

AIRPROX REPORT No 2011128

Date/Time: 29 Sep 2011 1632Z

Position: 5141N 00010E
(Stapleford CCT– elev
185ft)

Airspace: Lon FIR (Class: G)

Reporting Ac Reported Ac

Type: C152 PA23

Operator: Civ Trg Civ Pte

Alt/FL: 1000ft↓ 1000ft↓
QNH (1023mb) NK

Weather: VMC VMC


Visibility: 15km 9999

Reported Separation:

200ft V/400m H NK

Recorded Separation:

NR V/0.1nm (180m) H



PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

THE C152 PILOT reports that they were flying a white ac on a training flight, squawking 7000 with Mode C but TCAS was not fitted, in receipt of an A/G service from Stapleford while conducting cct training on RW22 (LH). They were established on base leg in the descent, heading 310° at 90kt and while passing through 1100ft QNH, he became aware of a PA23 ac, lower than them and turning inside the base leg from downwind. The PA23 stopped the turn and proceeded to fly underneath their ac so they immediately conducted a climbing right turn having by then descended to 1000ft QNH. The PA23 appeared in front of them and slightly to the L now conducting a climbing left turn onto final approach; he estimated its height at that stage to be below 700ft QNH and it was about 400ft in front of them. Had they not observed the PA23 fly from behind and underneath the nose of their ac they would have collided whilst both making the final turn.

He estimated the risk as being high.

THE PA23 PILOT reports flying a white ac with a red stripe with all external lights switched on, on a private VFR flight from Bembridge to Stapleford via MAY VOR, QE2 Bridge, squawking with Modes C and S, but TCAS was not fitted and initially he was in receipt of a BS from Farnborough East Radar. At the QE2 Bridge he changed to Stapleford Radio, received the airfield information, the QNH and QFE and was told that the RW in use was 22(L).

As he came from the E and Stapleford has a LH cct, he overflew the airfield at 2000ft, reported 2000ft overhead and descended on the dead side. He crossed the end of RW22 at 1200ft and then turned downwind, there was one ac [ac3] about 1.5nm ahead of him also on the downwind leg and he reported downwind one ahead. He turned base for RW22 at 90kt and at the normal distance out of about 2.5nm from touchdown and by that time the ac ahead of him was well into its final approach. He turned final descending at .9nm then called final.

By that time an ac that he later realised was behind and above him called TWR informing them that he turned finals in front of it. He did not know where it came from, didn't see it on the downwind leg or on base and continued to make a safe approach and landing; while continuing his approach and landing the ac behind him went around.

He could not estimate the separation as the ac was behind and assessed the risk as being low.

UKAB Note (1): The Stansted METAR was:

METAR EGSS 291620Z 13010KT CAVOK 25/16 Q1023

UKAB Note (2): The recording of the Debden Radar shows the incident. Although all 3 ac are squawking 7000, from the timings and pilots' reports, there is little doubt that these are the ones involved. At 1630:09 the PA23 is in the mid-downwind position displaced 1.5nm laterally from RW midpoint, at an alt of 1000ft, ac3 is at the end of the base leg, about to turn final at an alt of 900ft and about 1.5nm from the displaced threshold and the C152 is 1.2nm from the PA23 in its 1230 o'clock but not displaying Mode C info (its DW track was displaced 1.7nm laterally from the RW). At 1630:44 ac3 is short final at 600ft alt, abeam the PA23 at 800ft and the C152 is in the PA23's 1230 o'clock at 0.7nm, 2.2nm from the threshold having started its turn onto base leg 18sec previously. As the C152 is crossing the PA23's nose at 0.7nm the latter commences its turn onto base leg inside the C152 at an alt of 800ft. The two ac close to 0.1nm, the C152 always being behind the PA23 and the former commences a go around falling further behind the PA23 which continues inbound and disappears from radar at 1629:41. The vertical separation cannot be determined.

ATSI reports that Stapleford provides an A/G service that is not recorded; that being the case they had nothing to add.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available included reports from the pilots of both ac and radar recordings.

Accepting that smaller aerodromes are not necessarily required to record their RT, the lack of an RT recording/transcript limited the inquiry since it cannot be determined what the respective pilots transmitted or were in a position to have heard.

Aerodrome ccts are visual environments where 'see and separate' is the principal means of collision avoidance and joining ac are required by the RoA to fit in with the pattern established by preceding ac. Regardless of the size of the pattern being flown by ac ahead, following ac should conform to it, go around or depart the cct and rejoin later.

Members noted that this incident took place in good weather and light conditions and in a fairly quiet visual cct.

The PA23 pilot had clearly thought that there was only one ac ahead of him, saw an ac on the final approach and was satisfied that he was fitting in with the traffic pattern. However, in reality there were 2 ac ahead and he did not see the C152 and therefore could not fit in with the pattern it was flying. Although the PA23 pilot reported that he transmitted 'one ahead' this part of his transmission was either not heard or its significance was not assimilated by the C152 pilot or the A/G operator which would most likely prompted a clarification request.

Although the C152 pilot saw the PA23 in sufficient time to initiate effective avoidance, since the latter pilot did not see the C152 nor was he aware of its presence until after the event, Members agreed that safety was not assured.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: The PA23 did not conform to the pattern being formed by the C152 and flew into conflict with it on the base leg/final turn.

Degree of Risk: B.

