM 1 may have been purely fortuitous. If the SF25 had passed unsighted to the PRM 1 crew, then a definite risk of collision existed, risk A. Alternatively, if the PRM 1 did manoeuvre as late avoiding action, given the radar recording shows the ac passing about 0·1nm apart, the action taken had been just enough to remove the actual collision risk but safety was not assured, risk B. On balance it was judged that this had been a risk bearing Airprox with at least a B rating for the risk.

A Board Advisor commented that he was airborne from Parham that afternoon and there were several gliders operating on the S Downs where the Airprox occurred as the Wx conditions were favourable for ridge soaring. A gliding pilot Member also commented that it was fortunate that the PRM 1 was cruising at 2400ft crossing the S Downs as the strength of the N'ly wind over the local terrain on that particular day made it conducive for flying on the N side of the ridge at around 1500ft. for best lift.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: A conflict in Class G airspace.

Degree of Risk: B.