

AIRPROX REPORT No 2010165

Date/Time: 16 Oct 2010 1437Z (Saturday)

Position: 5113N 00146W (2.25nm S
Netheravon - elev 455ft)

Airspace: D126/Para DZ (Class: G)

Reporting Ac Reported Ac

Type: BN2T C208

Operator: Civ Comm Civ Club

Alt/FL: 2000ft
(RPS) ↓cct

Weather: VMC CLBC VMC CLOC


Visibility: >10km 10km

Reported Separation:

Nil V/200m H Not seen

Recorded Separation:

500ft V/0.2nm H



PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

THE BN2T PILOT reports flying a sortie in support of an Army training exercise in Salisbury Plain DA complex squawking 7002 with Modes S and C. The visibility was >10km flying 500ft below cloud in VMC and the ac was coloured white/blue with anti-collision, nav and strobe lights all switched on. They had been cleared into the areas by Salisbury Ops on the previous day and D126 and D128 were active from the surface to 6000ft on the Portland RPS for their operations. The adjacent D125 was their Western limit as live firing was taking place. They had also been briefed by Salisbury Ops that parachuting would be going on at Netheravon and gliding at Upavon. Prior to departure he confirmed this information by listening to the Salisbury Ops recorded activity bulletin by telephone, as Salisbury Ops was not usually manned at weekends, as was the case on the day of the incident. The task was to monitor a proposed surface convoy route from the E of D126 to the W along the Southern transit route up to crossing point C [3000m/1.5nm SW of DZ centre]. In order to achieve this they were flying below cloud cover to maintain good camera contact with the proposed targets. On entering the range he established communications with Netheravon both to establish their movements and inform them of theirs. Netheravon stated that it was quiet and that only 1 ac was in use. He asked Netheravon to inform them prior to each drop, which they did as part of their 'clear to drop' procedure. Most of the time the BN2T was sufficiently S of Netheravon not to need to take evasive action. Twice the Army asked for them to look at areas closer to the airfield but before proceeding closer he confirmed with Netheravon that he was clear to do so. On one occasion when they were tasked to look at a crossing N of crossing point C, they had to make a number of moves S to avoid the paradrops as and when required. The paradrop ac [the C208] took-off in an E'ly direction and was never a threat, climbing out of sight to the E. On returning from the drop the ac would descend rapidly to the E and its pilot announced when it was passing 4000ft, at which point they would all start looking for the drop ac as its route was a wide downwind leg to R base for RW06. This route brought the drop ac close to their operational area but on most occasions the paradrop pilot would announce that he was visual with their ac first and then they would reciprocate when visual. The paradrop ac did not stay confined to the ATZ and would roam freely through the active Danger Area. He heard some chat on the radio between Netheravon and the drop ac pilot about, "its XXXX's turn now, you can change over soon". Shortly afterwards whilst heading 270° close to crossing point C at 90kt and 2000ft RPS they were looking for the paradrop ac after a drop as a call was made by its pilot at 4000ft seconds before the C208 appeared 800m away, high and to their L heading straight at them; the ac had descended to the W and was making a straight-in approach.

He immediately turned L to avoid it; the C208 then passed to their R by 200m as it descended through their level. He asked the C208 pilot if he was visual with his ac at the time and its pilot replied, "who are you?" He stated his c/s and informed the C208 pilot that he had just missed his BN2T. The C208 pilot then said that the BN2T should not have been there as it was an active Danger Area. He informed the C208 pilot that it was active for his ac working with the Army and that he had been in contact with Netheravon and the drop ac all morning. The C208 pilot apologised and landed thereafter. They finished their tasking about 10min later and departed for their final destination. He assessed the risk as low.

THE C208 PILOT reports flying for parachuting duties during the afternoon on the day of the incident and in communication with DZ Control on 128.3MHZ, squawking 0033 with Mode C. The visibility was 10km in VMC and the ac was coloured white/blue/red with nav and strobe lights switched on. Before commencing his duty he went to the Drop Zone (DZ) control bus as normal and spoke with the DZ controllers but they did not mention that there was or would be any other traffic operating in the vicinity of the DZ to affect. He took over from the morning pilot who briefed him on the run-in to use and suggested RW in use. He listened to the ATIS where he heard that there may be activity in D126 during his shift and was aware that there may be traffic S and W of the DZ up to 6000ft. With this in mind the final part of his descent at 150kt was on the delineation line between D126 and D128, making his base leg turn N up the Pewsey Valley along the boundary of D125 for a R turn onto RW06. He was unsure how many sorties he had completed on the day before the BN2T pilot spoke to him on the radio but on timings it must have been either his first or second sortie. At the time he was positioned RH downwind, he thought, and was asked whether he had seen the BN2T to which he replied he hadn't. There was also a short conversation where he mentioned his surprise that the BN2T was operating so close to the Netheravon DZ and thereafter he agreed to give position reports to keep adequate separation on future sorties during the rest of the day. He had not seen the BN2T and its pilot did not seem concerned at the time so he was surprised to hear the next day that an Airprox had been filed. Also, he learned that there had been an agreement for the BN2T flight to operate in conjunction with the parachute operation which was agreed on the previous evening but which he was not privy to.

UKAB Note (1): The MIL AIP at AD 2-EGDN-1-6 Para 2.17 promulgates Netheravon ATZ as a circle 2nm radius centred on N511449.66 W0014515.33 from SFC to 2000ft aal; elevation 455ft. The aerodrome is active 0800-1700 Mon-Fri, other times available to meet operational requirements. AFIS or A/G service is available to meet operational requirements. Intensive parachuting takes place seven days a week during daylight hours. RW06/24 is an unlicensed grass strip on the western side which may be used by parachuting and Netheravon Flying Club ac only when there is no FISO service and is entirely at pilot's discretion.

UKAB Note (2): The UK AIP at ENR 5-5-3-3 promulgates Netheravon as a Free-fall Drop Zone circle 1.5nm radius centred on 5111423N 0014615W from FL150 active normally during daylight hours. Activity notified on the day to Salisbury Operations or alternatively on 128.3MHZ.

UKAB Note (3): The DZ is approximately 1200m SSW of the Netheravon ARP. The unlicensed RW06/24 is 300m N of the DZ Reference Point.

UKAB Note (4): The SPTA Airspace Allocation for the weekend 16/17th October promulgates the BN2T activity in SPTA areas 17/18/19 between 1230-1530; no operating height was shown. Areas 17/19 are within D126 either side of a N/S dividing line through the Netheravon E airfield boundary. D125 was active with live firing 0830-0030; D126 and D128 were not firing. Netheravon JSPC/APA was promulgated active during daylight hours. The Airspace Allocation sheet and an Information and NOTAM sheet for SPTA and Netheravon is created by Netheravon Stanops on the Friday at 1200Z prior to the weekend activity and is faxed to various units including the JSPC/APA. These 2 sheets are also attached to the OPS room window for viewing by airfield users.

UKAB Note (5): Boscombe Down was active 0730-1500Z. The Boscombe METAR was 1450Z AUTO 02015KT 9999 FEW029 13/06 Q1021=

UKAB Note (6): AIS provided a copy of the Pre-Flight Information Bulletin (PIB) for the 16th October which included a NOTAM for the BN2T activity within D128: -

EGTT/QRDCA/IV/BO/W/000/060/5116N00144W005
DANGER AREA EG D128 EVERLEIGH ACTIVATED ABOVE NORMAL LVL. FIXED WING
ACTIVITY
LOWER: SFC
UPPER: 6000FT AMSL
FROM: 16 OCT 2010 06:00 **TO:** 16 OCT 2010 16:00 F3351/10

UKAB Note (7): The Pease Pottage radar recording clearly captures the incident. At 1435:00 the BN2T is seen 2.25nm S of Netheravon tracking 080° following a LH racetrack pattern, squawking 7002 [Danger Areas General] and indicating FL020 (2240ft QNH 1021mb) with a G/S 80kt. At the same time the C208 is seen 1.7nm NW of Netheravon in a slow L turn passing through heading 210° squawking 0033 [Aircraft Paradropping] indicating FL089 descending, ROD 4000fpm and G/S 190kt. Eighteen seconds later at 1435:18 the BN2T commences a L turn whilst the C208 is turning through heading 190° 1.8nm W of Netheravon, descending through FL077. The BN2T rolls out on a SW'yly track at 1436:00 level at FL020 whilst the C208 is steady on a track of 170° on the E boundary of D125 passing FL051 in the descent, 2nm to its W. The C208 commences a L turn towards Netheravon at 1436:12 descending through FL042, in the BN2T's 12 o'clock range 1.5nm. Twenty four seconds later the CPA occurs; the C208 is now steady on a NW'yly track descending through FL025 passing through the BN2T's 12 o'clock from L to R range 0.2nm, which is 500ft below at FL020. The next sweep shows the BN2T having turned L, which accords with the BN2T pilot's reported avoiding action, onto a S'yly heading at FL021 with the C208 diverging to the NW descending through FL020.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available included reports from the pilots of both ac, radar video recordings and reports from the appropriate operating authorities.

It appeared to Members that the C208 pilot had noted, from the ATIS, the BN2T's activity to the S and W but its proximity to the DZ, known to the previous BN2T pilot, had not been assimilated. That said, the C208 pilot's chosen flightpath, post paradrop, had taken his ac into the BN2T's notified activity area so, with the Airprox occurring in Class G airspace, there was equal responsibility on both pilots to maintain their own separation from other traffic through 'see and avoid'. However, for whatever reason, he had not seen the BN2T, which was in the airspace into which he was turning, and this was a part cause of the Airprox. The BN2T pilot had established an accord with the previous C208 pilot but had been surprised when he saw the C208 approaching from a different direction, late, as it descended towards Netheravon; this was the other part cause of the Airprox. Members agreed that better communication between the pilots concerned of their relative positions during each paradrop evolution would have improved their SA immensely.

Looking at the risk element, although the C208 pilot did not see the BN2T, the BN2T pilot saw the C208, 800m away above and descending, and took prompt and robust avoiding action to the S; the radar recording showing 500ft and 0.3nm at the CPA. This was enough to persuade the Board that any risk of collision had been quickly and effectively removed.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: A non-sighting by the C208 pilot and a late sighting by the BN2T pilot.

Degree of Risk: C.