AIRPROX REPORT No 2024107

Date: 02 Jun 2024 Time: ~1113Z Position: 5209N 00128W Location: 1.7NM NW Shenington

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	BE18	Unknown
Operator	Civ FW	Civ Gld
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Basic	Unknown
Provider	London Info	NR
Altitude/FL	2200ft	NR
Transponder	A, C, S	Not observed
Reported		Not reported
Colours	White/orange	
Lighting	Nav, strobes, beacon	
Conditions	VMC	
Visibility	>10km	
Altitude/FL	2200ft	
Altimeter	QNH (NK hPa)	
Heading	'easterly'	
Speed	128kt	
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	
Alert	N/A	
Separation at CPA		
Reported	'close' V/0m H	NR
Recorded	NK	



THE BE18 PILOT reports that whilst dealing with a declared emergency they glanced between the left engine nacelle and fuselage and saw the right wing of a glider pass beneath from right-to-left. They were not sure of the degree of separation, but it was close. They did not look for further details because they were dealing with a far more pressing issue.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE GLIDER PILOT could not be traced.

THE LONDON INFORMATION FISO reports that the BE18 pilot declared an engine failure at approximately 1112 and that they wanted to divert to Coventry. They asked the pilot to squawk 7700 and then imposed silence on the frequency. Although the pilot had not declared a PAN, they were unsure as to how the situation would develop. They phoned D&D whilst their colleague attempted to phone Coventry and, during the phone call, the BE18 pilot said that they had got the engine restarted and would continue on to [their planned destination]. [An Airprox was not declared on frequency].

Factual Background

The weather at Birmingham and Brize Norton was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGBB 021120Z 32010KT 300V360 9999 FEW040 19/09 Q1028=
METAR EGBB 021050Z 33008KT 280V360 CAVOK 19/09 Q1028=

METAR EGVN 021120Z 36009KT 9999 FEW037 20/10 Q1027 NOSIG RMK BLU BLU=
METAR EGVN 021050Z 36012KT 9999 FEW034 20/12 Q1028 NOSIG RMK BLU BLU=
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Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

The BE18 and glider pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard [1]. The estimated time of Airprox was derived from the BE18 pilot declaring an emergency at 1112:11 and declaring 'ops normal' at 1114:30.

Summary of NATS Ltd Occurrence Investigation

The UK Airprox Board notified Safety Investigations that the pilot of [BE18 C/S] reported an Airprox with a suspected glider whilst receiving a service from London Information. A London FISO report had already been received regarding an aircraft emergency involving [BE18 C/S] coincident with the time and position of the pilot reported Airprox. A confliction was not reported on the London Information frequency.

London Information was operating in a split configuration with the London Information FISO West (LFISOW) operating the West and North frequencies, with another FISO present operating the east frequency. [BE18 C/S] was a Beech BE18 twin-engine from [departure airfield], inbound to [destination airfield]. The pilot was receiving a Basic Service from London Information. At 1112:11 (all times UTC), the pilot of [BE18 C/S] reported "*we've bit of a problem here, we're just south of Wellesbourne, we've lost an engine, we need to route into Coventry*."

The CA4114 from the LFISOW stated *'I asked the aircraft to squawk 7700 and then imposed silence on the frequency. Although the aircraft hadn't declared a PAN, I was unsure how the situation would develop.'* London Centre was informed of the details, however, prior to notification to Coventry Tower, the pilot of [BE18 C/S] reported at 1114:30 "*we are now operations normal, continuing en-route*." The LFISOW confirmed the onward routeing to [destination] and instructed the pilot to re-select squawk 1177.

The pilot of [BE18 C/S] did not report a confliction on the London Information frequency.

Figure 1



Figure 2

Review of NODE radar displayed [BE18 C/S] make some unusual manoeuvres at 1111:14 and 1111:42 (Figure 2). From the timing of the RT-reported engine failure, it was presumed that these manoeuvres occurred due to this technical issue, as the pilot report stated no form of avoiding action was taken.

[1] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.



Figure 3

Radar displayed no primary or secondary contacts on NODE radar replay that correlated with the pilot's reported confliction, therefore a closest point of approach could not be established (Figure 3).

A further significant manoeuvre was observed at 1114:58 (Figure 4), although this may have been a turn to coincide with the pilot's decision to change direction from Coventry, back to [destination].



Figure 4

Conclusions and RAT Assessment

The Airprox occurred when the pilot of [BE18 C/S] changed track to divert to Coventry as a result of a reported engine failure. This track took [BE18 C/S] to the north of the Shenington Gliding site. The pilot Airprox report stated the conflicting aircraft was a glider.

The confliction was not reported on the London Information frequency, and no primary or secondary contacts were visible on NODE radar replay. Therefore, a Closest Point of Approach could not be established.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a BE18 and an unidentified glider flew into proximity at a position surmised to be about 2NM northwest of Shenington gliding site at about 1113Z on Sunday 2nd June 2024. Both pilots were operating in VMC, the BE18 pilot under VFR in receipt of a Basic Service from London Information and the glider pilot likely under VFR but not in receipt of a FIS.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of a report from the BE18 pilot, radar photographs/video recordings and a report from the FISO involved. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board agreed that without the glider pilot's narrative it was not possible to make an accurate assessment of the risk of collision, Risk D. Members agreed that the following contributory factors had pertained:

CF1: The London FISO was not required to monitor the BE18 under a Basic Service.

CF2: The BE18 pilot had had no situational awareness on the glider and the glider pilot likely also no situational awareness on the BE18.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2024107			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Ground Elements			
	• Situational Awareness and Action			
1	Contextual	• ANS Flight Information Provision	Provision of ANS flight information	The ATCO/FISO was not required to monitor the flight under a Basic Service
	Flight Elements			
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
2	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness

Degree of Risk: D.

Safety Barrier Assessment[2]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Ground Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action were assessed as **not used** because the London FISO was not required to monitor the BE18 under a Basic Service.

Flight Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the BE18 pilot had no situational awareness of the glider and the glider pilot likely also had no situational awareness of the BE18.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **not assessable** because the glider EC could not be established.

See and Avoid were assessed as **not assessable** because the it could not be established whether the glider pilot saw and avoided the BE18.

[2] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.


Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2024107
Outside Controlled Airspace
Barrier
Provision
Application
Effectiveness
Barrier Weighting
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
Ground Element
Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance
Manning & Equipment
Situational Awareness of the Confliction & Action
Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance
Flight Element
Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance
Tactical Planning and Execution
Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action
Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance
See & Avoid
Key:
Full
Partial
None
Not Present/Not Assessable
Not Used
Provision
Application
Effectiveness