


AIRPROX REPORT No 2022110

Date: 21 Jun 2022 Time: 1445Z Position: 5106N 00255W Location: Middlezoy village

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	Europa XS	Vans RV8
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Listening Out	Listening Out
Provider	129.830MHz	129.830MHz
Altitude/FL	NK	NK
Transponder	A, C	Off
Reported		
Colours	White	White
Lighting	None	None
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	500ft	600ft
Altimeter	QNH (1014hPa)	QNH
Heading	080°	080°
Speed	65kt	80kt
ACAS/TAS	PilotAware	Not fitted
Alert	None	N/A
Separation at CPA		
Reported	100ft V/100m H	0ft V/0.5-0.75NM H
Recorded	NK	



THE EUROPA XS PILOT reports that whilst returning to Westonzoyland from a local flight, they heard a number of aircraft calling 'Middlezoy Traffic' for joining and runway in use. There were approximately 6 aircraft calling so they decided to orbit south of Bridgwater, as it appeared that there was an impromptu fly-in at Middlezoy. When it was quieter on the radio, they called to advise that they were 4 miles east of the field and would make an overhead join for Westonzoyland. There was a response from a person on the ground at Middlezoy advising them that RW08 was in use. They confirmed that they would be landing at 'Westonzoyland', the operator acknowledged and apologised for their error. When they were overhead, they confirmed on the radio that they were descending to land on RW08 at Westonzoyland. They made a downwind call for RW08 at Westonzoyland and eventually confirmed that they were on final approach to RW08, at Westonzoyland. At this time, an aircraft on the ground at Middlezoy advised that they were at the hold and would wait for [the Europa] to land before they took off. They confirmed again that they were on final approach for RW08 at Westonzoyland. Unfortunately, they were a little fast when they touched-down, so called that they were going-around making sure to emphasise that they were at Westonzoyland. Just after making this call, they heard the aircraft at Middlezoy call that they were rolling for take-off. This left them in a dilemma as normal practice is to turn right after take-off from RW08 at Westonzoyland to avoid the no-fly zone, but they knew that they would be turning into the path of an aircraft that was taking-off from Middlezoy, so they continued straight ahead. Looking behind, they were just able to see the aircraft taking-off as it appeared to be making smoke like an aerobatic aircraft. They continued straight ahead but lost sight of the aircraft. They made a call to get the other aircraft's position and then saw the aircraft, no longer making smoke, on their right and slightly above. They estimated that the aircraft was less than 100m to their right and less than 100ft above. They did not know if the other pilot had them in sight but, if they did, they made no attempt to turn away from the Europa as in the standard departure, but continued straight ahead. Westonzoyland is a small airfield near Bridgwater in Somerset where microlight aircraft and group 'A' aircraft have been operating for a number of years. A certificate of lawful use was granted for microlight

aircraft on part of an original WW2 runway 15/33 in 2000, with permission for the use of an additional grass runway (03/21) granted in 2013. A grass taxiway connects the existing runways and has been used occasionally for many years as an extra runway when the weather conditions favour its use. There is a non-standard departure and overhead join procedure which exists to comply with 'no fly zones' which form part of the original planning consent. In recent years, aircraft have begun operating from another part of the same old WW2 airfield under the name of 'Middlezoy'. Middlezoy airfield is a few hundred metres from Westonzoyland airfield, they have 3 runways orientated 08/26, 15/33 and 06/24. Both airfields operate using the common Microlight Frequency 129.830MHz.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE VANS RV8 PILOT reports that they were on climb-out at Middlezoy when they observed an aircraft parallel also in the climb at around ½ to ¾ a mile to their left. The other pilot asked for their position and they replied 'I'm in your 3 o'clock', to which they replied 'visual'. By this point, the RV8 was ahead and above the other aircraft on a heading of around 150°. When they observed the other aircraft take a right turn, they initiated a wide left turn to pass behind at a range of ¾ to 1 mile to go on track. At no point was there a threat of collision and they were visual throughout. They opined that they considered this to be a malicious MOR as there was no threat and both pilots were visual with good separation. There appears to be a conflict between the two airfields, driven by Westonzoyland towards Middlezoy, which is not a healthy situation. Many attempts have been made by Middlezoy to have a meeting to resolve any issues but these are ignored.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'None'.

A MIDDLEZOY REPRESENTATIVE reports that Middlezoy does not operate with an AGO – both sites use the common microlight frequency 129.830MHz for reasons of flight safety to co-ordinate movements. To the best of their knowledge, the course of events was that the RV visited Middlezoy to take one of their resident aircrew flying. After returning from their sortie, the RV8 pilot joined the resident pilots for a coffee before departing. They were briefed as a reminder on the departure procedure which for RW08 requires a right turn onto east directly after take-off remaining below 500ft until passing abeam Middlezoy village when a further climb is made as required. [The representative] was in their car on the way home as the RV was taking-off and waited short of the runway until it took-off and passed by in a right-hand climbing turn. The RV8 had waited at the threshold for the Europa approaching Westonzoyland to land. It would appear that the Europa made the decision to go around but one assumes the [go-around] call may not have been heard by the RV pilot who, thinking the Europa was on the ground, finally began their take-off run.

They noted that flying at Middlezoy is governed, in addition to the usual regulations, by their own Flying Order Book that all Middlezoy-based pilots have to read, sign for annually, and comply with. Their procedures are clearly explained on their website, in Pooley's Flight Guide, and also on their Facebook page. They take great care not to inconvenience their colleagues at Westonzoyland, but are disappointed that despite stating to the contrary, the management will not communicate with them to discuss any operational matters, despite many requests on [Middlezoy's] part to host such meetings.

Factual Background

The weather at Yeovilton was recorded as follows:

METAR EGDY 211420Z VRB03KT 9999 BKN040 23/11 Q1021=

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

Unfortunately, the incident did not show on the NATS area radars, the Europa pilot had provided GPS data, which enabled their track to be plotted. Unfortunately, without GPS data from the RV8 the exact geometry of the two aircraft could not be determined.

At Figure 1 is a satellite picture showing the location of the two airfields.



Figure 1

The following circuit information was found on the Westonzoyland website:




Figure 2

The following information was found on the Middlezoy website:

Middlezoy Aerodrome Joining Instructions

In order to deconflict with traffic from Westonzoyland Microlight site (who circuit to the East at 800ft) it is important to follow the instructions below:

Join overhead not below 2000ft and proceed to the South not descending until abeam Middlezoy village when you can then descend to 500ft and make your approach to the runway in use (26/08 is primary, wind permitting) along the indicated tracks.

Make blind R/T calls to "Zoyland Microbase" on 129.830. Do not expect a reply but listen out for other aircraft. Suffix all your calls with " Middlezoy". eg - " G-FRED approaching left base runway 26 Middlezoy"

At all times avoid the villages of Middlezoy and Othery and the Model Flying site shown on the photo.

Maintain a good lookout at all times (there may be non-radio traffic around). If a go-around is necessary do not climb above 500ft until abeam Middlezoy following the briefed tracks as above.

Aircraft parking is East of the hangar, South of R/W 26.

Departure R/W 26: Fly straight ahead for 1 minute or until abeam Westonzoyland Village not above 500ft then climb and proceed as required avoiding the Westonzoyland and Middlezoy circuit area.

Departure R/W 08: On lift off turn immediate right through 45 deg not above 500ft until abeam Middlezoy Village then climb and proceed as required avoiding Westonzoyland and Middlezoy circuit area.




Figure 3: taken from the Middlezoy airfield website

The Europa XS and RV8 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.¹ An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation.² When an aircraft carries a serviceable SSR transponder, the pilot shall operate

¹ (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

² (UK) SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.

the transponder at all times during flight, regardless of whether the aircraft is within or outside airspace where SSR is used for ATS purposes.³

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a Europa XS and a Vans RV8 flew into proximity in the vicinity of Middlezoy village at around 1445Z on Tuesday 21st June 2022. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, neither in receipt of an ATS.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots and GPS data from the Europa. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first discussed the working relationship between Westonzoyland and Middlezoy. They noted that following a previous Airprox⁴ they had made a recommendation that the two airfield managers develop a LoA regarding integration of their operations. This recommendation had been partially accepted at the time, with both parties agreeing to meet. The Board were therefore extremely disappointed to discover that the situation had not moved any further forward. Furthermore, they thought that this lack of integration had contributed to the Airprox on this occasion (**CF1**). Members considered whether to make a further recommendation, but thought that to do so would be repeating previous work and instead, resolved to urge the operating authorities of the two units to agree on a way forward before there was a more serious incident.

The Board then looked at the actions of the Europa pilot. They had sensibly held off when they had heard aircraft flying in to Middlezoy and waited until the circuit was clear and the Board commended them for that. They had reported that they had made all of the appropriate calls and had also made sure that they had reiterated that they were to land at Westonzoyland, and indeed this was corroborated by the RV8 pilot. It was therefore unfortunate that the go-around became necessary, as at this point the RV8 pilot took-off. The Europa pilot then became concerned about the position of the RV8 as, under normal circumstances, they were required to turn right into the circuit. Members discussed whether the Europa pilot could have extended the circuit, climbed higher, or indeed turned left. They noted that there was a no-fly zone to the north of the airfield, but also noted that whilst it was a nature reserve no-fly zone, it was not a brick wall, and had the pilot truly thought they were in danger of colliding with the RV8, they could have turned over it. They noted that the GPS data log provided showed the Europa pilot flying more-or-less the usual visual circuit for Westonzoyland, and therefore concluded that, whilst concerned by the proximity of the RV8 (**CF6**), the Europa pilot had probably become visual with the RV8 fairly early into the climb-out.

Turning to the RV8 pilot, members wondered why, having held for the Europa to land, the pilot had commenced their take-off run before they knew the Europa had landed (**CF3**). Holding for a few more moments would not have made much difference, so they could only conclude that the pilot had not heard the Europa pilot's go-around call and therefore had inaccurate situational awareness about its positioning (**CF5**). That being said, it appeared that the RV8 pilot very quickly became aware of the situation, had been visual with the Europa as it climbed away and had been able to take action to turn behind it. Consequently, the RV8 pilot had not considered there to be a risk of collision. The Board noted that the pilot reported that their transponder had been turned off, although it had probably made no difference to this Airprox, because the Europa pilot had been aware that the RV8 was lined-up and ready to depart, still the Board wished to remind pilots that UK regulation requires that aircraft fitted with transponders should operate them at all times (**CF1, CF4**).

When determining the risk of the Airprox, the Board considered the two pilots' reports and noted that the RV8 pilot had been visual throughout, and had taken action to remain clear. They therefore quickly agreed that there had been no risk of collision. However, they thought that the lack of co-ordination

³ (UK) SERA.13001

⁴ Airprox 2019151 available from the UKAB website [here](#).

between the two airfields was concerning and therefore agreed that safety had been degraded; Risk Category C.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

2022110				
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
Flight Elements				
• Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance				
1	Organisational	• Flight Operations Documentation and Publications	Flight Operations Documentation and Publications	Inadequate regulations or procedures
2	Human Factors	• Use of policy/Procedures	Events involving the use of the relevant policy or procedures by flight crew	Regulations and/or procedures not complied with
• Tactical Planning and Execution				
3	Human Factors	• Insufficient Decision/Plan	Events involving flight crew not making a sufficiently detailed decision or plan to meet the needs of the situation	Inadequate plan adaption
4	Human Factors	• Transponder Selection and Usage	An event involving the selection and usage of transponders	
• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action				
5	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
• See and Avoid				
6	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment⁵

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because Westonzoyland and Middlezoy airfields are currently operating autonomously and would benefit from an LoA. Also, the RV8 pilot had been flying without their transponder selected on.

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because the RV8 pilot had not remained on the runway until the Europa had landed.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **partially effective** because the RV8 pilot had inaccurate situational awareness because they believed the Europa had landed.

⁵ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).

Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2022110		Outside Controlled Airspace						
Barrier	Provision	Application	Effectiveness					
			Barrier Weighting					
			0%	5%	10%	15%	20%	
Ground Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance							
	Manning & Equipment							
	Situational Awareness of the Confliction & Action							
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance							
Flight Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance							
	Tactical Planning and Execution							
	Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action							
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance							
	See & Avoid							
Key:			Full	Partial	None	Not Present/Not Assessable	Not Used	
Provision								
Application								
Effectiveness								