AIRPROX REPORT No 2024026

Date: 27 Feb 2024 Time: 1602Z Position: 5109N 00146W Location: Boscombe Down (406ft)

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	PC21	DA42
Operator	MoD ATEC	Civ Comm
Airspace	Boscombe MATZ	Boscombe ATZ
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	ACS	Traffic
Provider	Boscombe Tower	Boscombe App
Altitude/FL	3100ft	2300ft
Transponder	A, C, S+	A, C, S+
Reported		
Colours	Red, white, blue	White, blue
Lighting	Nav, HISL, landing	Landing, taxi, nav, strobes
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	NR	>10km
Altitude/FL	2500ft	1800ft
Altimeter	NR (NR hPa)	QFE (NR hPa)
Heading	230°	050°
Speed	NR	130kt
ACAS/TAS	TAS	TAS
Alert	TA	TA
Separation at CPA		
Reported	500ft V/<0.5NM H	200ft V/1000m H
Recorded	800ft V/0.3NM H	



THE PC21 INSTRUCTOR reports flying a student conversion sortie from the rear seat, conducting circuits to RW23 and the circuit was clear. They had situational awareness that the flight checker (DA42) and 3 other ETPS fixed-wing aircraft were also airborne. Whilst halfway around the final turn for a normal circuit to RW23, they were instructed to 'go-around'. As the student conducted the go-around the instructor started looking for traffic on the multi-function displays and TCAS [sic]. Whilst climbing back to circuit height they were advised of the flight checker breaking off the approach for RW05. They questioned with ATC if the flight checker was now 'head-to-head' with them and the reply from ATC was for them to climb to 3000ft. The DA42 didn't display on the datalink and there was nothing on TCAS [sic]. As they started the climb the DA42 appeared on TCAS [sic] with an associated 'TRAFFIC, TRAFFIC' warning, approximately 1.5-2NM on the nose, 200ft above. As they were already climbing, the instructor took control to increase the rate of climb and they then saw the landing light of the DA42, which was co-altitude and within 1NM, both aircraft positioned over the runway pointing head-to-head. They were then told [by ATC] to disregard the climb and descend back to circuit height, but because they were now above the DA42, the instructor continued the climb, breaking left and away from the DA42. They reviewed the aircraft recorded data (HUD, voice, TCAS [sic], GPS position, datalink) post flight which confirmed their recollection of events.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE DA42 PILOT reports that on completion of the ILS calibration it was clear they did not have the fuel to complete the PAR, so as they positioned outbound for RW05 coverage work (range 15 miles, height 3500ft) a discussion was had between their ground assessor and the aircraft crew on how best to proceed. The aircraft was near the extended centreline for RW05 at approximately 8 miles. The ground assessor, after liaising with ATC, told the crew to start with accuracy work on RW05 so from a distance of around 8 miles the aircraft was positioned onto the centreline for the first approach. At

around 4 miles the controller asked the crew if they were inbound for a low approach and this was confirmed. Very shortly afterwards the pilot was asked to 'break off' and climb to height 2000ft. At this point they could see the PC21 on approach to the opposite [runway] end around about 700ft below and about 4 miles ahead. They remained visual with the PC21 throughout the next chain of events. At some point in the go-around, ATC told them to turn left heading 340°. As they were in the turn ATC then told them to 'disregard last'. As they again took up runway heading the PC21 was to the right of their nose, climbing rapidly through their level and about 1 mile ahead. They were comfortable that with this aircraft in sight there was no chance of a collision. As the PC21 passed down the right-hand side, about 200ft above and maybe half a mile away, they performed what they would describe as a slightly aggressive manoeuvre with a wing over and a circle behind the DA42. They put this down to an attempt by the PC21 pilot to show they had them in sight. The incident was discussed as a crew but because they had the PC21 visual at all times and were flying in good VFR conditions they had good reason to think the PC21 crew also had them visual and they felt further discussion was unnecessary.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'None'.

THE BOSCOMBE DOWN AERODROME CONTROLLER (ADC) reports they had a PC21 in the circuit [for RW23] and an RJ70 warned in for an instrument recovery. In the time they had been in position the calibrator DA42 had been making approaches to RW23 and they had been receiving phone calls from the Approach controller and the Supervisor as to the serial that the aircraft was flying next, in order to deconflict with circuit traffic. When the PC21 was turning final for their next approach to RW23, they looked at the ATM and noticed that the DA42 was about 5 miles out on RW05, looking like it was making an approach against the stream, which had not been warned in to them. They verbalised this in the VCR and the Ground controller stated that they would call the Approach Room to find out what was going on. At this point they broke the PC21 off and informed them of the DA42 on [approach to] RW05. They asked if it was head-to-head and they stated that it was. They heard the Ground controller issuing a 'call by 2' (delayed clearance) on the landline to the Approach Room. At this point the Aerodrome controller issued the PC21 a climb to 3000ft QFE because they felt this was the best option to remove them from the ATZ whilst still unaware of the intentions of the DA42 pilot, who looked to be following a profile against the stream. They then spoke to the Supervisor on the landline and asked if the climb to 3000ft QFE was 'ok' to which they said that it was not and that the calibrator was being broken off, so they informed the PC21 pilot to disregard and fly at circuit height. At the point that they saw the DA42 they could see the PC21 above it and asked them if they were visual. They stated that they were. Once clear, the PC21 pilot asked if they could return to circuit height which was approved.

THE BOSCOMBE DOWN APPROACH CONTROLLER reports they were working the calibrator aircraft (a DA42), an RJ70 inbound via radar and a Tutor that was general handling over D123. This was over 2 frequencies [UHF and VHF] that were cross-coupled. This was their first time working a calibrator aircraft and they were being talked through the procedure by the Supervisor. The DA42 pilot had been making approaches to RW23 and afterwards was going to be completing serials to RW05 at a range of 7-15NM, so there was no indication to the Approach controller that it would be making an approach to RW05. After it had climbed out from RW23 the [DA42 pilot] told them they would be holding at 2000ft. Previously, they had given a 'turning inbound call' when making approaches, and this gave the Aerodrome controller time to prepare, however this was not given. The Supervisor was busy taking phone calls at the time and when they noticed the calibrator it was approaching 4.5NM. They were given a 'call by 2' by the Aerodrome controller and then they were told by the Supervisor to break it off from the approach and climb the calibrator to 2000ft. They turned it to 340° when level to get it away from the PC21 in the circuit. After this, the aircraft was vectored for further approaches to RW23 without incident and then landed to refuel.

THE BOSCOMBE DOWN SUPERVISOR reports they were in the Approach Control Room (ACR) at the time of the occurrence, monitoring and deconflicting station flying with the flight calibration of the Boscombe ILS (RW23) and PAR (RW05 and RW23). During the afternoon, they were utilizing the flight calibration to guide and instruct the Approach controller on calibration procedures, which they had not previously seen. Having completed the ILS flight check of RW23 without incident, it was agreed the calibration aircraft would climb-out straight ahead and complete the range work for PAR RW05. However, having been delayed from a previous task and due to time and fuel constraints, they

discussed completing the runs to touchdown first for both runways, then land for a refuel before completing the range work. At this point no clearance had been passed to the pilot of the calibrator aircraft to turn inbound against the stream. They had not yet briefed the control team of the potential change to the original plan, believing the [DA42] was holding 10NM to the southwest of Boscombe. At this time, they accepted a phone call from one of the [base aircraft] operators regarding an instrument flying sortie that required an ILS approach, which had been turned down twice because the ILS had not yet been handed back to ATC. At the time, they believed that this was a further call attempting to arrange the required ILS, however, the call was to discuss why it was not possible to conduct the ILS and was therefore not urgent or operational and kept as brief as possible. The result of taking the call was a reduction in situational awareness and, on completion of the call, they checked on the calibration flight and noticed the DA42 was approaching 4 miles for RW05 with a PC21 in the circuit for RW23 that appeared to be turning final. They instructed the Approach controller to break-off the calibrator and climb the DA42 to 2000ft QFE and informed the Aerodrome controller (ADC) of this. The DA42 was then re-positioned for RW23, completed the calibration of the RW23 PAR and landed without further incident. Without the requirement to take the phone call they would have noticed the calibrator turn inbound at 10NM and would have instructed [the Approach controller] to ascertain the intentions of the calibrator. They would then have briefed the control team of the updated plan for the check. With numerous aircraft operating at the time to RW23 they would have organised the calibration of RW23 PAR first and then, as traffic levels reduced, have arranged for the check of RW05. Both pilots were visual with each other and the calibrator was visual at approximately 4NM with the PC21. They believed there was no risk to the aircraft involved colliding; loss of safe separation and a possible Airprox as the worst case scenario.

The supervisor perceived the severity of the incident as 'Medium'.

Factual Background

The weather at Boscombe Down was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGDM 271620Z 23009KT 9999 FEW020 BKN026 BKN040 08/04 Q1019 BECMG BKN020 RMK BLU
BECMG WHT=
METAR EGDM 271550Z 23008KT 9999 FEW020 SCT029 BKN040 08/04 Q1019 BECMG SCT020 RMK BLU
BECMG WHT=
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Analysis and Investigation

Military ATM

An Airprox occurred on 27 Feb 24 at approximately 1610 UTC, within the MOD Boscombe Down visual circuit. The PC21 was conducting a routine training sortie conducting visual circuits to RW23 in receipt of an Aerodrome Control Service from the Boscombe Down Aerodrome controller. The DA42 was conducting a MOD Boscombe Down flight check in receipt of a Traffic Service from the Boscombe Down Approach controller.

Utilising occurrence reports and information from the local investigation, outlined below are the key events that preceded the Airprox. Where available they are supported by screenshots to indicate the positions of the relevant aircraft at each stage. The screenshots are taken from NATS radar recordings and therefore may not present the exact radar presentation of the aircraft observed by both the controllers and Supervisor. Separation data is derived from the NATS radar data. The DA42 is not displayed by NATS radar for the entirety of the period preceding the Airprox with a gap between 1601:00 and 1601:32.

During the period preceding the Airprox, the DA42 pilot had been conducting flight checking to RW23. The Boscombe Down Approach controller, having not experienced flight checking activity before, was utilising the flight checking guide and being supported by the Boscombe Down Supervisor. On completion of the RW23 activity, an agreement was made between the Boscombe Down Supervisor, Boscombe Down Approach controller and Flight Checking Ground Assessor that the DA42 would depart straight ahead to commence outer flight checking serials for RW05.

At 1552:18, the DA42 pilot reported going around from the final RW23 flight checking element. As per the agreed plan, the DA42 pilot was instructed to *"climb runway track to height two thousand feet".* During the climb out it was identified between the DA42 crew and Flight Checking Ground Assessor that an amendment was required to the plan as a result of fuel limitations. The DA42 pilot therefore established in a holding pattern at 2000ft, 8NM to 10NM from the airfield in the RW05 approach. The Flight Checking Ground Assessor and Boscombe Down Supervisor then discussed potential options of completing the inner flight checking serials for RW05 first. Instead of the planned outer flight checking serials, which would have consisted of serials between 15NM and approximately 8NM in the RW05 approach, the amendment to the inner flight checking serials required approaches to the RW05 threshold.

With no approval provided to the Flight Checking Ground Assessor for inner flight checking serials to commence, and the Boscombe Down Approach controller therefore not briefed regarding the DA42's next serial, the Boscombe Down Supervisor received a phone call. Expecting the phone call to be related to the ongoing flight checking activity, they elected to answer at 1553:30. The phone call, whilst related to the flight checking activity, was actually regarding facilitation of a sortie planned later for the day and resulted in a second call initiated immediately after ending at 1558:56. As a follow-on from the conversation with the Flight Checking Ground Assessor, the Boscombe Down Supervisor called Boscombe Down Operations at 1559:12 to arrange a refuel and to update onward intentions. The phone call ended at 1600:09.

During the period of these phone calls, and unaware of the discussions regarding a change of intentions for the DA42, the Boscombe Down Approach controller provided the DA42 pilot with own navigation on two occasions, at 1554:35 and at 1555:28. However the DA42 pilot confirmed their intentions at 1557:35 with "*we are holding current position at two thousand*". Whilst unable to identify a precise timing, the DA42 can be confirmed as established on an inbound profile to RW05 at 1559:15.



Figure 1 (1600:17): DA42 commences RW05 approach.
(DA42 5.3NM from Boscombe Down overhead)

At 1600:17, following a discussion within the Boscombe Down Visual Control Room, the Boscombe Down Ground controller called the Boscombe Down Supervisor to ascertain the intentions of the DA42 pilot. The Boscombe Down Supervisor informed the Boscombe Down Ground controller that the DA42 pilot was conducting a RW05 approach. Simultaneously the Boscombe Down Approach controller contacted the DA42 pilot to confirm their intention; *"are you flying through at this time?".* The DA42 pilot responded "*Affirm, fly through to go around gear up please*". The Boscombe Down Aerodrome controller, unsure of the DA42 pilot's intentions, instructed the PC21 pilot to break off their approach at 1600:42.

Realising that the Boscombe Down Aerodrome controller had not been notified of the DA42 pilot's RW05 approach, the Boscombe Down Supervisor instructed the Boscombe Down Approach controller to break off the DA42. At 1600:55, the Boscombe Down Aerodrome controller passed this instruction to the DA42 pilot, "*break off the approach, climb to height two thousand feet*". The DA42 pilot acknowledged the break-off instruction and commenced a climb to 2000ft QFE.

At 1601:02, the Boscombe Down Supervisor informed the Boscombe Down Aerodrome controller via the radar clearance line that the DA42 was breaking off. The Boscombe Down Aerodrome controller subsequently relayed this information to the PC21 pilot within the visual circuit through a broadcast.



Figure 2 (1601:24): PC21 instructed to climb to 3000ft QFE.

The PC21 pilot acknowledged the broadcast call and requested confirmation that the DA42 was climbing to 2000ft QFE. The Boscombe Down Aerodrome controller confirmed the DA42's height and then, at 1601:24, instructed the PC21 pilot to climb to 3000ft QFE, which the PC21 pilot acknowledged. The decision to climb the PC21 was based upon an assumption that whilst the DA42 was potentially approaching the out of use runway, the most suitable course of action was to climb the PC21 out of the visual circuit environment.



Figure 3 (1601:44): PC21 instructed to maintain circuit height.

At 1601:29, the Boscombe Down Supervisor called the Boscombe Down Aerodrome controller but was still talking in person with the Boscombe Down Approach controller. Therefore, the Boscombe Down Supervisor's instruction regarding the DA42 of "*Get him climbing, once he's level 2000ft then turn him outbound*" was heard by both the Boscombe Down Aerodrome and Approach controllers but only meant for the Boscombe Down Approach controller. This caused the Boscombe Down Aerodrome controller to confirm their in-action plan of climbing the PC21 to 3000ft with the Boscombe Down Supervisor. Aware of the head-to-head nature, the Boscombe Down Supervisor corrected the Boscombe Down Aerodrome controller, who subsequently instructed the PC21 pilot to maintain circuit height at 1601:44.



Figure 4 (1602:26). CPA.

CPA occurred at 1602:06 and was recorded as 0.1NM horizontal and 800ft vertical separation.

The local investigation conducted by MOD Boscombe Down identified the event outcome as a loss of safe separation between two non-cooperating aircraft with the cause being the DA42 conducting the RW05 inner flight checking serials without ATC approval. Several BM-related causal/aggravating factor were identified, with recommendations identified where suitable:

The Boscombe Down Supervisor, whilst managing the plan to facilitate the amended flight checking serials, became distracted by a lower priority landline call delaying the required approvals and controller briefing. When combined with the aspect that the Boscombe Down Supervisor was providing an increased level of support to the Boscombe Down Approach controller, this exacerbated the issue. Recommendation: Engagement with Flying Sqns to direct non-flight safety landline calls to the Air Traffic Control switchboard and not directly to the Supervisor, to prevent non-essential calls and minimise the likelihood of distraction.

The DA42 pilot assumed they were approved to commence the RW05 inner flight checking serials based on an incorrect assumption between themselves and the Flight Checking Ground Assessor. With the Boscombe Down Supervisor engaged with the landline call and Boscombe Down Approach controller not briefed on the plan, this incorrect assumption was not corrected. Recommendation: Local orders updated to ensure that an additional controller is rostered/available during flight checking activity to provide a dedicated liaison function independent of the Supervisor.

On amendment of the flight checking plan, the Boscombe Down Supervisor established a suitable plan to facilitate the flight checking activity. With no approval given to commence the RW05 inner flight checking serials by either the Boscombe Down Approach controller to the DA42 pilot or the Boscombe Down Supervisor to the Flight Checking Ground Assessor, the assumption that the DA42 pilot would remain established in their holding pattern was a valid assumption. Expecting the landline call to be a relevant call the Boscombe Down Supervisor was correct in answering the call, equally

based on the assumption the DA42 pilot would continue holding, there was no reason to end the call prematurely. The Boscombe Down Supervisor's first action following the non-priority landline call, to contact Boscombe Down Operations, was the first step in enabling the amended plan. With the next steps being to inform both the Boscombe Down Aerodrome and Approach controllers, only then would the DA42 be cleared to commence the RW05 inner flight checking serials. As the DA42 commenced the serials without receiving this clearance it resulted in a lack of awareness for all parties involved.

On identification of the proximity of the DA42 and PC21, both the Boscombe Down Aerodrome controller and Boscombe Down Approach controller/Supervisor made suitable decisions to increase the level of anticipated separation between the DA42 and PC21. Unfortunately, when combined, the actions decreased the vertical separation with the PC21 being instructed to climb through the cleared level of the DA42 following its break-off. This was further exacerbated when the Boscombe Down Supervisor instructed the Boscombe Down Aerodrome controller to keep the PC21 at circuit height. With the PC21 having already climbed above the DA42, the descent to circuit height put the PC21 back through the DA42's level. In isolation, all of these decisions were suitable; however, as no controller had full awareness of each other's plan or the DA42 and PC21's actual position, it was difficult to identify suitable deconfliction.

Overall, the action of the DA42 pilot to commence the RW05 inner flight check serials without positive clearance from the Boscombe Down Approach controller significantly degraded the usual barriers to prevent opposite direction approaches.

UKAB Secretariat

The PC21 and DA42 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[1] An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation.[2]

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a PC21 and a DA42 flew into proximity at Boscombe Down at 1602Z on Tuesday 27th February 2024. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, the PC21 pilot in receipt of a military Aerodrome Control Service from Boscombe Tower and the DA42 pilot in receipt of a Traffic Service from Boscombe Approach.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, reports from the air traffic controllers involved and reports from the appropriate operating authorities. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board members first discussed the Airprox from the Boscombe Down ATSU viewpoint. The flight checking DA42 crew had completed some of their planned work and, due to their low fuel state, had decided to modify the plan, which had involved an approach to RW05 with RW23 being the active runway and with a PC21 in the visual circuit. The revised plan had required ATSU coordination, which the Supervisor had been in the process of achieving when they had answered the telephone to what transpired to have been a call that had served only to distract them from their coordination activities. At about the same time, the DA42 pilot had commenced an approach to RW05, which the Approach controller had seen and to which they had issued a go-around instruction, but by which time the PC21 pilot had seen the approaching DA42 and had elected to climb out of the visual circuit in order to take avoiding action. Members felt that the seeds of the Airprox had essentially been sown by the lack of coordination between the Supervisor, Approach controller, Flight Checking Ground Assessor and DA42

[1] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity. MAA RA 2307 paragraphs 1 and 2.
[2] (UK) SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome. MAA RA 2307 paragraph 17.

pilot (**CF1**), in the main due to the telephone call received by the Supervisor (which they had not known had been non-essential at the time) and their subsequent distraction from the task in hand (**CF5**). The final element had been that the DA42 pilot had commenced an approach to RW05 (**CF9**) without asking for (**CF8**) or receiving clearance to do so (**CF7**). Board members discussed the way in which flight checking activities were conducted and acknowledged that operations were usually carried out at a high tempo. Nonetheless, it was incumbent upon those taking part that the operational task was conducted with due deference to potential safety issues. The Approach controller had reasonably expected the DA42 pilot to remain in their holding position (**CF4**) and, with another aircraft on radar approach to RW23, had consequently seen the DA42 pilot's approach to RW05 at a late stage (**CF2**). Once both the Approach and Aerodrome controllers had assimilated the conflict they had issued avoiding action (**CF6**) which, with prior coordination not possible, had unfortunately resulted in a further erosion of separation (**CF3**) until the PC21 instructor had taken control and used their aircraft's performance to climb rapidly out of conflict. Turning to the pilots, the PC21 pilot in the RW23 visual circuit had had no situational awareness of the DA42 on an approach to RW05 (**CF10**) until about the time when the DA42 pilot had started their go-around and the DA42 pilot had had only generic situational awareness of the PC21 in the RW23 visual circuit (**CF10**). Both pilots had received TAS alerts (**CF11**) and the DA42 pilot had remained visual with the PC21 from a range of about 4NM. Although the PC21 pilot had seen the DA42 at a late stage (**CF12**) and had been concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft (**CF13**), the Board felt that the early visual sighting by the DA42 pilot, the PC21 instructor's avoiding action and the degree of separation at CPA, had resulted in a situation where risk of collision had been averted, Risk C.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2024026			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Ground Elements			
	• Situational Awareness and Action			
1	Human Factors	• ATM Coordination	Coordination related issues (external as well as internal)	
2	Human Factors	• Conflict Detection - Detected Late	An event involving the late detection of a conflict between aircraft	
3	Human Factors	• Conflict Resolution-Inadequate	An event involving the inadequate provision of conflict resolution	
4	Human Factors	• Expectation/ Assumption	Events involving an individual or a crew/ team acting on the basis of expectation or assumptions of a situation that is different from the reality	
5	Human Factors	• Task Monitoring	Events involving an individual or a crew/ team not appropriately monitoring their performance of a task	Controller engaged in other tasks
6	Human Factors	• Traffic Management Information Provision	An event involving traffic management information provision	The ANS instructions contributed to the Airprox
	Flight Elements			
	• Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance			
7	Human Factors	• Use of policy/Procedures	Events involving the use of the relevant policy or procedures by flight crew	Regulations and/or procedures not complied with
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
8	Human Factors	• Accuracy of Communication	Events involving flight crew using inaccurate communication - wrong or incomplete information provided	Ineffective communication of intentions
9	Human Factors	• Action Performed Incorrectly	Events involving flight crew performing the selected action incorrectly	Incorrect or ineffective execution
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
10	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			

11	Contextual	• Other warning system operation	An event involving a genuine warning from an airborne system other than TCAS.	
	• See and Avoid			
12	Human Factors	• Identification/ Recognition	Events involving flight crew not fully identifying or recognising the reality of a situation	Late sighting by one or both pilots
13	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment[3]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Ground Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because Boscombe ATC personnel were unaware of the DA42 pilot commencing an approach to RW05.

Flight Elements:

Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance were assessed as **partially effective** because the DA42 pilot commenced an approach without clearance from ATC.

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **ineffective** because the DA42 pilot commenced an approach to RW05 without declaring their intentions.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the PC21 pilot had no situational awareness of the approaching DA42.



[3] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.