

## AIRPROX REPORT No 2011076

Date/Time: 10 Jul 2011 11075Z (Sunday)

Position: 5055N 00046W  
(3nm N Goodwood)

Airspace: Lon FIR (Class: G)

Reporting Ac Reported Ac

Type: Luscombe 8A Cessna 172

Operator: Civ Pte Civ Pte

Alt/FL: 2000ft 1600ft↓  
QNH (1018mb) QFE

Weather: VMC CAVOK VMC NR


Visibility: 35km >10km

Reported Separation:

100ft V/200m H NR

Recorded Separation:

NR V/0 H



## PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

**THE LUSCOMBE 8A PILOT** reports flying a pleasure flight, from a farm near Horsham to Sandown, I.O.W. in a white ac with a belly strobe switched on, in receipt of a BS from Farnborough radar (West) but no transponder was fitted. He was tracking about 250° at 90kt from Billingshurst and when he was between Cocking & Singleton (North East of Goodwood horse racing track) at 2000ft QNH, he looked to his right, through RH door window and saw an ac less than 200m away and slightly lower. He pulled back on the control stick but probably did not achieve much more separation before the ac crossed. The other ac which he thought might have been a white C152/172 with a dark blue stripe, continued on its track of about 160°. He thought that the ac might be Goodwood based and he did not see it until very late, as he it came from his rear RH quarter. He reported the incident to Farnborough after landing and assessed the risk as being high.

He remarked that he is conscious of the importance of a good lookout and will continue to look for methods of improving his scan.

**THE CESSNA 172 PILOT** reports flying on a private flight from Denham to Goodwood in a white ac with blue stripes, squawking 7000 with Modes C and S. The flight was flown at about 2000ft on the London QNH and after leaving Denham ATC he transferred to Farnborough and was given a BS and routed just to the SW of the Farnborough overhead, direct to Goodwood; Farnborough terminated the service when they were about 12nm from Goodwood and he transferred to Goodwood ATC. As their cct traffic was light he requested to join R Base for RW24. At the time of the reported Airprox he was conducting a gentle descent heading 160° to position as advised. Both he and his passenger, who is also a PPL holder, were keeping a careful lookout for possible cct traffic, and listening to the local ATC for reports of other ac but neither of them saw the Luscombe ac which reported the Airprox (or any other ac) so he could not assess the risk. Their ac is of the high wing type, so visibility upwards, particularly when in a descent, is difficult. They did not hear the Luscombe report the incident on the Goodwood ATC frequency and were only aware of the incident when contacted by RAC.

**ATSI** reports that the radar recordings used for the investigation of the Airprox were sourced from the Gatwick radar head, which is not supplied to Farnborough.

The C172 established communication with Farnborough LARS (West) at 1042 on transfer from Farnborough LARS (North), the pilot reporting 10nm from WOD and he was instructed to squawk 0432 and place on a BS. The ac continued to route via WOD and overhead Farnborough Airport, towards its destination, Goodwood aerodrome.

At 1102:28, the Luscombe L8A (L8) contacted the Farnborough (West) frequency. The pilot's attempt to establish communication was broken, so he was requested to pass the message again. Consequently at 1103:00, the pilot reported, "*heading for Sandown out of Slinfold Wellcross Farm [near Horsham] two thousand feet one zero one eight QNH no transponder Basic Service*" and the controller confirmed the provision of a BS. The radar photograph shows the C172 tracking S at 2200ft and a primary radar return tracking SW, believed to be the L8, is 7.3nm to its SE. No further RTF transmissions were made to, or received from, either ac until 1104:30, when the C172 was instructed to, "*squawk seven thousand freecall Goodwood...*" At that time the C172 was at 2100ft, 9.2nm from Goodwood, with the primary return 5.1nm SE of it.

The radar recordings show the subject ac continuing on conflicting tracks, coming into close proximity at 1107:26.

[UKAB Note (1): Although the primary return believed to be the L8 shows severe track jitter, they coincide at 1107.26.]

The West Controller reported that the returns from the L8 were intermittent and at the time of the Airprox it was not showing on the radar display. No transmissions were made to the L8 until 1115, when the pilot was asked to report his position but no response was received.

Although the C172 pilot did not request a BS or read back the service as required on the West frequency, the service was probably a continuation of the service being provided on the North frequency and the pilot confirmed in his report that he was aware that he was receiving a BS.

The MATS Part 1, Section 1, Chapter 11, Pages 4/5, defines a BS:

'A Basic Service is an ATS provided for the purpose of giving advice and information useful for the safe and efficient conduct of flights. Basic Service relies on the pilot avoiding other traffic, unaided by controllers. It is essential that a pilot receiving this service remains alert to the fact that, unlike a Traffic Service and a Deconfliction Service, the provider of a Basic Service is not required to monitor the flight. Controllers may allocate SSR codes to ac in receipt of a Basic Service. The issuance of such a code does not constitute the provision of a surveillance service.'

## **PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS**

Information available included reports from the pilots of both ac, transcripts of the relevant RT frequencies, radar recordings, reports from the air traffic controllers involved and reports from the appropriate ATC authorities.

The Board noted that this incident took place in Class G airspace where 'see and avoid' is the principal method of collision avoidance; in this case the two pilots had an equal and shared responsibility to avoid each other but under the RoA the Luscombe, having the C172 on its right, should have given way to it; this however, is dependant on the pilots seeing each other's ac and in this case neither did so in time to take any effective avoidance.

When trying to analyse the conspicuity aspects of the incident, Members noted that both ac had been flying at similar speeds, closing on a line of constant bearing and with little or no relative

movement, making them difficult for their respective pilots to detect or, it was proposed they had possibly been in each other's blind areas. A GA Member reminded pilots of the importance of manoeuvring their ac and/or moving their head to minimise 'blind' areas particularly when flying through congested areas. He also reminded that flying at unusual alts can reduce the probability of ac conflicting at the same height; 2000ft for instance is well used but few pilots elect to fly at, for instance, 1750ft, which in this case could have increased the vertical separation.

While noting that the incident took place after both ac had left the Farnborough frequency, Members observed that, although both pilots had requested an ATS, apparently neither had requested a TS despite flying through a very congested area.

Since neither pilot saw the opposing ac in time to take any effective avoidance, most Members agreed that in this incident there had been an actual risk of collision.

### **PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK**

Cause: A non-sighting by the C172 pilot and effectively a non-sighting by the Luscombe 8A pilot.

Degree of Risk: A.