AIRPROX REPORT No 2022105

Date: 09 Apr 2022 Time: 1359Z Position: 5054N 00040W Location: 4.5NM NE Goodwood

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	P68	Paraglider
Operator	Civ Comm	Civ Hang
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	None	None[1]
Provider	N/A	N/A
Altitude/FL	2800ft	2880ft
Transponder	A, C, S	Not fitted
Reported		
Colours	White, Blue	Red, Purple, Blue
Lighting	Nav, Beacon, Landing	None
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	3000ft	3000ft
Altimeter	QNH (NK hPa)	amsl (GPS)
Heading	090°	SE-SSE
Speed	140kt	22kt
ACAS/TAS	SkyEcho	Not fitted
Alert	None	N/A
Separation at CPA		
Reported	100ft V/0.5NM H	400ft V/'minimal' H
Recorded	~100ft V/0.1NM H	



THE P68 PILOT reports that they were inbound to [destination airfield] at 3000ft 6NM NE of Goodwood. They had recently changed frequency from Goodwood Information to Shoreham Approach and the ATIS had just been noted, including a warning about paragliders in the area. Coincidentally, a paraglider was sighted shortly thereafter at less than 1NM, in their 11 o'clock, and at a similar altitude (approximately 100ft higher). An immediate descent to below 2500ft was made to avoid the paraglider. They recall that the paraglider was dark blue.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE PARAGLIDER PILOT reports that during a cross country flight they were on a straight glide; travelling at around 25kt, heading SE-SSE, sinking at around 1m/s, when they heard an aircraft below and to the west (side-on) of them. Looking down they observed the aircraft passing at what they assessed to be a safe distance heading east at, they guess, around 150kt, slightly in front and around 400ft beneath them. At least one non-competitive paraglider, a mainly white glider, was also flying in the approximate vicinity at the time of the Airprox. Partly for safety reasons, paragliders are usually dressed in bold colours which can be a useful assistance in identification. Their glider is red, purple and blue and is a custom (unique) colour scheme.

THE SHOREHAM CONTROLLER reports that the reported location of the Airprox was outside the area where they would routinely provide air traffic services (i.e. beyond the DOC of their radios). None of the staff recall providing a service to the P68 pilot at the time and location notified.

[1] The pilot reported that their radio was switched off.

Factual Background

The weather at Shoreham was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGKA 091350Z 23018KT CAVOK 10/03 Q1017
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Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken and the P68 was detected and identified using Mode S data, the paraglider was not detected; however, the pilot kindly supplied their GPS data file to the UKAB Secretariat, which has been used to produce the diagram to and measure CPA. However, as differing data sources have been used the CPA has been recorded as an approximation. The P68 had been in level flight prior to the Airprox and the descent that the pilot reported was first recorded on the radar sweep at which CPA occurred. The radar then recorded an increased rate of descent from the P68 until the aircraft was approximately 600ft below their previous cruise altitude. The GPS data file supplied by the paraglider pilot showed that they had been descending on a relatively straight course as described in their report.

The P68 and paraglider pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[2] If the incident geometry is considered as overtaking then the paraglider pilot had right of way and the P68 pilot was required to keep out of the way of the other aircraft by altering course to the right.[3]

Comments

BHPA

The BHPA commends the alertness of the paraglider pilot in hearing the P68 aircraft and monitoring its track and is relieved that no collision occurred. We also commend the P68 pilot, not only for their prompt descent when they saw the paraglider, but also for their forward planning actions in tuning Shoreham's ATIS and receiving information regarding paragliding activity in the area, which clearly increased their alertness to that risk.

Finally, we also commend the destination airfield's foresight in putting a warning on their ATIS regarding paragliding activity in the area. Perhaps this is an initiative that could be taken nationwide.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a P68 and a Paraglider flew into proximity 4.5NM northeast of Goodwood at 1359Z on Saturday 9th April 2022. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, neither in receipt of an ATS.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings and GPS data. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first discussed the actions of the P68 pilot and agreed that they had been managing their flight well. They had been planning ahead by copying the Shoreham ATIS, which included information regarding paragliding activity in the vicinity, and this had given them generic awareness of the presence of the paraglider (**CF1**). Members' attention turned to examine whether the P68 pilot had been able to utilise their EC equipment to further build on their generic situational awareness, however, it was

[2] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.
[3] (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(3) Overtaking.

determined that, although the paraglider pilot had been carrying a GPS, it had not had any EC capability and therefore had been incompatible with the equipment on the P68 (**CF2**). Members discussed that paragliders can be difficult to visually acquire and the Board agreed that, although the P68 pilot had been able to acquire the paraglider, it had been at a later than optimum time (**CF3**).

Next, members discussed the actions of the paraglider pilot and the Board was grateful to them for supplying their GPS data file to the Secretariat. The Board noted that the pilot had been carrying a VHF radio and that it had been turned off; a discussion followed regarding the practicalities of using such equipment once airborne, which included the possible impact on the pilot's ability to hear approaching aircraft. Because the paraglider pilot had heard the approaching P68, the Board agreed that they had been able to build generic situational awareness of its presence prior to sighting it (**CF1**). However, members agreed that the paraglider pilot had visually acquired the P68 at a late stage (**CF3**). The Board wished to encourage paraglider pilots, when practical, to inform local ATSUs and airfields of their location and duration of activity, and a paraglider pilot member went on to add that it is also helpful for pilots of other aircraft to inform ATSUs when they observe paragliding activity, all of which facilitates the promulgation of this information to other airspace users.

Finally, the Board considered the collision risk involved in this Airprox. Members noted that the pilots of both aircraft had had an awareness of the presence of the other however they had both become visual with the other aircraft at a later than optimum stage. The P68 pilot had been able to take action to further increase separation and, although safety had been degraded, members were satisfied that there had been no risk of collision. Consequently, the Board assigned a Risk Category C to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2022105			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Flight Elements			
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
1	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
2	Technical	• ACAS/TCAS System Failure	An event involving the system which provides information to determine aircraft position and is primarily independent of ground installations	Incompatible CWS equipment
	• See and Avoid			
3	Human Factors	• Identification/ Recognition	Events involving flight crew not fully identifying or recognising the reality of a situation	Late sighting by one or both pilots

Degree of Risk: C

Safety Barrier Assessment[4]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **partially effective** because both pilots had only had generic awareness of the presence of the other; the P68 pilot from the ATIS they had copied, and the paraglider pilot as a result of hearing the approaching P68.

[4] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the paraglider pilot had not had any EC equipment compatible with that carried by the P68 pilot.

See and Avoid were assessed as **partially effective** because, although both pilots had become visual with the other aircraft, it had been at a later than optimum stage.