Assessment Summary Sheet
Contributory factor assessment for each assessed Airprox can be downloaded.
Total | Risk A | Risk B | Risk C | Risk D | Risk E |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
9 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 0 | 1 |
Airprox | Aircraft 1 (Type) | Aircraft 2 (Type) | Airspace (Class) | ICAO Risk |
---|---|---|---|---|
2020146 | AW169 (HEMS) | PA28 (Civ FW) | London FIR (G) | A |
2020147 | ASK21 (Civ Gld) | PA28 (Civ FW) | Middle Wallop ATZ (G) | C |
2020162 | Voyager (HQ Air Ops) | Typhoon (2) (HQ Air Ops) | London FIR (G) | C |
2020163 | S92 (Civ Comm) | EC175 (Civ Comm) | Aberdeen CTR (D) | E |
2020164 | EV97 Eurostar (Civ FW) | A-22 Foxbat (Civ FW) | Scottish FIR (G) | C |
2020165 | Wildcat (RN) | Merlin (HQ JHC) | Merryfield ATZ (G) | C |
2020166 | DA42(A) (Civ FW) | Jupiter (Civ Comm) | London FIR (G) | B |
2020167 | RV9 (Civ FW) | Phenom (HQ Air Trg) | London FIR (G) | C |
Recommendation: The CAA conducts a review to establish the reasons behind why many training airfields chose not to maintain their ATZ when the requirement to hold an aerodrome licence to conduct training activity was removed. Where those reasons fall within the competency of the CAA – take appropriate action to mitigate against any increase in risk associated with the removal of the protection previously afforded to them (by an ATZ). | ||||
2020168 | Nova Mentor 4 (Civ Hang) | Jodel D117 (Civ FW) | London FIR (G) | C |
Consolidated Drone/Balloon/Model/Unknown Object Summary Sheet
Contributory factor assessment for each Drone/Balloon/Model/Unknown Object Airprox can be downloaded.
Total | Risk A | Risk B | Risk C | Risk D | Risk E |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
Airprox Number | Date Time (UTC) |
Aircraft (Operator) |
Object | Location [1] Description/ Altitude |
Airspace (Class) |
Pilot/Controller Report Reported Separation Reported Risk |
Comments/ Risk Statement | ICAO Risk |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2021007 |
18 Feb 21 1537 |
DA40 (Civ FW) |
Unk Obj |
5216N 00044W Wellingborough 2500ft |
London FIR (G) |
The DA40 pilot reports that they were performing a VFR navigation training flight and were on a leg tracking towards Grafton Underwood. Just 1NM to the south of Wellingborough town, while performing standard lookout, they spotted the UAV closing fast, to the left and slightly below the nose at a range of about 100m. They performed a steep right-hand climbing turn but, by the time they had begun climbing away, the UAV was already abeam their left wing and slightly below. The UAV was 1-1.5m across, grey/silver in colour and with no visible markings or lighting. Immediately afterwards they informed Cranfield approach and passed the location of the incident. There was no NOTAM informing of UAV activity in that area active at the time. Reported Separation: 50ft V/50m H Reported Risk of Collision: High The Cranfield controller reports that the [DA40] pilot was under a Basic Service and reported a UAV passing down their left-hand side in a north-to-south direction. They reported their position as 2NM north of Wellingborough at 2500ft. |
In the Board’s opinion the reported altitude and/or description of the object were such that they were unable to determine the nature of the unknown object. Applicable Contributory Factors: 4 Risk: The Board considered that the pilot’s overall account of the incident portrayed a situation where although safety had been reduced, there had been no risk of collision. |
C |
2021010 |
4 Jan 21 1015 |
A330 (CAT) |
Unk Obj |
5128N 00025W Heathrow 1500ft |
London CTR (D) |
The A330 pilot reports that on departure from LHR RW09R, passing 1500ft, the crew noticed a drone of approx. 50cm diameter pass about 20ft from the flight deck, above and to the right. It was reported to ATC and the flight continued without further incident. Reported Separation: 20ft V/0m H Reported Risk of Collision: Not reported |
In the Board’s opinion the reported altitude and/or description of the object were such that they were unable to determine the nature of the unknown object. Applicable Contributory Factors: 4, 6 Risk: The Board considered that the pilot’s overall account of the incident portrayed a situation where providence had played a major part in the incident and/or a definite risk of collision had existed. |
A |
[1] Latitude and Longitude are usually only estimates that are based on the reported time of occurrence mapped against any available radar data for the aircraft’s position at that time. Because such reported times may be inaccurate, the associated latitudes and longitudes should therefore not be relied upon as precise locations of the event.