AIRPROX REPORT No 2024209

Date: 04 Aug 2024 Time: ~1254Z Position: 5127N 00145W Location: 2NM NW Marlborough

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	Ikarus	Paraglider
Operator	Civ FW	Civ Hang
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	None	NK
Altitude/FL	~1925ft	NK
Transponder	A, C, S[1]	None
Reported		Not reported
Colours	White	
Lighting	Strobe	
Conditions	VMC	
Visibility	NR	
Altitude/FL	3000ft	
Altimeter	QNH (1016hPa)	
Heading	200°	
Speed	70kt	
ACAS/TAS	SafeSky	
Alert	Information	
Separation at CPA		
Reported	100ft V/100m H	NR
Recorded	NK	



THE IKARUS PILOT'S INSTRUCTOR reports that their student had been on a solo cross-country navigation exercise, climbing to 3000ft to avoid thermals. After noticing an alert on their [EC device], they saw a yellow-and-black paraglider. They dived sharply and turned left to avoid.

[The Ikarus pilot's instructor confirmed the time and location of the Airprox.]

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE PARAGLIDER PILOT could not be traced.

Factual Background

The weather at Brize Norton was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGVN 041250Z 24004KT 9999 SCT034 BKN250 20/11 Q1015 NOSIG RMK BLU BLU
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Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken. At the reported time of the Airprox, an aircraft was observed approximately 5.5NM south-west of the reported Airprox location heading 260° with the Mode S hex-code for the Ikarus. This aircraft was discounted from further analysis.

[1] The Ikarus was not observed on the radar replay at the time of CPA, but was subsequently observed on radar with a Mode S hex-code for an unrelated aircraft.

Another aircraft (not observed on the radar replay at the time of the reported Airprox) was observed by reference to ADS-B data at the reported Airprox location, at the reported time of the Airprox and heading 200° (Figure 1). An ADS-B signal from that aircraft matched the registration of the Ikarus. This is the aircraft that was assessed to have been involved in the Airprox although was subsequently observed on the radar replay with a Mode S hex-code for the other unrelated aircraft.

Figure 1 – 1254 (ADS-B data)

Some limited primary-only returns appeared sporadically on the radar replay in the minute before CPA. However, none of the returns could be identified. Despite extensive enquiries, the paraglider pilot could not be traced.

The separation at CPA could not be determined. The diagram was constructed from ADS-B data and the Ikarus pilot's report.

The Ikarus and paraglider pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[2]

Comments

AOPA

It is encouraging that more pilots are fitting electronic conspicuity devices to their aircraft. As can be seen in this instance, it assisted in the avoidance of a potential mid-air collision. It is widely recognised that paragliders are difficult to spot visually so an effective lookout scan should be used all the time.

BHPA

It is unfortunate that the paraglider pilot in this Airprox incident has not been traced nor, apparently, had informed anyone of what must have been a quite close encounter with a small aircraft. The BHPA believes that, with the wind direction that day, the paraglider pilot probably took off from one of three very popular free-flying sites about 8 miles to the south-west in the Vale of Pewsey. We suggest that the paraglider pilot was most probably carrying a FLARM or FANET+ enabled device which enabled their location to be displayed on the device in the other aircraft. We highly commend

[2] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

the student pilot for having such a device and for their timely reaction. Although there seems some confusion regarding which aircraft was transmitting the correct hex-code, the BHPA strongly recommends that all pilots keep a very good lookout when flying in uncontrolled airspace and to invest in a suitable EC device.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when an Ikarus and a paraglider flew into proximity 2NM north-west of Marlborough at approximately 1254Z on Sunday 4th August 2024. The Ikarus pilot was operating under VFR in VMC not in receipt of an ATS. The paraglider pilot could not be traced.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of a report from the Ikarus pilot's Instructor, radar photographs/video recordings and ADS-B track data. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the pilot of the Ikarus. It was noted that the Ikarus pilot's Instructor had supplied a narrative report of the incident on behalf of the Ikarus pilot, and members commented that it was unfortunate that only limited information had been provided. Notwithstanding, members proceeded with their discussion and focussed on the matter of electronic conspicuity (EC). Members noted that there had been some difficulty in the identification of the aircraft in the first instance and suggested that the transponder fitted to the Ikarus had been swapped with the transponder of another aircraft without the Mode S hex-code being changed. Nevertheless, members noted that the Ikarus had been fitted with an additional EC device which had provided an alert to the presence of the paraglider (**CF2**). Consequently, members agreed that the pilot of the Ikarus had gleaned situational awareness of the presence of the paraglider, albeit somewhat generic in nature (**CF1**), but which had augmented their lookout. Members noted that, upon visual acquisition of the paraglider, the pilot of the Ikarus had 'dived sharply and turned left to avoid'. That description indicated to members that the avoiding action had been necessarily abrupt, and noted that it had been consistent with the reported separation at CPA of 100ft vertically and 100m horizontally. Whilst a recorded measurement of the separation at CPA had not been available, members appreciated that to have sighted a paraglider at that distance had caused the Ikarus pilot concern (**CF3**).

Members next turned their attention to the actions of the pilot of the paraglider and agreed that it had been unfortunate that they could not be traced to have provided their perspective of the event. Notwithstanding, members commended them for having carried an EC device and noted that it had been (at least one-way) compatible with the EC device fitted to the Ikarus.

Concluding their discussion, members turned to the matter of the risk of collision that the encounter had presented. Some members declared that they believed insufficient information had been available with which to make a determination. A vote was conducted and an alternate view, that the encounter had presented no risk of collision, prevailed. Nevertheless, members were in full agreement that the proximity of the Ikarus and paraglider had reduced to an extent were safety had been compromised. The Board assigned Risk Category C to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2024209			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Flight Elements			
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
1	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness

	• **Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance**			
2	Contextual	• Other warning system operation	An event involving a genuine warning from an airborne system other than TCAS.	
	• **See and Avoid**			
3	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	~~Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement~~	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment[3]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **partially effective** because the pilot of the Ikarus had gleaned generic situational awareness of the presence of the paraglider.



[3] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.