


AIRPROX REPORT No 2023160

Date: 26 Jul 2023 Time: ~1009Z Position: 5138N 00222W Location: 1NM SW of Wotton-under-Edge

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	Pioneer 300	Jabiru
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	N/R
Service	AFIS	N/R
Provider	Kemble	N/R
Altitude/FL	A026	N/R
Transponder	A, C, S	None
Reported		Not reported
Colours	Red/Silver	
Lighting	Nil	
Conditions	VMC	
Visibility	>10km	
Altitude/FL	2200ft	
Altimeter	QFE (995hPa)	
Heading	~080°	
Speed	110kt	
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	
Alert	N/A	
Separation at CPA		
Reported	30ft V/30m H	NR V/NR H
Recorded	Not Recorded	



THE PIONEER PILOT reports that they had been flying to [destination airfield] from [departure airfield] via the old Severn bridge and had already contacted Kemble tower [whilst] over the bridge. Near Wotton-under-Edge they noticed an aircraft in front of them with about 5sec notice. The Pioneer pilot banked about 30° to starboard to avoid the [oncoming] aircraft, as they did this the other pilot saw their aircraft [they believed] and banked to starboard too.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as ‘High’.

THE JABIRU PILOT declined to report.

THE KEMBLE AFISO reports that they had been providing the Flight Information Service when the Pioneer had been inbound. The AFISO confirmed that no mention of an Airprox had been made from the pilot on the RT. They have listened to the recording to confirm this. The AFISO has since spoken to the Operations team and became aware that, while booking in, the pilot referred to being involved in an Airprox. The AFISO believed the pilot mentioned this as they believed the aircraft may have departed Kemble, as it had been travelling west. The AFISO had looked at the flight strips from the day’s movements and none booked out west in the timeframe, and none in their opinion could have been mistaken for a Jabiru.

Factual Background

The weather at Bristol was recorded as follows:

METAR EGGD 260950Z AUTO 19008KT 150V230 9999 NCD 16/09 Q1013=

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat




Figure 1 – CPA ~1009. White cross indicates reported position of Airprox

The Pioneer and Jabiru pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.¹ If the incident geometry is considered as head-on or nearly so then both pilots were required to turn to the right.²

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a Pioneer and a Jabiru flew into proximity at Wotton-under-Edge at around 1009Z on Wednesday 26th July 2023. The Pioneer pilot was operating under VFR in VMC and in receipt of an Aerodrome Flight Information Service from Kemble. The Jabiru pilot declined to contribute to the Airprox process.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of a report from the Pioneer pilot, radar photographs/video recordings and a report from the AFISO involved. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board firstly discussed the actions of the Pioneer pilot, noting that they had had an active transponder and had communicated with the AFISO at Kemble to ensure the best possible situational awareness for themselves and others in the area. Members did note that the Pioneer had been operating without an active TAS unit and opined that such equipment helps to raise awareness for others; they noted that the financial support package for the purchase of such equipment will remain in place until the end of March 2024 and encouraged all to take advantage of that where possible. The Board concluded that a lack of received radio calls and electronic emissions meant that the Pioneer pilot had not had any situational awareness of the Jabiru (**CF2**) and that only a fortunate late-sighting (**CF3**) and concern for their proximity (**CF4**) had enabled avoiding action to have been taken.

Turning to the actions of the Jabiru pilot, members were disappointed that the pilot had declined to contribute to the Airprox process and wished to remind all those operating within the UK FIR that the

¹ UK Reg (EU) SERA.3205 Proximity..

² UK Reg (EU) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(1) Approaching head-on..

role of the UK Airprox Board is to collate the evidence, assess and report the circumstances, contributory factors and risks of collision for all Airprox occurrences in UK airspace. The Board will then communicate its findings, lessons identified and associated recommendations to relevant sections of the UK aviation regulatory and operating organisations and the broader aviation communities. The sole objective of the UKAB is to enhance air safety in the UK. It is a fundamental tenet of the UKAB that the Board never apports blame or liability. In order to encourage an open and honest reporting environment, all reports are disidentified, and the names of companies or individuals are neither released nor published.

It is important that the Board is offered individual recollections of events to enable their work to fulfil the above role. For this reason, they do not share reports of other involved individuals, companies or service providers; rather, they ask for those who were involved in the event to offer through the Airprox reporting format, whatever narrative and supporting material (such as recordings, transcriptions, flight logs etc) they can.

The Board then moved on to consider the role of the Kemble AFISO, and members accepted that their contribution had been limited by the nature of the service being provided and the distance of the Pioneer from the airfield and felt there had been no more that they could have done in this situation.

When assessing the risk, members considered the reports from the Pioneer pilot, the AFISO involved and available radar replays. They noted that the separation between the 2 aircraft had been greatly reduced and that, although the Pioneer pilot reported that they had visually acquired the Jabiru at a late stage and believing that the Jabiru pilot had performed an avoidance manoeuvre at the same time as they had, members accepted that safety had been much reduced but that a risk of collision had remained (**CF5**). Accordingly, members assigned a Risk Category B to this Airprox.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2023160			
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
Ground Elements				
• Situational Awareness and Action				
1	Contextual	• Traffic Management Information Action	An event involving traffic management information actions	The ground element had only generic, late, no or inaccurate Situational Awareness
Flight Elements				
• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action				
2	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
• See and Avoid				
3	Human Factors	• Identification/ Recognition	Events involving flight crew not fully identifying or recognising the reality of a situation	Late sighting by one or both pilots
4	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft
• Outcome Events				
5	Contextual	• Near Airborne Collision with Aircraft	An event involving a near collision by an aircraft with an aircraft, balloon, dirigible or other piloted air vehicles	

Degree of Risk: B.

Safety Barrier Assessment³

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:


Ground Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action were assessed as **not used** because the Pioneer pilot had been operating outside the AOR of the Kemble AFISO.

Flight Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the Pioneer pilot had no Situational Awareness of the Jabiru.

See and Avoid were assessed as **partially effective** because the Pioneer pilot achieved only a late sighting of the Jabiru.



³ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).